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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1940s, computing technology has advanced rapidly.

With these

developments and the easy access to new technology, computers have become a weapon
of choice for many rogue individuals and states in their efforts to achieve their goals. In
response, cybersecurity has become a priority to governments and private organizations.
Modeling and simulation of cyberattacks can provide insights into the opportunities of an
aggressor to be successful and the measures a defender can take to increase security.
Understanding the threat and conduct of potential cyberattacks that can result from
simulating them may provide insights into how an attack could proceed and what might
be done to deter an attack before it starts or thwart an attack once it has begun. To fully
exploit the potential benefits of cyberattack simulation, the models should be
reconfigurable and reusable so that different types of cyberattacks can be simulated
without developing entirely new models for each type of cyberattack.
There have been multiple areas of research conducted to study security threats.
Cybersecurity research topics including modeling attacks on computer networks, malware
propagation using agent-based modeling, and using game theory to model attacker and
defender actions [Fanti, 2016] [Kotenko, 2015] [Jaisul, 2014]. Knowledge of cyberattacks
has been described as instrumental in designing secure software [Barnum, 2007]. Most
cyberattacks have been found to follow one of a set of patterns. In particular, MITRE
Corporation developed an online database called the Common Attack Patterns
1

Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC), which documents over 500 different attack
patterns, common attributes, goals, and mitigations [MITRE, 2017]. Each attack pattern
described in the CAPEC (version 3.1) database can be performed by an individual or
organization independently from any other attack. However, some of the attackers’ goals
can be achieved through different techniques, i.e., there is more than one way to attempt to
gain privileged information associated with a system or install malware. An attacker may
prefer to run one attack over another due to their own control of the process. However,
because the attacker has options, these must be considered. The attacker may also combine
two or more techniques or sections of an attack pattern, creating a new attack pattern to
improve the chances of success.
Consequently, effective simulation of cyberattacks cannot only use models based
on the attack patterns described in the CAPEC database, where each attack pattern is
described separately. Instead, it must be possible to select individual models of attack
patterns or models of particular techniques within the attack patterns and combine or
“compose” them into composite models that reflect the range of attack patterns and
techniques available to an attacker. Doing so will require a composition framework that
includes a metadata-based approach for selecting component models, operations and
modeling structures for composing them, and a software tool automating or semiautomating the process. The research project described in this dissertation introduces such
a framework with the context of a multi-project research program described in the next
section.

2

1.1 Research Program Projects and Structure
This project is the second phase of multiple interrelated research projects that, when
combined, provide a comprehensive capability for cyberattack modeling. Figure 1.1
displays the overall structure of the research program and the sequence in which it
progresses.

Figure 1.1 Diagram of the overall research program
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The MITRE-maintained Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC) is a database documenting known cyberattack patterns [MITRE, 2017]. Each
CAPEC entry describes a specific type of cyberattack; for example, its entries include
Cross-Site Scripting (CAPEC-63), SQL Injection (CAPEC-66), and Spear Phishing
(CAPEC-163). The CAPEC database entries are available in two forms: as humanreadable text, which is displayed online in the web-accessible version of the database,
and as XML, which can be downloaded and processed.
In the first project, CAPEC entries are converted automatically into executable
PNPSC nets that model the attacks described in the entries. The XML version of a
CAPEC entry is input to a Python script that produces either an executable modified Petri
net or a visual diagram of a PNPSC net as a Graphviz image [Whitaker, 2019]. This
project is illustrated in Figure 1.1(a).
The CAPEC cyberattack pattern database used in the first project as input to the
automatic generation of cyberattack models describes the attacks in an attacker-centric
manner. In the second project, the cyberattack component models will be enhanced to
include defender actions, responses, and techniques. Typically, a defender has multiple
individually or jointly deployed techniques to detect or block an attacker’s actions. In
addition, representations of normal user activities and non-attacker network traffic on the
target computer system will be added.
The enhanced PNPSC models will aid system designers in performing decision
analyses when evaluating different defense techniques. Performance metrics must be
identified and collected while using the enhanced PNPSC models to simulate
cyberattacks to compare different defense techniques.
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Repeatable statistical and

analytical methods will use the performance metrics as inputs to compare different
defense techniques. Design of experiments methods will be used to identify which
defense techniques are critical factors in defending against attacks, allowing for a
reduction in the total number of simulations runs while maintaining a high level of
statistical confidence. This project is illustrated in Figure 1.1(b).
The PNPSC nets generated in the first project and enhanced in the second project
are considered component models rather than complete models because they model only
a single type of cyberattack. Most computer systems to be modeled could be vulnerable
to more than one type of attack, so multiple component models must be combined to fully
represent the system. Thus, the cyberattack component models generated in the first two
projects must be integrated or composed to produce complete models of attacks to target
computer systems. The third project is concerned with enabling those compositions.
Such composition requires that the component models be defined to be
composable, i.e., to include places and transitions that serve as “connectors” and allow
the PNPSC nets to be connected. The connectors must be designed to preserve the
modeling semantics of the component models and pass needed information through the
connections. Moreover, before the component models can be composed, they must be
selected, i.e., the correct models necessary to model the attack on a target computer
system must be selected from a repository of all component models. The component
selection problem is, in general, NP-complete [Petty, 2003b]. Component selection is
NP-complete because to be certain of finding a composition that satisfies the
requirements, it may be necessary in the words case to try all possible compositions of
components in the repository, which is O (2n) if there are n components. However,
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engineering solutions, especially metadata describing each component, have been
proposed to provide a practical component selection capability [Taylor, 2015]. This
project is illustrated in Figure 1.1(c).
In the fourth project, the model of the target computer system is verified and
validated. Verification is the process of determining whether a model’s implementation
is consistent with its specification [Petty, 2010]. In this work, PNPSC nets are verified
by comparing them to their corresponding CAPEC entries. Methods to do so include
analysis of the formal properties of the PNPSC nets and verifying the net’s reachable
markings against allowable attack states described using predicate calculus.
Validation determines the degree to which a model’s behavior and output are
consistent with the system or phenomenon being modeled [Petty, 2010]. The PNPSC
nets will be validated against actual cyberattacks using methods that include manual
execution of attack sequences represented in the PNPSC net [Christensen, 2017] and face
validation using panels of cybersecurity subject matter experts [Cantrell, 2018]. This
project is illustrated in Figure 1.1(d).
The validated model is executed to simulate cyberattacks [Bland, 2018] [Bland,
2020]. Multiple iterations of a simulated attack are conducted to support a machine
learning algorithm, specifically reinforcement learning with an ε-greedy policy [Sutton,
2018]. The algorithm’s task is to learn which actions to take, i.e., which transition rates
to change for the different observable markings of the PNPSC net to accomplish the goals
of either the attacker or the defender. The reinforcement learning algorithm is designed
to be either an attacker or a defender, and its learning process is intended to be robust
even if opposed by a player that is also learning. This project is illustrated in Figure 1.1(e).
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The overall research program is coordinated by Dr. Mikel Petty, Associate
Professor, Computer Science Department and Senior Scientist for Modeling and Simulation,
the Information Technology and Systems Center (ITSC), at the University of Alabama in
Huntsville. The individual projects and the persons working on them are:
•

“Generating Cyberattack Model Components from Vulnerability Databases,” Dr.
T. Whitaker, Modeling and Simulation

•

“Adding Defenders and Users,” C. D. Colvett, Ph.D. candidate, Industrial and
Systems Engineering and Engineering Management

•

“Selecting and Composing Cyberattack Model Components,” K. Maxwell, Ph.D.
candidate, Computer Science

•

“Validating Cyberattack Models,” N. Christensen, M.S. Cybersecurity; Dr. W. A.
Cantrell, Modeling and Simulation

•

“Machine Learning of Cyberattack and Defense Strategies,” Dr. J. Bland,
Computer Engineering

1.2 Research Questions
The component selection problem has been proven to be NP-complete in both
certain exceptional cases [Page, 1999] and in general [Petty, 2006]. However, it has also
been claimed that if there are specifications and heuristics for the selection and composition
to fulfill a specific purpose, it may allow practical instances to be solved in an acceptable
time [Taylor, 2015]. The selection and composition processes specification must be defined
for PNPSC models or their components to be composed into full cyberattack models.
Therefore, the research questions addressed in this research are:
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1. What are the formal properties of a PNPSC net, and how do they relate to
composing PNPSC component models?
2. Can the NP-complete component selection problem be solved in an acceptable time
when selecting PNPSC component models for composition?
a. What metadata should be associated with the component models to facilitate
composition?
b. What heuristics that use the component metadata will efficiently select
components in most instances?
3. What is the appropriate level of granularity for defining reusable and composable
PNPSC component models?
a. What are the differences between the levels of granularity, and how do they
impact the overall design of a PNPSC cyberattack model?
b. Would more than one level of granularity be applicable?
4. How can PNPSC component models be composed into complete PNPSC models
of cyberattacks?
a. What other places and transitions must be added as external “interfaces” to
enable PNPSC component models to be composed beyond those in the
individual components?
b. Must the internal design of the component model be modified to enable
them to be used as components?
Answers to the questions were developed in this research and are presented in this
dissertation.

8

1.3 Research Tasks
To be answer the research questions proposed there were specific tasks that were
required to be completed to determine the answers. Table 1.1 shows a mapping of the
research tasks and which questions those tasks assisted in answers.
Table 1.1 Mapping of research tasks to research questions
Task
Preliminary study of the
research topic involved use
of Petri nets in simulation of
cyberattack
In-depth literature review

Q1

Q2

Q2a

Q2b

Q3

Q3a

Q3b

Q4

Q4a

Q4b

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Research current selection
methods
Define composition
framework

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Determine formalism for
composition

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Design and develop
repository database

X

X

X

Write scripts to retrieve
information from database

X

X

X

Design and develop web
interface for user interaction
with repository

X

X

X

Establish rules and heuristics
Identify the decomposition of
a model into components

X

X

X

Determine operations and
approaches to compose
components into system
model

X

X

X

Manually compose
components

X

X

X
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Table 1.1 continued
Task
Create files of composed
models to input into PNPSC
Verifier and PNPSC
Simulator
Run composed models
through PNPSC Verifier and
PNPSC simulator
Publish conference papers on
defined concepts

Q1

X

Q2

X

Q2a

X

Q2b

X

Q3

Q3a

Q3b

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Q4

Q4a

Q4b

X

X

Chapter 2 begins with a comprehensive review of existing literature and the
description of fundamental concepts required to analyze the problem. Chapter 3 presents
the formalism designed to model cyberattacks, followed by Chapter 4 describing the
validation process. Chapter 5 defines the granularity required of the model components and
composition methods, followed by Chapter 6 describing the selection algorithms and a tool
created to assist the process. Case studies based on the component granularity are
presented in Chapters 7 and Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter 9 presents conclusions from this
research, emphasizing the significance of these results and the expected future work.
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This project focuses on the selection and composition of model components to
assemble or compose models of cyberattacks. In the next section, an overview of models
and tools suitable to the defense and possible attacks of computer systems is presented,
followed by a discussion of the use of Petri nets and their applicability to model different
systems, including cyberattacks. A review of the attack pattern descriptions from the
CAPEC database, the source of information on known cyberattacks, and the initial
modeling design provide additional background information related to this project.
Portions of this chapter are from [Petty, 2017] [Mayfield, 2018a] [Mayfield, 2019b].
2.1 Overview
Motivated by the frequency and potential consequences of cyberattacks,
cybersecurity analysts have studied and documented the patterns those attacks follow,
thereby creating a knowledge base of resources instrumental in designing security software
[Barnum, 2007].
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the MITRE Corporation has developed and is currently
maintaining and updating an online database called the Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC), which documents different attacks [MITRE,
2017]. As documented in CAPEC, the attacks may be completed by a single attacker or a
group, i.e., the CAPEC database entries typically do not specify if a single attacker or an
organization performs the attack pattern they describe.
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Even though there is no

documentation on the number of attackers performing the attack, the attack pattern
descriptions describe different techniques used to achieve a specific attack goal. Most of
the attack pattern descriptions in the CAPEC database partition the attack pattern into three
phases: Explore, Experiment, and Exploit. The three phases are defined later. In addition
to describing the phases of the attack patterns’ execution flows, the attack pattern
descriptions in the CAPEC database also document the goals that an attacker using the
pattern may be attempting to achieve in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and
Accessibility (CIA).
Modeling and simulation are methods to document attack patterns and analyze
cyberattacks. Developing executable models of attack patterns and using those models to
simulate cyberattacks can provide valuable information about the dynamics and evolution
of the cyberattacks. There are several studies proposing methods to model cyberattacks.
Pan et al. described a methodology to model defense solutions for electrical transmission
system intrusions. Their study modeled cyber-physical systems’ behaviors using causal
event graphs [Pan, 2012]. Yeole et al. discussed mechanisms and techniques that are
available to detect one type of cyberattacks, specifically SQL Injections. One of the main
problems stated in their study is that the techniques they describe take the input and
compare it to saved patterns of SQL Injections, so if an attacker finds a different way to
perform the attack their proposed solution will not be helpful [Yeole, 2015]. Kaur and Kaur
attempted to provide a way to integrate attack mitigation into the early stages of the system
development life cycle. They used threat modeling to plan mitigation for an SQL Injection
attack. Their model used data flow architecture, deployment diagrams, and other UML
(Unified Modeling Language) concepts to demonstrate the stages where vulnerability
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mitigation could be embedded to save time and expenditures and allow for secure software
development, rather than removing vulnerabilities after the fact. [Kaur, 2014]. Most of
these studies address specific situations and do not apply to all of the attack patterns found
in the CAPEC database.
Wang et al. studied the process of assessing software product security [Wang,
2009]. Unlike other research in this area, they did not base system security assurance on
components alone. They defined assurance levels based on accepted standards such as
those found in the CAPEC database. They also developed an automated tool that supports
their approach to delivering an “environment score.” Their main focus was the importance
of security metrics. While partially based on the CAPEC attack patterns, their study did
not focus on cyberattacks themselves, and it also did not have any association to the
simulation and modeling of components.
Petri nets can model many different types of systems, including cyberattacks.
Khan et al. defined an Algebraic Petri net that was used as the basis to propose a formal
framework to measure cyber resilience from attacks and failures [Khan, 2015]. The
modeling of the attack behavior and consequent reaction of the security systems is an
essential source of information for the analysis and planning defense mechanisms. He
and Zhu described an approach that established trust between strangers by exchanging
digital credentials needed in peer-to-peer networks and grid computing [He, 2007]. They
modeled the disclosure policies between two parties that allow for trust negotiation as a
Petri net and proposed a negotiation strategy based on Negotiation Petri nets (SNPN).
The Petri net models addressed specific situations and did not consider the possibility of
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composing attacks. The research described here focused on using the basic Petri net
structure discussed in the next section in a broader analysis of cyberattacks.
2.2 Petri Nets
C. A. Petri first formalized Petri nets in 1962 [Petri, 1962]. Petri nets can model
discrete, dynamic, and distributed systems. The semantics of Petri nets are oriented
towards modeling sequence, concurrency, and synchronization in processes, networks, and
workflows [Resig, 2013]. The Petri net formalism has proven to be highly flexible and
extensible [Murata, 1989], and many applications exist; recent examples include command
and control systems [Liu, 2017], healthcare systems [Djtog 2018], and maintenance
strategies [Santos, 2018].
Petri nets consist of places and transitions connected by arcs; the places may contain
tokens. Figure 2.1 shows an example of a small Petri net. (In the figure, the labels and
dashed arrows in blue are not part of the Petri net, they are explanatory annotations.) Places
are represented graphically by circles, transitions by bars or rectangles, arcs by arrows, and
tokens by dots. Places and transitions named, either abstract names such as p1, p2, p3
(places), and t1 (transition) shown in Figure 2.1, or descriptive names that define the place
or transition modeling.

Figure 2.1 A simple Petri net
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A place represents a state or condition in the system or process modeled by the Petri
net. If a place contains a token, that state or conditions interpretation is known to be true.
A Petri net’s marking is the presence or absence of tokens in the places of a Petri net. A
Petri net’s marking when its execution begins is its initial marking. A transition represents
an action or event that may change the state or condition of the system. Transitions may
have one or more input places, denoted by arcs directed from the place(s) to the transition,
and one or more output places, denoted by arcs directed from the transition to the place(s).
The number of input and output places of a transition need not be the same. If all of a
transition’s input places contain a token, that transition is said to be enabled. Enabled
transitions may fire, which represents the action represented by the transition occurring.
When the transition fires, it consumes the token from the input places and generates a token
placed in its output places. The change in the marking of the Petri net that results from the
firing represents a change in the state of the system or process the Petri net is modeling due
to the action represented by the firing transition occurring. A standard Petri net’s execution
logic, expressed as pseudocode, is summarized in Figure 2.2.
Determine which transitions are enabled
While (at least one transition enabled)
Arbitrarily select one of the enabled transitions
Fire the selected transition, changing Petri net’s marking
Determine which transitions are enabled
endWhile
Figure
2.2 Execution
of a Petri
Standard
Figure 2.2
Execution
logic of aLogic
standard
net Petri net

Figure 2.3 shows three examples of Petri nets from office furniture manufacturing
applications. Figure 2.3(a) represents synchronization. Both of the transition’s input
places (Drawer available and Handle available) must be marked, i.e., true, before the
transition’s action (Attach handle) can be performed to complete the drawer. Figure 2.3(b)
15

represents resource constraints. A conveyor is required for the transport action to occur.
Two conveyors are available, represented by the two tokens in the Conveyor available
place. After a conveyor transports material, represented by the Transport transition, it must
be reset by the Reset Conveyor transition before it transports additional materials. Figure
2.3(c) combines concurrency resource constraints. The left and right processes, which are
the movement of materials in the factory, can occur mainly in parallel, but when they arrive
at the same crossing point in the factory, only one can pass through the crossing at a time.
The single crossing is represented by the single token in the Crossing open place, with the
effect that the Cross A and Cross B transitions must fire serially.

(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 2.3 Three example Petri nets that model manufacturing processes
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An essential advantage of Petri nets is that their semantics, described informally
above, can be expressed formally and unambiguously. A standard Petri net is formally
defined as a 5-tuple PN = (P, T, W, M0, B):
1. P = {p1, p2, …}; finite, non-empty set of places
2. T = {t1, t2, …}; finite, non-empty set of transitions
3. W ⊆ (P  T) ∪ (T  P); set of arcs from places to transitions and transitions to places
4. M0: P → ℤ+; initial marking of tokens in places, with 0 ≤ M0(p) ≤ B(p) for every p ∊ P
5. B: P → ℤ+ ∪ ; upper bound on tokens per place
P and B together imply a “space” (set) M* of all possible markings; M0 ∊ M*. Mi,
where i is a time step, denotes the current marking at time step i. [Reisig, 2013].
2.3 From CAPEC Patterns to an Initial Manually Designed Model
This section describes the process used to create PNPSC models based on the
information found in the CAPEC attack pattern description. CAPEC-66 SQL Injection will
be used as an example.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) and research conducted by
Anita Zakrzewska and Erik Ferragut assisted in determining the cyberattacks [Zakrzewska,
2011]. OWASP reports the top ten common system vulnerabilities, and for this description
of the modeling process, we chose to work with SQL Injection, which has made the top ten
for multiple years in a row [OWASP, 2017].
To properly model the SQL Injection attack, this project bases the Petri net model
on the CAPEC-66 SQL Injection attack pattern description version 3.1 [MITRE, 2017].
The CAPEC-66 description contains a complete schema and classification taxonomy of the
attack pattern.

System administrators can use both the CAPEC-66 attack pattern
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description and a validated model of that attack pattern to improve system security by
understanding the attacker’s perspective and approaches. Software developers can enhance
the security of the systems they develop by understanding the techniques used by possible
attackers.
Through the process of empirical validation, Nicholas Christiansen showed in his
thesis work that manually following the CAPEC-66 attack pattern as represented by a Petri
net model of that pattern could successfully exploit a real computer system. His testing was
conducted with the Metasploitable system. [Christiansen, 2017].
Developing a Petri net model of a CAPEC attack pattern uses three parts of the
attack pattern description: the attack summary, the attack pre-requisites, and the attack
execution flow.
While creating a Petri net model of a CAPEC attack pattern, the model developer
uses the CAPEC description to understand the attacker’s perspective, how the attack works,
and the actions taken to complete the attack. The attack pre-requisites are the next item
reviewed from the description. Based on the required pre-requisites to the attack, the
designer can determine the initial Petri net places.
Figure 2.4 shows the attack pre-requisites documented in the CAPEC-66
description, and Figure 2.5 shows the graphical representation of the pre-requisites as the
initial places of the Petri net model.

Figure 2.4 Attack pre-requisite for SQL injection
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Figure 2.5 Graphical representation of attack pre-requisite for SQL injection

After determining the places needed to represent the attack pre-requisites, the next
step is to follow the execution flow of the attack. In many CAPEC attack pattern
descriptions, the first part of the attack execution flow explains the attacker’s Explore
phase. Following the attack pattern description’s list of the techniques used in the attack
steps provides the model developer with information he/she can use to determine the
transitions needed in the model. The Explore phase also includes information on the
possible outcomes based on the listed attack step techniques. The outcomes documented
in the CAPEC attack pattern description display the markings that will enable each
transition to “fire.”
Figure 2.6 shows the attack execution flow for the SQL Injection, while Figure 2.7
graphically represents the information as a (partial) Petri net model. At the top of Figure
2.7 is the transition that the attack pre-requisites lead to. That transition represents the first
action taken by the attacker.
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Figure 2.6 SQL injection explore section

Figure 2.7 SQL injection transitions modeled in a Petri net

There is one outcome based on this transition, Survey Application, and it is that the
attacker has taken inventory of the system’s functionality. To successfully survey the
application, the attacker can choose between two techniques to use. With whichever
technique the attacker decides to attempt, the outcome will be the same, obtaining the
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results of the Explore phase. In this initial manually designed model, two possibilities can
occur from the Explore phase, one is representative of success, which will allow for the
attack to continue, and the other is of failure, represented by a state where the attacker
would have no other options to continue.
As shown in Figure 2.6, there is only one attack step to complete the Explore phase.
However, this is not the case for all of the documented CAPEC attack patterns. In the
scenario where the attacker has been able to identify at least one data input to the
application, the attacker will then be able to enter the Experiment phase of the attack. Just
like with the Explore phase, the Experiment phase can have multiple steps to it. With the
SQL Injection attack, there are two Experiment phase attack steps, each with multiple
techniques. Figure 2.8 displays the first attack step of the Experiment phase, showing the
techniques, indicators, outcomes, and security controls. Figure 2.9 graphically represents
this information as part of the Petri net model.
The first attack step contains four attack techniques. Each of these techniques will
provide the attacker with a positive or negative indication of his/her attack. There are three
results possible from the indicator place, two indicators will lead to negative results, and
one indicator leads to a positive result. The positive indicator leads to the attacker’s
awareness that the SQL Injection attack can continue. The two negative indicators leads
the attacker to a state where the attack can no longer continue, ultimately a state of failure.
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Figure 2.8 CAPEC experiment step 1

Figure 2.9 Petri net showing the unsuccessful attack end place

Once the attacker has reached the point where he/she is aware that a given input is
vulnerable to SQL Injections, the next phase can occur, which is to exploit the
vulnerability, shown in Figure 2.10. This phase, the Exploit phase, also has four attack
techniques. Therefore, the model will consist of four transitions associated with each
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possible attack step technique. This section of the attack pattern description also has
indicators; however, the indicators differ slightly from the Experiment phase. In the
Exploit phase there are only two indicators, one positive and one negative, directly
corresponding with success or failure. Therefore, there is not an additional place to
represent the knowledge of the indicators, as shown in Figure 2.11.

Figure 2.10 Attack step technique
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Figure 2.11 Petri net representing the 2nd step attack technique

After following the CAPEC-66 attack pattern description and creating the Petri net
model the next step would be to simulate the Petri net to show that it is executable.
Based on additional research, to design Petri nets, multiple design iterations were
conducted, and the Petri net model was enhanced based on different information found in
the CAPEC-66 attack pattern description.
2.4 Enhanced CAPEC-66 Petri Net Design
One of the main reasons for using the CAPEC database as a resource to design
cyberattack models is because the CAPEC database provides knowledge in association
with the attacker’s perspective of an attack. Using the CAPEC database allows system
designers and developers to understand the minimal skill sets and knowledge an attacker
must have to be successful. By having this knowledge, designers and developers can then
focus on the CAPEC attack pattern description of mitigation techniques.

24

In the enhanced PNPSC net design, the focus shifted from the attack itself to the
attacker goals that were documented in the CAPEC attack pattern description. This shift
occurred because the design should not be specific to techniques, software, and hardware
used for an attack. With the way the world is changing every day along with technology,
these techniques, software, and hardware will be obsolete, and the models created should
representative of the attack without the details of specific technology requirements.
The design decisions made to enhance the Petri net model of CAPEC-66 starts with
a different subset of the model’s transitions now representing four different possible types
of actions: non-controllable, attacker’s, active defender, and passive defender. The active
defender transitions represents a person monitoring the system, while a passive defender
transitions represents areas with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Figure 2.12 shows
a portion of the enhanced Petri net model where red transitions are the attacker’s actions,
while the blue transitions are the active defender’s actions, while non-controllable actions
are unchanged from the standard design.

Figure 2.12 Player controlled transition defined
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Another modification introduced was to focus on the goals that the attacker is
possibly trying to achieve. No matter which goals the attacker is trying to achieve, there
will be a subnet pattern, which is a specific pattern of places and transitions, that will lead
to that goal. The modifications included additional places that represent whether the
attacker succeeded or failed, whether the active defender gained knowledge of the attack
and actively monitored the system, and if the defender passively or actively blocked the
attacker.
Figure 2.13 continues from the place “Controllable Inputs Found” in Figure 2.12
and displays the Petri net with four goals that the attacker has according to CAPEC-66.
The goals associated with SQL Injection are (1) to read application data, (2) to modify
application data, (3) to gain privileges, or (4) to execute malicious code. There is a
transition found for each of these represented goals, shown in red in Figure 2.13.

Figure 2.13 Enhanced Petri net based on attacker goals (partial image)
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Figure 2.14 focuses on one of the goals to closely show the addition of the attacker
controllable transitions in red, the active defender controllable transitions in blue, and the
passive defender controllable transitions in green. Each of the goals is following the same
subnet pattern. If the attacker fails at achieving the goal, there are three possible outcomes:
1. The attacker has been blocked and therefore has no opportunity to attempt the attack
again.
2. The defender has detected, but not blocked, the attacker allowing for the attack to
continue.
3. The attacker has failed at achieving the goal without defender interaction, and
therefore, the attacker can attempt the goal again or attempt to achieve one of the other
goals associated with the attack.

Figure 2.14 Transitions and places for “Modify Application Data” attack goal
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With this enhanced Petri net model design, there is no need to stay focused on the
detailed manner in which the attack takes place. The initial manually designed model of
the Petri net is assumed to possibly need to be updated any time that new technology is
developed and used by the attacker. With the enhanced model, the design is focused on
the success or failure of the attacker.
Another shift in the design of the models is that the focus is no longer on the
indicators of the attack step techniques, but instead on the ability to complete a technique
to move from one phase of the attack to the next. Figure 2.15 shows one of the phases of
the CAPEC attack pattern and the correlation to the enhanced Petri net model.

1
2
3

Explore phase
1

2

3

Figure 2.15 Enhanced mapping from CAPEC to Petri net
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2.5 Summary
This chapter described some of the other research conducted associated with the
use of Petri nets and cybersecurity. Also described is the process to manually create Petri
nets to model cyberattacks according to the CAPEC database. Chapter 3 also presented an
additional enhanced Petri net model that has been developed.
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CHAPTER 3. AN EXTENDED MODEL FOR CYBERATTACKS

One of the fundamental concepts used in this research is the Petri Nets with Players
and Strategies (PNPS) formalism. The PNPS formalism extends the standard Petri net
formalism and was introduced by Zakrzewska and Ferragut [Zakrewska,2011]. Portions of
this chapter are from [Mayfield, 2018a] [Petty, 2019b].
The PNPS formalism includes features relevant to cyberattack modeling. For
example, in a standard Petri net, the transition to fire is selected arbitrarily from all enabled
transitions in a standard Petri net. In a PNPS net, each transition has an associated firing
rate. The likelihood of a transition firing, when enabled, is a function of its firing rate. The
rate is the maximum number of times the transition could fire per time unit if continuously
enabled. In a PNPS model, rates can be interpreted as the likelihood of the action or
modeled event occurring. Higher rates result in an increased likelihood of occurrence. A
firing time is generated for each enabled transition. Before each firing of a transition, one
of the enabled transitions is selected to fire. For each transition, a time between successive
firings of the transition, or inter-firing time, is generated for each enabled transition. The
enabled transition with the earliest firing time is selected to fire, which represents the action
or event modeled by the transition occurring.
Another significant change is that two or more competing or cooperating players
may be defined. The players have goals to achieve, which are expressed as markings in the
PNPS net. They attempt to influence the sequence of transition firings to achieve their goal.
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Players do not have complete information during the execution of the PNPS net. Each
player may only observe a subset of places during execution. Each player must determine
what actions to take based on the marking of only the places that a player can observe. This
feature model the limited information that the player might have regarding the state of the
target computer system and the adversary’s actions during a cyberattack.
Figure 3.1 is an example of a PNPS net from [Zakrewska, 2011]. In the figure, the
labeled places represent the possible states of the model and the transitions represent
actions or events. A firing rate is indicated when more than one transition is enabled. The
green transitions are non-controllable and the red transitions are attacker controlled.

Figure 3.1 Simplified SQL injection represented by a PNPS net [Zakrewska, 2011]

3.1 Petri Nets with Players, Strategies, and Costs (PNPSC)
In this section, the Petri Nets with Players, Strategies, and Costs (PNPSC)
formalism is presented, both as a detailed description and a walkthrough example. The
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PNPSC formalism includes all of the extensions to the Petri net formalism present in the
PNPS formalism, as well as two additional extensions: cost functions and inhibitor arcs.
The PNPSC formalism allows for more than two players. However, the examples presented
in this project assumes a single attacker and defender without loss of generality.
Every action taken by a player has a cost that represents the action’s time, effort,
skill level, and expense. Players incur costs in two ways. First, when a player changes a
transition’s rate there is a cost proportional to the magnitude of the change in rate. In other
words, changing the probability of the event represented by a transition occurring has a cost,
and that cost is a function of the magnitude of the change. Second, when a transition fires,
there may be a cost to one or more players.
Definition 3.1: A PNPSC net is a 15-tuple formally defined as PNPSC = (P, T, W, Q, B,
M0, L, G, Θ, O, F, Ω, Γ, C, D), where
1. P = {p1, p2, . . .}; finite, non-empty set of places,
2. T = {t1, t2, . . .}; finite, non-empty set of transitions,
3. W ⊆ (P ×T) ∪ (T ×P); set of directed arcs from places to transitions and transitions
to places
4. Q ⊆ (P ×T); set of inhibitor arcs from places to transitions
5. B: P → ℤ+ ∪ ∞; upper bound on tokens per place
6. M0: P → ℤ+ ; initial marking of tokens in places with 0 ≤ M0(p) ≤ B(p) for every p
∈P
7. L: W → ℤ+ ; arc weights
8. G = {g1, g2, . . .}; finite, non-empty set of players
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9. Θ = (T0, T1, T2, . . . , T|G|); partition of transition set T into |G| + 1 subsets such that
T=T0 ∪ T1 ∪ T2 ∪ . . . ∪ T|G| and Tj ∩ Tk = ∅ for 0 ≤ j, k ≤ |G| and j≠ k; Ti = set of
transitions controlled by player gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ |G| and T0 = set of stochastic transitions
not controlled by any player
10. O = (O1, O2, . . ., O|G|); collection of |G| subsets of place set P, i.e., Oi ⊆ P for 1 ≤ i
≤ |G|; Oi is the subset of place set P observable by player gi
11. F: T → ℝ+ ; firing rates for transitions, both non-player-controlled and playercontrolled; the latter may be changed during execution
12. Ω: (T − T0) → ℝ+ ; maximum firing rates for player-controlled transitions; 0 < F(t)
≤ Ω(t) for t ∈ (T − T0)
13. Γ= (Γ1, Γ2, …, Γ|G|); a collection of functions Γi: M*Oi → (ℝ+)|Ti| where Γi is a
mapping from the possible markings of player gi’s observable places to the
desired firing rates for each of player gi’s controlled transitions
14. C = (C1, C2); collection of two functions representing costs; C1: T → ℝ+ and C2 :
(Ti, F0, F1) → ℝ+
15. D: T → ℘(G); players that incur a cost for a fired transition
Q is a set of inhibitor arcs from places to transitions. An inhibitor arc will cause a
transition to be ineligible to fire when the arc’s point of origination has at least one token.
Θ is a partition of transition set T, implying that no more than one player may control a
transition (some transitions may not be controlled by any player). On the other hand, O is
not necessarily a partition of place set P; thus, 0, 1, or more than 1, player may observe a
place. Γ represents the players’ strategies. Each player gi may observe the marking MOi of
a subset Oi of the net’s places given a marking M. Based on that observed marking, player
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gi will want to set the firing rates of that player’s player-controlled transitions Ti to specific
values. Function Γi is thus a mapping from all possible markings of player gi’s observable
places, denoted M∗Oi, to the desired rates for player gi’s controlled transitions. Γi returns
those desired rates as a vector with |Ti| elements.
Another factor to consider is the costs associated with resources used during the
attack, whether those resources are time or money. Organizations incur costs to secure
systems.

These costs are only associated with player actions. Any non-controlled

transition’s firing cost will always be 0. On the controlled transition, in most PNPSC nets,
only the player that controls the transition that is fired will take on the cost. Any other
players will have a cost of 0 for that transition.
The total costs for all transition rate changes and transition firings are accumulated
for each player over the course of a simulation execution. Analyzing these costs will
provide an estimate of the total incurred cost by an organization defending its system and
an estimate of the attacker’s cost. The result could identify whether the attacker will
persist in the attack. C represents the costs and it is comprised of two functions. C1 is the
transition firing cost; it specifies the cost of the action or event that a transition represents.
C2 is the rate change cost; it specifies the cost of performing the action required to change
a set of transition rates. C2 is defined as C2 =∑j∈𝑇𝑖 |𝐹0 (𝑗) − 𝐹1 (𝑗)|. Recall that Ti is the
set of transitions controlled by player gi. Using subscripts 0 and 1 to denote “before” and
“after,” respectively, F0(j) is the rate of transition tj before a rate change and F1(j) is the
same transition’s rate after a rate change. Thus, C2 is the sum of absolute values of the
changes to the rates of the transitions controlled by player gi. D is the set of players that
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incur the cost of firing a transition; that set may consist of 0, 1, or more than one player
[Bland, 2020].
The execution logic of a PNPSC net is expressed as pseudocode and is shown in
Figure 3.2. The Boolean variable reset controls an aspect of the PNPSC net execution left
unspecified in [Zakrewska, 2011] and explains whether or not the transition firing time
stays the same or resets if the enabled transition is not selected to fire. The pseudocode in
Figure 3.2 handles either interpretation. In Figure 3.2, reset is set to TRUE, causing the
firing times to be reset; setting reset to FALSE in the pseudocode would have the opposite
effect. Variables prevenabled and enabled are vectors of Boolean variables, with one
element for each transition. Subscripts allow for references to individual elements in the
vectors; references without a subscript indicate the entire vector. The symbol # precedes
comments in the pseudocode.

Figure 3.2 Pseudocode for the execution logic of a PNPSC net

3.1.1

Transition Firing Time Resetting

An essential part of a PNPSC model is determining when to fire a transition and
the system’s overall state after the firing. One approach calculates firing times for currently
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enabled transitions and maintains those values while the transitions are enabled. Another
approach recalculates all firing times for all enabled transitions. Due to this recalculation,
an enabled transition scheduled to fire next could become the last.
These different approaches to firing transitions might affect the results. An
experiment measured the possible differences caused by the two approaches on the
schedule of the transition’s firings. This experiment used a simple verification method that
counted the number of times a transition was fired during a simulation. The results were
compared across both approaches. This experiment specifically tested the effect of
resetting the firing time of unfired enabled transitions during a PNPSC model simulation.
The experiment consisted of eight transitions and a million firings. Each of the eight
transitions had rates according to their transition number. For example, transition 4 had a
rate of 4. The experiment ran once with the reset option set to true, recalculating the firing
times of any unfired enabled transitions. A run with the reset option set to false did not
cause recalculation of the transition firing time. Table 3.1 reports the results of how many
times a transition was fired based on whether the firing time was reset.
Table 3.1 Results of reset experiment
Transition
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Rate
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Reset
36613
66827
93839
119000
141170
161598
181440
199513
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No Reset
36943
66774
94081
118911
141132
161686
181712
198761

The results presented in Table 3.1 demonstrate that the two methods were
statistically comparable, suggesting that the reset option does not affect the long-term
probability of a transition firing over a long execution or a series of multiple executions.
This could be caused by the exponential distribution’s memoryless property.
3.1.2

Transition Firing Rates and Probabilities

Based on the two approaches described for resetting the transition firing time, the
latter approach is best suited to this model because it does not impact long term
probabilities. The efficacy of this approach will be shown through Theorem 3.1. At any
given time during the execution of a PNPSC net, some subset of the net’s transitions will
be enabled. The firing time of an enabled transition is a function of its current rate. In
particular, a transition’s firing time is a random variate generated from an exponential
distribution, with the transition’s firing rate being the exponential distribution’s rate.
The probability that a specifically enabled transition will be the next to fire needs
to be determined in order to simulate the firing of transitions. There is a set of enabled
transitions at a given time, or a probability that a specifically enabled transition will have
the earliest firing time. Understanding the relationship between a transition’s rate and its
probability of firing next may influence a player’s strategy as encoded in the strategy
function in terms of the set rate of a player-controlled transition.
Based on initial results by Sheffield, Takahara, and Did [Sheffield, 2014]
[Takahara, 2017] [Did, 2018], this project provides a new solution described in Theorem
3.1.
Theorem 3.1 Assume that at a specific time n transitions t1, t2, …, tn are enabled, that their
rates are currently λ1, λ2, …, λn, and their firing times, which are random variates generated
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from exponential distributions with those rates, are X1, X2, …, Xn. Let λ = λ1 + λ2 + … +
λn, i.e., the sum of the enabled transitions ’ rates. The probability that a specific transition,
say ti with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, will fire next, or equivalently, that Xi = min(X1, X2, …, Xn) is the ratio
λi/λ, or given a set of enabled transitions t1, t2, …, tn with rates λ1, λ2, …, λn in a PNPSC
net, then the probability that ti will fire next is λi/λ.
Proof
Note that Xi = min(X1, X2, …, Xn) if and only if Xi ≤ X1 and Xi ≤ X2 and … and Xi ≤ Xn for
all Xj with j≤ i. From the cumulative distribution function of the exponential distribution
[Banks, 2012], we know that
P ( X i  X 1 ) = 1 − e − 1x

P ( X i  X 1 ) = e − 1 x

P ( X i  X 2 ) = 1 − e − 2 x

P ( X i  X 2 ) = e − 2 x





P( X i  X n ) = 1 − e

− n x

P ( X i  X n ) = e − n x

For a given x,
P(min( X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n )  x)
= P( X 1  x)  P( X 2  x)    P( X n  x)
= e −1x  e −2 x    e −n x
= e −( 1 + 2 ++ n ) x
= e − x

Given these probabilities, and recalling that from the probability density function
of the exponential distribution, the relative probability of a specific value x in an
exponential distribution with rate λ is f(x) = λe–λx [Banks, 2012], then the probability that a
specific transition’s firing time Xi = min(X1, X2, …, Xn) can be calculated as
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P ( X i = min( X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n ))
= P ( X i  X j for 1  j  n and j  i )


=  i e −i x P ( X i  X j for 1  j  n and j  i | X i = x) dx
0



=  i e −i x P ( x  X j for 1  j  n and j  i ) dx
0



=  i e −i x  P ( X j  x) dx
0

j i



=  i e −i x  e
0

− j x

dx

j i



=  i e −i x e −(  −i ) x dx
0



= i  e −x dx
0

= −i
= −i
=

e − x





|

0

−1

−  − i

 
 
0

.

i


which was to be shown. ■
3.1.3

An Example PNPSC Net

Figure 3.3 shows an example of a PNPSC net. The attacker can use two attack
methods to reach the goal. An attacker can succeed using either method. If the attacker uses
both attack methods, it increases the likelihood of reaching the goal. However, there is a
disadvantage to deploying both attack methods. Deploying both attack methods can
increase the likelihood of detection by the defender.
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Figure 3.3 PNPSC net example

Table 3.2 list the attack strategy with the associated transitions and rates. Table 3.3
list the defense strategy with the associated transitions and rates. The defender will use an
intrusion detection system or other methods to detect and block a cyberattack in the real
world. The defender can also use the concept of situational awareness to help block the
attacker through monitoring and gaining knowledge from an attack.
Table 3.2 Attacker strategy
Action

Rate

Attacker performs attack 1
Attacker performs attack 2
Attacker reaches goal via attack 1
Attacker reaches goal via attack 2
Attacker uses attacks 1 and 2 to reach a goal

3
2
1
2
Immediate transition

Table 3.3 Defender strategy
Action
Defender detects and blocks attack 1
Defender detects and blocks attack 2
Defender blocks attack 1 via knowledge
Defender blocks attack 2 via knowledge
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Rate
3
2
1
2

For instance, if the defender chooses to gain situational awareness during Attack 1, the
defender can block Attack 2 actively.
3.2 CAPEC–63 Cross-Site Scripting PNPSC Model Example
This section discusses the design of the validated PNPSC net for a Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) attack. Figure 3.4 shows the entire PNPSC model for Cross-Site Scripting.
The net is relatively large, so the example is split in four parts. The first part of the example
shows the Explore phase of the net. The subsequent parts show the Experiment, Exploit,
and Goal phases. Included with each part of the model is an explanation of a possible
occurrence of an attack as it would be represented in the model.

Figure 3.4 PNPSC model for Cross-Site Scripting
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Figure 3.5 shows the Explore phase, which is the first phase of the attack. The
places and transitions are listed in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. There are three possible
outcomes in the Explore phase: (1) the explore technique will be successful, and the
attacker will be able to proceed to the Experiment phase, (2) the explore technique will fail
and the attacker may continue to the Experiment phase, or (3) the defender will detect the
attack. Being detected by the defender does not block the attack. The attacker can continue
and can use one of the first two routes to continue to the Experiment phase.

Figure 3.5 Explore phase of CAPEC-63
Table 3.4 CAPEC-63 PNPSC net Explore phase places
Place
aP0_n

Description
Explore phase of the attack occurring

aP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web
pages to find entry points.

aP 2_0_t

Attack successful - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web
pages to find entry points.

aP3_0_t

Attack done - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages
to find entry points.
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Table 3.4 continued
Place

Description

aP 4_0_t

Defender detected - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web
pages to find entry points.

aP6_1_t

Attack occurring - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of
the web application.

aP7_1_t

Attack successful - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of
the web application.

aP8_1_t

Attack done - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the
web application.

aP9_1_t

Defender detected - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of
the web application.

aP11_2_t

Attack occurring - Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is
constructed.

aP12_2_t

Attack successful - Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is
constructed.

aP13_2_t

Attack done - Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is
constructed.

aP14_2_t

Defender detected - Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is
constructed.

aP5_p

Explore phase done

Table 3.5 CAPEC-63 PNPSC net Explore phase transitions
Transition

Description

Rates

aT0_0

Attacker attempts - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze
the web pages to find entry points.

7

aT1_0

Attacker succeeds in - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and
analyze the web pages to find entry points.

5

aT2_0

Attacker fails in - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the
web pages to find entry points.

2

aT3_0

Defender detects - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze
the web pages to find entry points.

3

aT4_0

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Use a spidering tool to follow and record all
links and analyze the web pages to find entry points.

2

Attacker moves to Experiment phase

3

Attacker attempts - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual
traversal of the web application.

4

aT5
aT6_1
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Table 3.5 continued
Transition

Description

Rates

aT7_1

Attacker succeeds in - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual
traversal of the web application.

2

aT8_1

Attacker fails in - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual
traversal of the web application

5

aT9_1

Defender detects - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual
traversal of the web application.

4

aT10_1

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Use a proxy tool to record all links visited
during a manual traversal of the web application.

3

aT12_1
aT13_2

Attacker attempts - Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how
it is constructed.
Attacker succeeds in - Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze
how it is constructed.

2
5

aT14_2

Attacker fails in - Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how
it is constructed.

1

aT15_2

Defender detects - Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how
it is constructed.

6

aT16_2

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Use a browser to manually explore the
website and analyze how it is constructed.

8

A Cross-Site Scripting attack starts with the knowledge that the target client
software allows for scripting communication from remote hosts. The first action taken by
the attacker is to survey the applications for user controllable inputs (aP0_n). The attacker
has three techniques that he/she can pursue to advance to the Experiment phase: (1) attempt
to spider the website (aT0_0), (2) attempt to use proxy tools to record all links (aT6_1),
and (3) attempt to use a browser to manually explore the website (aT12_2). During this
phase, the defender attempts to gain knowledge that an attack is taking place. During the
Explore phase, the defender’s gains will not have any immediate consequences, but it could
impact transition firing rates in subsequence phases of the attack.
A specific example of one possible sequence of events in a Cross-Site Scripting
attack will illustrate one of the techniques that the attacker can attempt to allow for a
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specific outcome, and other paths in alternate techniques are similar. The transitions
representing the attacker’s actions at the beginning of the Explore phase are player
controllable and have firing rates that the attacker may manipulate. In this example, subject
matter experts would determine realistic rates as the example uses notional rates.
Suppose the attacker manipulates the transition rates so that aT0_0 fires first, then
the attacker attempts to spider the website (aP1_0_t). There are three outcomes from the
attacker spidering the website: (1) the attacker may be successful (aP2_0_t), (2) the attacker
might fail (aP3_0_t), or (3) the defender might detect that spidering is taking place
(aP4_0_t). Assume that the attacker fails to spider the website, having a token consumed
by aT1_0 and placed in aP3_0_t and aP2_0_t. If aP3_0_t is marked, the attacker may
continue to pursue their goal. Even though the attacker has failed to spider the website
he/she can continue with the attack. The transition aT4_0 will consume the token found in
aP3_0_t, and the attacker will have reached a state of attempting or succeeding in the
Explore phase, aP5_p. From here, aT5 fires, and the attacker moves on to the Experiment
phase.
Figure 3.6 provides a closer look at the Experiment phase of the PNPSC net. The
places and transitions are listed in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. Once the attacker starts the
Experiment phase, he/she have different techniques available. This Experiment phase has
four techniques that the attacker can attempt before failing.
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Figure 3.6 Cross-Site Scripting Experiment phase
Table 3.6 CAPEC-63 PNPSC net Experiment phase places
Place

Description

bP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known
URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP2_0_p

Attack flag - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If
possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP3_0_p

Defender detected - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known
URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP4_0_t

Attack successful - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known
URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP5_p Experiment phase done
bP6_1_t

Attack occurring - Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known
URLs.

bP7_1_p

Attack flag - Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known
URLs.

bP8_1_p

Defender detected - Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in
known URLs.

bP9_1_t

Attack successful - Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known
URLs.

bP10_2_t

Attack occurring - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry fields. If
possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP11_2_p

Attack flag - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry fields. If possible,
the probe strings contain a unique identifier.
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Table 3.6 continued

Place

Description

bP12_2_p

Defender detected - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry fields. If
possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP13_2_t

Attack successful - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry fields. If
possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP14_3_t

Attack occurring - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources accessed by
the application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP15_3_p

Attack flag - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources accessed by the
application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP16_3_p

Defender detected - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources accessed by
the application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP17_3_t

Attack successful - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources accessed by
the application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

bP18_p Experiment phase failed

Table 3.7 CAPEC-63 PNPSC net Experiment phase transitions
Transition

Description

Rates

bT0_0

Attacker attempts - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of
known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

8

bT1_0

Attacker fails in - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of
known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

7

bT2_0

Defender detects - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of
known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

5

bT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters
of known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

7

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase

1

bT5_1

Attacker attempts - Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS
probes in known URLs.

9

bT6_1

Attacker fails in - Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS
probes in known URLs.

2

bT7_1

Defender detects - Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes
in known URLs.

1

bT4
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Table 3.7 continued

Transition

Description

Rates

bT8_1

Attacker succeeds in - Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS
probes in known URLs.

9

bT9_2

Attacker attempts - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry
fields. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

7

bT10_2

Attacker fails in - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry
fields. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

2

bT11_2

Defender detects - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry
fields. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

3

bT12_2

Attacker succeeds in - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry
fields. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

2

bT13_3

bT14_3

bT15_3

bT16_3

bT17

Attacker attempts - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources
accessed by the application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique
identifier.
Attacker fails in - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources
accessed by the application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique
identifier.
Defender detects - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into resources
accessed by the application. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique
identifier.
Attacker succeeds in - Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into
resources accessed by the application. If possible, the probe strings contain a
unique identifier.
Attacker fails Experiment phase

7

4

8

5

3

The Experiment and the Explore phases share similarity in design. During the
Experiment phase of the attack, there are four possible outcomes: (1) the attacker will be
successful with one of the Experiment phase techniques, and will proceed to the Exploit
phase, (2) the attacker will fail all options, (3) the attacker will fail one technique and can
attempt another technique, (4) the attack will be detected by the defender. Being detected by
the defender does not block the attack. The attacker can continue if successful or attempt a
different technique if it has not been attempted.
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In the Experiment phase of the attack, the four techniques that the attacker can
attempt are: (1) use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs
(bT0_0), (2) attempt to use a proxy tool to record results (bT5_t), (3) attempt to use probe
strings to inject script into the user interface entry fields (bT9_2), or (4) attempt to use
injection script into resources (bT13_3). However, if the attacker is unsuccessful in all of
these techniques, the attacker fails (bT17). Like the Explore phase of the attack, each
technique attempted during the Experiment phase has the same set of outcomes. If the
attacker fails using a specific technique, an inhibitor arc will prevent another attempt using
the same technique. However, the attacker may attempt another technique if one is available.
A defender may detect the attacker. This detection does not impact the attacker’s
intermediate goal in completing the Experiment phase. If the attacker fails all possible
techniques in the Experiment phase, the attacker cannot move on to the Exploit phase. The
main difference between the Explore and the Experiment phases is that transitions have rates
affected by actions that the attacker undertook during the Explore phase. The attacker will
not proceed if he/she cannot be successful with at least one technique. The affected
transitions are: (bT3_0) attacker injects script via parameters, (bT8_1) attacker records
results via proxy tool, (bT12_2) attacker successfully uses injection scripts in the user
interface entry fields, and (bT16_3) attacker successfully uses injection script into resources.
If any of the three success places (aP3_0_t, aP8_1_t, aP13_2_t) found in the Explore phase
have a token, then the firing rate transitions (bT3_0, bT8_1, bT12_2, bT16_3) in the
Experiment phase could be increased.
A token is placed in bP9_1_t and bP5_P if the attacker uses a proxy tool to record
the results to complete the Experiment phase. Marked place bP9_1_t indicates the attacker
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successfully used a proxy tool to record results, while marked place bP5_p indicates the
completion of the Experiment phase. Marked place bP9_1_t can affect transition rates in
the Exploit phase.
If the attacker is successful in the Experiment phase, the next phase is the Exploit
phase, shown in Figure 3.7. Places and transitions are listed in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9. The
Exploit phase is similar in design to the Experiment phase. Before the attacker fails, he/she
can attempt five different techniques in a Cross-Site Scripting attack. The five techniques
are: (1) load the victim’s browser with malicious scripts and send the retrieved information
to the attacker (cT0_0), (2) cause the browser to take commands (cT5_1), (3) load the
victim’s browser with malicious scripts to perform actions (cT9_2), (4) load the victim’s
browser with scripts to execute requests to other websites (cT13_3), and (5) load the victim’s
browser with scripts to expose invalid information to the user (cT17_4). If the attacker is not
successful with one of the five techniques, then he/she will have failed the Exploit phase
(cT21).

Figure 3.7 Cross-Site Scripting Exploit phase
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Table 3.8 CAPEC-63 PNPSC net Exploit phase places
Place

Description

cP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and sends document
information to the attacker.

cP2_0_p

Attack flag - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and sends document information to
the attacker.

cP3_0_p

Defender detected - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and sends document
information to the attacker.

cP4_0_t

Attack successful - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and sends document
information to the attacker.

cP5_p

Exploit phase done

cP6_1_t

Attack occurring - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes
the browser to execute appropriately.

cP7_1_p

Attack flag - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes the
browser to execute appropriately.

cP8_1_p

Defender detected - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes
the browser to execute appropriately.

cP9_1_t

Attack successful - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes
the browser to execute appropriately.

cP10_2_t

Attack occurring - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and performs actions on the
same web site

Attack flag - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during
cP11_2_p the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and performs actions on the same
web site
Defender detected - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
cP12_2_p identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
performs actions on the same web site
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Table 3.8 continued

Place

cP13_2_t

Description
Attack successful - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
performs actions on the same web site

Attack occurring - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes
cP14_3_t
the browser to execute request to other web sites (especially the web applications that have
CSRF vulnerabilities).
Attack flag - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes the
cP15_3_p
browser to execute request to other websites (especially the web applications that have CSRF
vulnerabilities).
Defender detected - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes
cP16_3_p
the browser to execute request to other web sites (especially the web applications that have
CSRF vulnerabilities).
Attack successful - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s server and then causes
cP17_3_t
the browser to execute request to other web sites (especially the web applications that have
CSRF vulnerabilities).
cP18_4_t

Attack occurring - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and exposes attackermodified invalid information to the user on the current web page.

Attack flag - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
cP19_4_p during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and exposes attackermodified invalid information to the user on the current web page.
Defender detected - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
cP20_4_p identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
exposes attacker-modified invalid information to the user on the current web page.

cP21_4_t

Attack successful - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and exposes
attacker-modified invalid information to the user on the current web page.

cP22_p

Exploit phase failed

cP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and sends document
information to the attacker.
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Table 3.9 CAPEC-63 PNPSC net Exploit phase transitions
Transition

Description

Rates

cT0_0

Attacker attempts - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
sends document information to the attacker.

6

cT1_0

Attacker fails in - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through
vectors identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the
victim’s browser and sends document information to the attacker.

2

cT2_0

Defender detects - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through
vectors identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s
browser and sends document information to the attacker.

7

cT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
sends document information to the attacker.

1

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase

3

cT5_1

Attacker attempts - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s
server and then causes the browser to execute appropriately.

7

cT6_1

Attacker fails in - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s
server and then causes the browser to execute appropriately.

1

cT7_1

Defender detects - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s
server and then causes the browser to execute appropriately.

2

cT8_1

Attacker succeeds in - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through
vectors identified during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an
attacker’s server and then causes the browser to execute appropriately.

6

cT9_2

Attacker attempts - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through
vectors identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s
browser and performs actions on the same web site

4

cT10_2

Attacker fails in - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
performs actions on the same web site

5

cT11_2

Defender detects - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
performs actions on the same web site

1

cT4
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Table 3.9 continued

Transition

cT12_2

cT13_3

cT14_3

cT15_3

cT16_3

Description
Attacker succeeds in - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through
vectors identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s
browser and performs actions on the same web site
Attacker attempts - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s
server and then causes the browser to execute request to other web sites
(especially the web applications that have CSRF vulnerabilities).
Attacker fails in - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through
vectors identified during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an
attacker’s server and then causes the browser to execute request to other web
sites (especially the web applications that have CSRF vulnerabilities).
Defender detects - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through
vectors identified during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an
attacker’s server and then causes the browser to execute request to other web
sites (especially the web applications that have CSRF vulnerabilities).
Attacker succeeds in - Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and takes commands from an attacker’s
server and then causes the browser to execute request to other web sites (especially
the web applications that have CSRF vulnerabilities).

Rates

3

1

8

4

2

cT17_4

Attacker attempts - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
exposes attacker-modified invalid information to the user on the current web page.

9

cT18_4

Attacker fails in - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
exposes attacker-modified invalid information to the user on the current web page.

4

cT19_4

Defender detects - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through
vectors identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s
browser and exposes attacker-modified invalid information to the user on the
current web page.

6

cT20_4

Attacker succeeds in - Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment phase and loaded by the victim’s browser and
exposes attacker-modified invalid information to the user on the current web page.

2

Attacker fails in Exploit phase

5

cT21

As with the previous phases, the Exploit phase has the same three outcomes for
the attempts of each technique: (1) the attacker can succeed, (2) the defender detects the
attacker and the attacker continues, or (3) the attacker may fail one technique and continue
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to another. The Exploit phase is similar to the Experiment phase where some transition
rates are affected by previously marked places in the model. Marked places in the
Experiment phase can impact transitions firing rates in the Exploit phase.
Of all the possible techniques that the attacker can attempt in the Exploit phase, this
example will assume that transition cT17_4 will fire. If transition cT17_4 fires, a token is
placed into cP18_4_t, which represents the attacker loading the victim’s browser with
scripts to expose invalid information to the user. Transition cT19_4 is assumed to fire next
from the three possible outcomes, which represents the defender detecting an attack in
progress, and cP20_4_p is marked with a token to flag that the defender has that
knowledge. The attacker fails at the attempt to load the victim’s browser with scripts
(cT18_4). A token is placed in cP19_4_p to flag that the attacker has failed, a token is sent
back to cP_0_p where the attacker will have the chance to attempt a different technique.
The inhibitor arc to transition cT17_4 will prevent the transition from becoming enabled
again. The attacker’s next action is to attempt to cause the browser to take commands
(cT5_1); this will place a token into cP6_1_t. Here the attacker is successful. Two tokens
are generated by the transition. One is placed into cP9_1_t to flag his/her success, and the
other is placed into cP5_p, allowing the attacker to continue to the Goals phase.
In the Goals phase, there are three outcomes: (1) the attacker succeeds, (2) the
attacker is blocked actively or passively, or (3) the attacker fails. According to CAPEC63, attackers may have three goals in this phase; they are: (1) the attacker attempts to read
data, (2) the attacker attempts to execute unauthorized code, or (3) the attacker attempts
to modify data. In the Goals phase, shown in Figure 3.8, there are four enabled transitions.
The transitions dT5_0, dT13_1, dT21_2 represent the techniques that the attacker uses to
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successfully reach their goal. The places and transitions are listed in Table 3.10 and Table
3.11. The success the attacker had in the Exploit phase will impact the rate of the enabled
transitions in the Goals phase. The transitions dT2_0, dT10_1, and dT18_2, represent the
defender monitoring the attack. These transition rates are impacted by the defender’s past
knowledge of the attack occurring. Marking from the defender detection places in all
previous phases can impact the defender transition rates in the Goals phase. With this
knowledge, the defender would be able to block the attacker from achieving their goal. If
the defender has not blocked the attacker and the attacker has not been successful, the
attacker can continue attempting to achieve their goal, hence the “loopback” from dT6_0,
dT14_1, or dT22_2 to dP0_0.

Figure 3.8 Cross-Site Scripting Goals phase
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Table 3.10 CAPEC -63 PNPSC net Goals phase places
Place

Description

dP1_0_p

Goal flag - Execute Unauthorized Commands

dP2_0_t

Attack occurring - Execute Unauthorized Commands

dP3_0_t

Attack failed - Execute Unauthorized Commands

dP4_0_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Execute Unauthorized
Commands

dP5_0_t

Attack blocked - Execute Unauthorized Commands

dP6_0_t

Attack successful - Execute Unauthorized Commands

dP7_1_p

Goal flag - Modify Data

dP8_1_t

Attack occurring - Modify Data

dP9_1_t

Attack failed - Modify Data

dP10_1_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Modify Data

dP11_1_t

Attack blocked - Modify Data

dP12_1_t

Attack successful - Modify Data

dP13_2_p

Goal flag - Read Data

dP14_2_t

Attack occurring - Read Data

dP15_2_t

Attack failed - Read Data

dP16_2_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Read Data

dP17_2_t

Attack blocked - Read Data

dP18_2_t

Attack successful - Read Data

dP19_p

Goals phase failed
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Table 3.11 CAPEC-63 PNPSC net Goals phase transitions
Transition

Description

Rates

dT0_0

Attacker attempts - Execute Unauthorized Commands

3

dT1_0

Attacker fails in - Execute Unauthorized Commands

2

dT2_0

Defender monitors - Execute Unauthorized Commands

9

dT3_0

Defender blocks (active) - Execute Unauthorized
Commands

6

dT4_0

Defender blocks (passive) - Execute Unauthorized
Commands

3

dT5_0

Attacker succeeds in - Execute Unauthorized Commands

4

dT6_0

Attacker tries again - Execute Unauthorized Commands

6

dT7_0

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Execute
Unauthorized Commands

1

dT8_1

Attacker attempts - Modify Data

5

dT9_1

Attacker fails in - Modify Data

3

dT10_1

Defender monitors - Modify Data

6

dT11_1

Defender blocks (active) - Modify Data

9

dT12_1

Defender blocks (passive) - Modify Data

3

dT13_1

Attacker succeeds in - Modify Data

1

dT14_1

Attacker tries again - Modify Data

1

dT15_1

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Modify
Data

9

dT16_2

Attacker attempts - Read Data

9

dT17_2

Attacker fails in - Read Data

6

dT18_2

Defender monitors - Read Data

1
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Table 3.11 continued
Transition

Description

Rates

dT19_2

Defender blocks (active) - Read Data

4

dT20_2

Defender blocks (passive) - Read Data

1

dT21_2

Attacker succeeds in - Read Data

3

dT22_2

Attacker tries again - Read Data

3

dT23_2

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Read Data

5

Attacker fails in Goals phase

1

dT24

To continue with a specific path example, assume that transition dT16_2 fires next.
The token is consumed by the transition and two are generated. One token is placed in
dP14_2_t, which indicates the attacker attempted the goal Read Data, and the second is placed
in dP13_2_p which flags the goal the attacker is attempting. At this point, because dP14_2_t
and dP16_p do not contain tokens, the transition dT19_2 is not enabled because it has two
incoming edges. The currently enabled transitions are dT21_2, dT20_2, dT18_2, and dT17_2,
where the attack moves into a portion of the phase where the attacker can succeed or be
blocked by a defender. Assuming that the transition with the highest rate fires when there
are multiple enabled transitions, based on the given rates, dT17_2 fires, the token is removed
from dP14_2_t and added to dP15_2_t. At this point transitions dT23_2 and dT_22_2 are
enabled. According to the rates provided in this example, the transition that would fire next
would be dT23_2. This action will place a token in dP16_2_p, which represents the defender
gaining knowledge of the attack. Here, the enabled transition is dT22_2, where the attacker
can try again. The transition dT19_2 is still not enabled because at this current state, dP14_2_t
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does not contain a token, and as mentioned earlier, both dP14_2_t and dP16_2_p would need
to be marked for that transition to be enabled. Enabled transitions are dT0_0, dT8_1, dT16_2,
and dT24. This execution flow will continue until a place of success, failure, or being blocked
is marked.
3.3 CAPEC–63 Cross-Site Scripting Cost Analysis Example
This section will show a cost analysis of the attacker’s and the defender’s actions
by manually tracing an example execution of the PNPSC net from beginning to end. The
execution is based on specific transition firing rates, and the example will demonstrate the
calculation of the cost estimates of both the attacker’s and the defender’s actions at each
time step.
For this example, a specific execution sequence is explained step-by-step, and the
cost estimates to the attacker and defender are calculated. The assumption is that the
transition with the highest rate fires when there are multiple enabled transitions. Multiple
executions of the attack would be required to provide significant results, and this example
illustrates the process.
Costs marked by “(a)” are those associated with attacker, those with “(d)” are for
the defender. Transitions that are not player-controllable do not have a cost and therefore
do not cause for players to incur a cost.
Table 3.12 details the transitions, rates, actions, and results associated with enabled
transitions and the estimated cost associated if the transitions fire during the Explore phase
of CAPEC-63.
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Table 3.12 Explore phase cost estimate analysis for Cross-Site Scripting attack
Time Transition

Rate

Action & Result

Cost

1

qT0

4

Transition enabled – fires

2

aT0_0

7

Transition enabled – fires

aT6_1

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT12_2

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT1_0

5

Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in aP2_0_t and aP3_0_t) 2(a)

aT2_0

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

4

aT4_0

4

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in aP5_p)

5

aT5

5

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in bP0_p)

3

1(a)

The attacker will survey the application for user-controllable inputs, which is the only
enabled transition when the attack begins (qT0). This transition is not player controlled, and
therefore there is no cost associated with it firing. Once the attacker begins the Explore phase,
there will be three enabled transitions, all considered player-controllable by the attacker. Thus,
the attacker can manipulate the firing rates to influence which one fires. Transition aT0_0
fires, and the attacker will attempt to use a spidering tool to follow and record all links that
allow for parameters to be entered into the URL. Because this is an attacker-controllable
transition when it fires, the transition consumes the token resulting in a cost to the attacker of
1 unit. In this example, the estimated cost values are equivalent to the number of outgoing
tokens from the firing transition. A new set of transitions are enabled, and the attacker will
succeed or fail in gathering links. The defender is also able to detect that someone is using a
spidering tool against their website. Based on the assigned firing rates, the attacker succeeds
in using the spidering tool (aT1_0), which places tokens in aP2_0_t and aP3_0_t resulting in
a cost of 2 units for the attacker. The transition (aT4_0) representing success fires next. A
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token is placed in aP5_p and transition aT5 fires next, allowing the attack to continue to
the Experiment phase. The cost estimate analysis continues in Table 3.13.
Table 3.13 Experiment phase cost estimate analysis for Cross-Site Scripting attack
Time
6

7

8

Transition

Rate

Action & Result

bT0_0

8

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT5_1

9

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in bP6_1_t)

bT9_2

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT13_3

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT17

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT7_1

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT8_1

9(aP8_1_t +5)

bT6_1

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT4

3

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in cP0_p)

Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in bP9_1_t
and bP5_p)

Cost

1(a)

2(a)

Based on the given rates, assume transition bT5_1 fires, and the attacker will
attempt to use a proxy tool to record vulnerability results with a cost of 1. The attacker now
succeeds or fails. The defender also can gain knowledge of the attack. In the current
example, the success of the attacker (bT8_1) fires next. This rate is affected by currently
marked places that indicate relevant events that occurred earlier in the attack. During the
Explore phase, the attacker successfully used the spidering tool (aP2_0_t); thus, the token
that marks this place increases the transition rate for bT8_1 by adding five to it, which is a
notional value for this example. Increasing the rate did not impact the transition firings for
this example, but it could in actual execution. When the transition bT8_1 fires, places
bP9_1_t and bP5_p are marked. Marked place bP5_p allows the attacker to continue to the
Exploit phase of the attack. Table 3.14 details the estimated costs associated with the
actions in the Exploit phase.
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Based on the transition rates, the attacker attempts to load the victim’s browser with
scripts to expose invalid information to the user (cT17_4) with a cost of 1 for the attacker.
The next enabled transitions correspond to the attacker succeeding or failing and the
possibility of the defender gaining knowledge of the attack. In this example, the defender
gains knowledge of the attack (cT19_4). The cost for the defender to gain knowledge is 2
because two tokens are generated by the transition to mark cP20_4_t and cP18_4_t. With
a token placed back in cP18_4_t, the attacker will attempt to load the user’s browser with
scripts to gain access to information. Transition cT18_4 fires, and a token marks cP19_4_p.
Marked place cP19_4_p indicates an unsuccessful attack, and another token is placed in
cP0_p which will enable the attacker to attempt a different technique in the Exploit phase.
This time, instead of five attacker-controlled enabled transitions, there are only four
because browser scripts cannot be used again after a failure of this technique. The enabled
transition that fires next is cT5_1, which represents the attacker trying to inject commands
from their server, causing the browser to execute appropriately. Once again, with this
technique, the attacker will succeed, fail, or the defender will have the ability to gain
knowledge of the attack. Based on the transitions’ rates, the attacker succeeds in this
attempt (cT8_1). A token is placed in cP9_1_t to document the success of the exploit
attempt, and one token is put into place cP5_p to allow the attacker to continue to the Goals
phase of the attack. With the attacker’s success in the Exploit phase, the attacker can move
forward to the Goals phase. Table 3.15 details the estimated cost associated with the Goals
phase.
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Table 3.14 Exploit phase cost estimate analysis for Cross-Site Scripting attack
Time

Transition

Rate

9

cT0_0

6

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT5_1

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT9_2

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT13_3

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT17_4

9

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in
cP18_4_t)

cT21

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT20_4

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT19_4

6

Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in
cP18_4_t and cP20_4_p)

cT18_4

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT20_4

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT19_4

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT18_4

4

Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in
cP19_4_p and cP0_p)

cT0_0

6

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT5_1

7

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in
cP6_1_t)

cT9_2

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT13_3

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT17_4

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT6_1

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT7_1

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

10

11

12

13

Action & Result
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Cost

1(a)

2(d)

1(a)

Table 3.14 continued

Time

14

Transition

Rate

cT8_1

6(bP9_1_t)

cT4

3

Action & Result
Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in
cP9_1_t and cP5_p)

Cost
2(a)

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in
dP0_p)

Table 3.15 Goals phase cost estimate analysis for Cross-Site Scripting attack
Time

Transition

Rate

15

dT0_0

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT8_1

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT16_2

9

Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in
dP13_2_p and dP14_2_t)

dT24

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT17_2

6

Transitions enabled – fires (token placed in
dP15_2_t)

dT18_2

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT19_2

4

Transition not enabled

dT20_2

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT21_2

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT23_2

5

Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in
dP16_2_p and dP15_2_t)

dT22_2

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT23_2

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT22_2

3

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in dP0_p)

dT0_0

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT8_1

5

Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in
dP8_1_t and dP7_1_p)

16

17

18

19

Action & Result
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Cost

2(a)

1(a)

2(d)

1(a)

2(a)

Table 3.15 continued

Time

20

21

Transition

Rate

Action & Result

dT16_2

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT24

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT9_1

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT10_1

6(3+cP20_4_p)

dT11_1

9

Transition not enabled

dT12_1

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT13_1

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT9_1

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT10_1

4(1+cP20_4_p)

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT11_1

8

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in
dP11_1_t)

dT12_1

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT13_1

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

Transition enabled – fires (tokens placed in
dP8_1_t and dP10_1_p)

Cost

2(d)

1(d)

For this example, based on the enabled transitions’ firing rates, the attacker will
attempt to read data. Two tokens are generated. One token marks place dP13_2_p, which
represents the goal flat to read data, and a second token marks dP14_2_t, which represents
the attempt to read data. There are five transitions, but not all of them are enabled. The
“defender blocks (actively)” transition requires two marked places for it to be enabled. In
this example where the attacker is attempting to read data, the enabled transitions are:
(dT17_2) the attacker fails, (dT21_2) the attacker succeeds, (dT18_2) defender monitors
the attack, (dT23_2) defender monitors the attack due to the attacker failing attempt, or
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(dT20_2) defender passively blocks the attack. With a firing rate of 6, transition dT17_2
fires, representing the attacker failing to read data. Since the attacker has failed to read
data, the defender can now learn about the attack, or the attacker may try a different attack.
With a firing rate of 5, transition dT23_2 fires. This represents the defender gaining
knowledge that the attack is taking place, and the attacker proceeds to attempt another goal.
While the defender has gained knowledge of the attack, the defender cannot block
the attack because the transition that allows for an active block requires two places to be
marked. The attacker returns to the beginning of the Goals phase and can either attempt a
different goal or the same one. Based on the calculated firing rates for the transitions at
this time step, the transition that fires is the one that allows for the attacker to complete the
goal to modify data (dT8_1). There are five transitions with the read data goal, four of
which are enabled. The fifth is not because it requires two places to be marked. At this
time, only one place contains a token. Out of the four enabled transitions, the transition for
the defender to monitor the attack fires. The firing of this transition places a token into
(dP8_1_t) attack occurring and (dP10_1_p) defense knowledge of the attack. With these
places marked, the transition becomes enabled to actively block the attack with the other
four transitions. Following the firing rates displayed in Table 3.15, transition dT11_1 fires
next, which results in the blocking of the attack and the attacker no longer being able to
proceed. In a final analysis of the estimated cost of this attack the attacker had a cost of 15
units while the defender had a cost of 7 units.
3.4 Summary
An extension to the definition of Petri nets adds inhibitor arcs. With the use of
inhibitor arcs, models can now represent a defense mechanism interrupting an attack. Since
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resources are required to fulfill tasks and attackers and defenders must have them available,
therefore tracking of these resources by analyzing the estimated cost associated with the
defender and attacker’s decision is incorporated in the specification of the PNPS
formalism. In addition to the enhancements to the Petri Nets with Players and Strategies,
the formal theorem and proof demonstrate that in a PNPSC net the probability that an
enabled transition will fire is proportional to its rate. Lastly, a simple example to illustrate
the calculation of cost was provided based on a PNPSC model for CAPEC-63 Cross-Site
Scripting attack. The next chapter explains the process of a structured face validation of
PNPSC models which was conducted to explore the models acceptability for research
purposes.
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CHAPTER 4. STRUCTURED FACE VALIDATION OF PNPSC MODELS

Early in the research program, an initial validation of several preliminary PNPSC
nets was conducted [Christiansen, 2017]. Those efforts involved building PNPSC models
and performing the attack on an actual computer system as specified in the model. The
attacks were performed on an isolated laboratory computer running the Metasploitable
operating system, a version of Linux with intentionally included vulnerabilities. Initial
experiments were successful in carrying out an attack with actions specified in the PNPSC
model. Although the PNPSC models tested in that manner were successfully validated,
those early models did not use all of the features of the PNPSC formalism. In addition,
those models primarily focused on the execution of the attack and not on the defender’s
potential actions. Subsequent validation efforts included all aspects of the PNPSC
formalism, such as multiple players and notional costs. Portions of this chapter are from
[Bland, 2018] [Cantrell, 2018].
4.1 Choice and Construction of Models
PNPSC models were manually developed of the following CAPEC attack
patterns:
•

CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting

•

CAPEC-66 SQL Injection

•

CAPEC-163 Spear Phishing

•

CAPEC-169 Footprinting
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These entries were selected from the CAPEC database based on the Open Web
Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 list for cybersecurity vulnerabilities or
supporting activities that can lead to a compromised system [OWASP, 2017]. Several
versions of PNPSC models of those attack patterns were manually constructed, reviewed
and assessed, and revised over a period of several months.
4.2 Validation
To validate the four PNPSC models, each model had a validation packet prepared
for it. The validation packet included the following:
•

A printout of the CAPEC attack pattern description

•

A diagram of the PNPSC model

•

A series of tables describing the places, transitions, associated rates, and
rates’ updates based on the PNPSC model’s state.

•

A questionnaire with 14 questions on a Likert scale intended to assess the
validity of aspects of the models used, followed by an open-ended
question requesting suggestions for improvements.

Before the actual validation of the PNPSC models, the validation process itself was
tested with the assistance of a member of the full-time research staff of the UAH
Information Technology and Systems Center. The tester holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science
and is a cybersecurity expert and researcher. This test identified several deficiencies in the
validation process. The deficiencies included omission of key Petri net concepts, the
absence of clear instructions, and a description detailing the development of the model.
The results from this preliminary evaluation were discarded and the validation process was
improved.
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4.2.1

Validation Activities

Two validation sessions were conducted. One was held in Huntsville, Alabama, on
April 9, 2018. The other was held in Nashville, Tennessee, on April 27, 2018. Between
these two sessions, a total of fourteen subject matter experts in cybersecurity were engaged.
Experts from multiple organizations were involved that represented government, higher
education, and healthcare. Before beginning their assessment of the models, the subject
matter experts, referred to as experts in the rest of the chapter, were given a short briefing.
The briefing was to explain and provide instructions on the validation packets that they
were asked to use during their assessment of the models, the briefing covered the following
topics:
•

The research program

•

CAPEC database and descriptions

•

Petri nets

•

PNPSC models

•

Expectations of the validation process

•

How to complete the validation

In these validation sessions, corrected and improved materials from the preliminary
test of the validation process.
In both locations, a research team member unknown to the experts before the
session delivered the briefing. The experts could discuss the material openly and consult
the research team member for clarification during the assessment. Every effort was made
to ensure that the two sessions were similar. The goal of maintaining similarity was to
reduce the probability of bias being introduced into the validation results.
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The experts evaluated the four PNPSC models for two hours. During those two
hours, questions were encouraged, repeated to the entire group, and answered for the whole
group to ensure common understanding.
During the evaluation, the experts identified two errors in the models provided in
the validation packets. These errors consisted of an extra transition arc on one net and the
mislabeling of a transition/place pair. In both cases, the errors were corrected, and the
experts were informed.
4.2.2

Qualification of Subject Matter Experts

The experts were asked demographic questions. The results of those questions are
summarized in Appendix A. The experts were selected from a government research
laboratory that focuses on applied cybersecurity and from a group of practicing
cybersecurity engineers and leaders working in healthcare and education. These experts
were diverse in levels of experience, education, and frequency of cybersecurity activities.
Most of the experts had limited experience with Petri nets. All of the experts had at least
five years of experience in cybersecurity.
4.2.3

Testing Method

For each of the four CAPEC attack pattern descriptions modeled, the following
statements were evaluated by the experts:
1. You are familiar with the attack pattern [descriptions].
2. The given Petri net makes sense from a conceptual point of view.
3. The attacker’s places and transitions make sense for actions that an attacker
can perform.
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4. The defender’s places and transitions make sense for actions that a defender
can perform.
5. The places/transitions combinations represent realistic states and actions that
can be performed.
6. Attacker’s places/transitions accurately represent actions an attacker can take.
7. Defender’s places/transitions accurately represent actions a defender can take.
8. The PNPSC net accurately represents events or situations that occur during
the given cybersecurity attack.
9. The CAPEC entry accurately models the specified cyberattack.
10. The PNPSC net accurately models the CAPEC entry.
11. The PNPSC net accurately models the specified cyberattack.
12. The rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the attacker/defender.
13. The costs described in the briefing accurately reflect the costs for this net.
14. The given PNPSC net models the given cyberattack in a correct enough way
to be useful for research.
The experts responded to these statements using the following Likert scale:
1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree
4. Agree
5. Strongly Agree
Responses of Strongly Disagree, Disagree, and Neither Agree nor Disagree were
interpreted as the subject matter expert disagreeing with the statement, and responses of
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Agree and Strongly Agree were interpreted as the subject matter expert agreeing with the
statement. This is a conservative interpretation of the Likert scale because 3 corresponds
to “Neither Agree nor Disagree” but was treated as disagreement. The aggregated
responses were tested using a statistical hypothesis test of proportion.
This method is considered statistically valid if both of the following are true:
np > 5
n(1–p)>5

In this method, p is the probability of success, meaning a response > 3, and n was
the number of respondents. On each submitted survey, all questions were answered. The
value of p was arbitrarily assigned the value 0.5, so p = 1 - p. The number of completed
surveys varied by attack, corresponding to the value of n. Table 4.1 summarizes the
confirmation that the requirements of the statistical test were met.
The binomial proportion of a sample is computed
𝑝̂ =

𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠

Denote 𝓃 ≡ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠.

For a binomial proportion, the mean
𝜇 = 𝑝 = 0.5

And the variance
𝜎2 =

𝑝(1 − 𝑝)
𝓃

Where 𝑝 is the probability of success. Recall the assumption 𝑝 = 0.5 where H0: 𝑝 = 0.5
and H1: 𝑝 > 0. 5 [Brase, 2015].
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Table 4.1 Statistical validity
CAPEC Attack Pattern
CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting
CAPEC-66 SQL Injection
CAPEC-163 Spear Phishing
CAPEC-169 Footprinting

n
11
12
13
11

p
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

np
5.5
6
6.5
5.5

n(1–p)
5.5
6
6.5
5.5

The null hypothesis indicated that the group disagreed with the statement.
Therefore, the following was sought out:

𝑃(𝑝̂ ≥ 0.5) ≈ 𝑃(𝑝 ≥ 0.5) = 𝑃 𝑧 ≥
(

0.5 − 0.5
2
√0.5
𝑛 )

= 𝑃(𝑧 > 0)

The 𝑝-value is the cumulative probability corresponding to the value of 𝑧. The test
strategy calls for 95% confidence, so whenever the 𝑝-value is greater than 0.05, the result
is that the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, and the test is considered inconclusive. The
𝑝-value represents the probability of a Type I error or a case where the null hypothesis is
rejected and is, in fact, true.
4.2.4

Validation Results

The null hypothesis for each of the 14 validation statements was that the experts
disagreed with the statement. Appendix A summarizes the analysis of the survey results
for the related CAPEC attack pattern entries represented by PNPSC models.
The results presented in Table A.6 suggest that for CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting,
the experts generally agreed that the PNPSC model was a valid representation of the
CAPEC attack pattern, except for the model’s rates and costs. Notably, many organizations
consider rate and cost data to be sensitive, so that data for input modeling is rarely available.
This finding related to rates and costs is consistent with all four models’ subject matter
expert assessment.
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Similar to the results in Table A.6, the results presented in Table A.7 suggest that
for CAPEC-66 SQL Injection, the experts generally agreed that the PNPSC model was a
valid representation of the CAPEC attack pattern, except for the model’s rates and costs.
Similar to the results in Table A.6 and Table A.7, the results presented in Table A.8
suggests that for CAPEC-163 Spear Phishing, the experts generally agreed that the PNPSC
model was a valid representation of the CAPEC attack pattern, except for the model’s rates
and costs.
The survey results for CAPEC-163 Spear Phishing differed from the results for the
other attack patterns because of one statement: “The CAPEC entry accurately models the
specified cyberattack.” The experts’ responses failed to reject the null hypothesis for this
statement. Comments from the experts suggest there may be concerns about the
completeness of the PNPSC model.
The results of CAPEC-169 Footprinting were different. Analysis of the responses
regarding rates and costs resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis. Responses to
statements about the Petri net as a whole and the CAPEC description were also rejected.
The results are presented in Table A.9. The overall result of the structured face validation
was that for three of the four PNPSC models (63, 66, and 163), the null hypothesis of
disagreement with the summary statement (“The given Petri net models the given
cyberattack in a correct enough way to be useful for research.”) was rejected. These
rejections were interpreted as the experts agreeing that those three PNPSC models were
valid.
The research team modeled the Explore phase of some related attack patterns along
with CAPEC-169 Footprinting to provide enough detail for an assessment. However, all
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related attack patterns were not included, which may have confused the experts and
partially explained the results.
4.3 Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to document the results gathered during a structured
face validation activity. This activity was designed to measure the validity of PNPSC
models constructed from CAPEC attack pattern descriptions and ascertain validity for
research. In general, the validation is considered a success in that errors were corrected in
the PNPSC models and that three out of four models were assessed to be valid for research,
suggesting the method is valid within limits.
The PNPSC model constructed from CAPEC-169 Footprinting was the only
PNPSC model that failed validation on more than three statements, and the only CAPEC
attack pattern description classified as a Meta abstraction pattern. All Detailed and
Standard abstraction patterns were validated.
Rates and costs failed validation for all four models. The rate and cost calculations
will be considered notional estimates until a better method of justifying the rate and cost
calculations and the initial values is developed.
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CHAPTER 5. PNPSC MODEL COMPONENTS
AND COMPOSITION METHODS
Most computer systems could be vulnerable to more than one type of attack, and
so it may be necessary to combine or compose multiple PNPSC models to represent
the various ways or patterns by which a particular computer system could be attacked.
Multiple “component” PNPSC models, each representing a single attack pattern,
would

be composed into a single integrated or “composite” PNPSC model,

representing all of the attack patterns that apply to the target system. Doing so requires
that the component models of single attack patterns be structures so as to be
composable. That may require the component models to include additional places and
transitions to serve as “connections” that enable the component models to be
composed. The connectors must be designed to preserve the modeling semantics of
the component models and pass needed state information through the connections.
Portions of this chapter are from [Mayfield, 2019a] [Maxwell, 2021].
Cyberattack model composition demands understanding of composability.
Composability has different meanings that depend on context; for various definitions, see
[Biddle, 2000] [Harkrider, 1999] [JSIMS, 1997] [Kasputis, 2000] [Page, 1998] [Petty,
2003a] [Pratt, 1999]. Six levels are given in [Petty, 2019b]: application, federate,
package, parameter, module and model. The model level has also been referred to as
“object-level”, “component”, and “reconfigurable models” [Post, 2002] [JSIMS, 1997]
[Diaz-Calderon,
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2000]. Composability in this project will be at the “model” level. The model level will
compose smaller-scale models into a larger-scale model. Because PNPSC nets can be
formally defined with mathematical notation, a formal approach to composability will be
used so that the structure and behavior of a model is specific. Even though it was designed
for embedded and cyber-physical systems, the Formal System Design (ForSyDe)
methodology is a recent formal modeling methodology that uses model composition
capabilities and may serve as a framework in this project [Attarzade-Niaki, 2016].
The definition of composability used in this project is a variation of the definition
provided by Petty and Weisel [Petty, 2003a]. Composability is the capability to select and
assemble component cyberattack models to form a composite cyberattack model of the
possible attacks on a target computer system based on specific requirements. This chapter
discusses the abstraction levels and relationships of CAPEC attack pattern description,
defines a PNPSC model as a coarse-grain component, and the components within a PNPSC
model as fine-grain components. This chapter also provides the definition of coarse-grain
and fine-grain components, and the developed processes to compose models based on their
component levels.
5.1 Levels and Relationships of CAPEC Attack Patterns
In the CAPEC database, each of the CAPEC attack patterns are classified into one
of three levels: Meta, Standard, and Detailed.
A Meta level attack pattern is an abstract characterization of a methodology or
technique used in an attack. It often omits a specific technology or implementation and
provides a model of a high-level approach. It is a generalization of a related group of
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Standard level attack patterns and is particularly useful for architecture and exercises in
modeling threat levels.
A Standard level attack pattern focuses on a specific methodology or technique
used in an attack. The Standard level attack pattern is considered a fully executable attack.
A Standard level attack pattern provides sufficient details to understand the technique and
its attempts to accomplish the desired goal. It is a specific type of an abstract Meta level
attack pattern.
A Detailed level attack pattern provides a low level of detail, typically leveraging
a technique targeting a specific technology, and it expresses a complete execution flow.
Detailed level attack patterns are more specific than Meta and Standard level attack patterns
and often require a protection mechanism to mitigate actual attacks. A Detailed level attack
pattern will often leverage several different Standard level attack patterns chained together
to accomplish a goal.
Each CAPEC attack pattern description may be related to other attack patterns,
defined as “ChildOf” and “ParentOf” relationships. This information gives insight into
similar aspects of an attack that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction.
5.2 Coarse-grain Components
Coarse-grain components represent a single cyberattack pattern, such as SQL
Injection. Coarse-grain components can be selected and composed to model the multiple
methods used to attack a target computer system.
Within the CAPEC database, several attack patterns serve as parents of or as
children of other patterns. A parent pattern includes one or more child patterns in how an
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attacker can accomplish their attack. In this case, a coarse-grain PNPSC model is a
complete model designed by composing several individual CAPEC attack patterns.
Figure 5.1 shows the component model of a Privilege Abuse cyberattack.
Privilege Abuse is a composite attack where the attacker can attempt three different attack
patterns. The folder shapes in the diagram labeled with their CAPEC attack pattern
number represent these different attack patterns. The model can result in 3 distinct states.
The attacker can succeed, be blocked by a defender, or fails (represented by places A1,
A2, A3). In the figure, Q3 represents the action for the attacker to begin based on the
attacker having the pre-requisites knowledge to perform a system attack. The places with
double lines represent “plug-ins” (connectors) that are within each of the PNPSC
components.

Figure 5.1 Coarse-grain framework design for components
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5.3 Fine-grain Components
A CAPEC attack pattern may have up to four phases: (1) Explore, (2) Experiment,
(3) Exploit, and (4) Goals. PNPC models of CAPEC attack patterns reflect that structure,
with a clearly distinguishable portion of a model representing each phase. Each phase has
a set of techniques that the attacker will attempt to progress through. The attacker can
achieve their goal or be blocked in the Experiment or Exploit phases. A fine-grain PNPSC
net component is a subnet designed to represent a technique modeled in one of the four
phases. These fine-grain components can then be selected to compose a “new”
cyberattack pattern not found in the CAPEC database.

Figure 5.2 PNPSC net sample Explore phase
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Figure 5.2 shows the model of a technique found within the Explore phase of
some PNPSC nets. Within this diagram, the places that are double-walled and bolded are
“plug-ins.” These “plug-ins” represent the possibility of tracking whether an attacker fails
during the execution of exploration technique. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, there are two
techniques that the attacker can follow to complete the Explore phase of the attack. One
technique follows the transition labeled AT0 and the second follows AT6.
Figure 5.2 contains a special symbol labeled “Bypass”. A bypass is a single
transition that represents the attacker essentially skipping a phase, e.g., proceeding from
the beginning to the end of the phase without executing the techniques within the phase.
In Figure 5.2, the bypass represents the attacker skipping the Explore phase. Not all
CAPEC attack patterns, and thus not all PNPSC models, contain a bypass. CAPEC-163,
Spear Phishing, in version 3.1 of the CAPEC attack pattern descriptions, is the only
description that contains the option to bypass a phase. In the documentation, the option is
found in the Experiment phase. However, with the possibility that an attacker may not
need to perform exploring actions, the model in Figure 5.2 shows a bypass within the
Explore phase. If the Explore phase is bypassed, the attacker proceeds with the next phase
of the attack.
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Figure 5.3 Explore phase framework for components

Figure 5.3 displays a PNPSC net where the Explore phase would be a
“placeholder” (the 3D box in the diagram) for the ability to “plug-in” components.
Additional components were added in parallel in the Explore phase of the model, more
information on composition operations are found later in the chapter.
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Figure 5.4 Component design for Explore phase

Figure 5.4 shows the places and transitions that correspond to the design of
component models representing techniques within the Explore phase. There is one input
place in the PNPSC model used as a “plug-in” for the component. Following the example
to the left side of the bypass option, there are four output places. One of the output places
(A11) is not part of the PNPSC net Explore phase design. A11 is here to support
communication between the model components.
In the PNPSC nets used in these examples, the Experiment phase follows the
Explore phase. It may also contain different techniques that the attacker may follow,
which will result in one of three outcomes: success, failure, or a defender becomes aware
that there is an attack attempt occurring. CAPEC-163, Spear Phishing, includes the
possibility of attackers attempting to bypass the Experiment phase. There is also the
possibility that an attacker will attempt all the possible experiment techniques. If the
attacker fails he/she will no longer be able to proceed with the attack, hence the “FAIL”
place.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 5.5 PNPSC net sample Experiment phase (a) and Exploit phase (b)

Figure 5.5a displays the Experiment phase, and 5.5b displays the Exploit phase of
a PNPSC net. In the PNPSC model, the bolded fail places found in both images are the
same place.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 5.6 Framework for components Experiment phase (a) and Exploit phase (b)

The Exploit phase proceeds the Experiment phase in the PNPSC net and has an
identical structure, except for the bypass option. When an attacker does not have the
option to bypass the Experiment phase, the attacker must succeed in one of the techniques
to proceed to the Exploit phase. The same is true for an Exploit phase; the attacker will
need to succeed through one of the techniques to move forward to the Goals phase. The
Experiment phase and the Exploit phase of a PNPSC net have similar designs, as shown
in Figure 5.6a and 5.6b
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Figure 5.7 Component design for experiment and Exploit phases

Figure 5.7 displays the design of the components found within both the
Experiment and Exploit phases. The last phase of the PNPSC net is the Goals phase. In
this phase, instead of having techniques to attempt, the attacker has a goal that he/she is
trying to accomplish based on all possible objectives associated with the attack. In
general, a player’s goal in a PNPSC net is represented by a desired marking of a place or
places in the net. Once an attacker begins his/her attempt on a goal, the place “goal flag”
(D1 and D7 in Figure 5.8) is marked with a token. The markings that are found in the
“goal flag” allows for an analyst to be able to determine which goal and how many times
that specific goal was attempted. While attempting to attain the desired goal, there are
several results. The defender can block the attacker. The defender might gain additional
knowledge that would later allow the defender to block the attacker. The attacker may
fail. Finally, the attacker may ultimately succeed in attaining his/her goal. If the attacker
fails to attain the desired goal, it leads to a defender gathering more information about the
attack. The attacker may then attempt a different attack goal if one exists, or attempt the
same goal again. However, the attacker’s chances of being blocked are more probable
because the defender is aware of the attack.
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Figure 5.8 PNPSC net sample Goals phase

Figure 5.9 Goals phase component framework for PNPSC net
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Figure 5.10 Goals phase component design

Figure 5.8 displays the Goals phase of a PNPSC net with two possible goals that
the attacker may attempt. Each goal has its own success and block places so that an
analyst is able to identify the goal that an attacker was successful in or blocked from,
however there is only one fail place that is marked whenever the attacker fails to achieve
the possible goals. Figure 5.9 displays the framework for using component “plug-ins.”
Figure 5.10 displays the design of components used within the Goals phase. All
components will have a respective success and block place, however the fail place is a
single place that all goals have an arc to in the case the attacker fails to accomplish a goal
or is not blocked by a defender.
Because fine-grain component models represent a specific technique used within a
phase to fulfill that part of the attack, each phase in the PNPSC model may have one or
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more fine-grain components. In order to model the possibility of an attacker using a
technique that was not previously identified as part of an attack pattern, the fine-grain
component that represents that technique could be integrated into the model of that pattern.
5.4 Composition Operations
The algebra and composition operations proposed by Hamadi et al. [Hamadi, 2003]
were used as the conceptual basis for cyberattack model composition in this work. This
project defines four operations that are applied to allow PNPSC models to be composed
together. These four methods are (1) sequential operation (2) parallel operation (3) a
combination of sequential and parallel operations, and (4) a bottom-up approach, otherwise
known as a generalization operation [Mayfield, 2018b]. Böhm and Jacopini showed that
sequence, selection, and iteration are sufficient control structures for any algorithm [Böhm,
1966]. For this project, iteration was not one of the operations used for composition for
three reasons (1) iteration is easy to implement using standard Petri net structures, e.g.,
Figure 2.3 (b) and Figure 2.3 (c) both have iteration in them, (2) the “loopbacks” present
in some of the case studies are a form of iteration, and (3) the attack pattern description in
the CAPEC database does not document the ability of an attacker to repeat attempt failed
techniques.
5.4.1

Sequential Operation

In the initial sequential operation, the composition consists of an initial attack
model where the attacker will succeed, be blocked or fail the attack. The initial model is
then followed by a second model where the attacker will succeed, be blocked or fail the
attack. In this scenario of sequential composition, if the attacker fails to accomplish their
goal, he/she can then attempt a different attack, if the attacker is successful he/she
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succeeded and therefore there is no need to continue with a second attack, and if the
attacker is blocked he/she does not have the option to continue to a second attack. The
composition consists of one or more additional models being connected to the fail place of
the preceding model, the number of attack models that are sequentially composed depends
on how many attacks the attacker has the knowledge to attempt.

Figure 5.11 Generic PNPSC-1 model
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Figure 5.12 Generic PNPSC-2 model

Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 represent two different generic PNPSC models to be
composed. For a sequential composition of these two PNPSC models the attacker will first
go through PNPSC-1. If the attacker succeeds, there is no continuation to the second
PNPSC model. If the attacker fails, then he/she will have the opportunity to continue to the
PNPSC-2 model. When composing the PNPSC model, there will be an outgoing arc added
to the fail transition of the PNPSC-1 model. This arc will lead to a place called “SeqComp”
that allows the attacker to continue to the second model, producing a composition of
sequential attacks. When the fail transition for PNPSC-1fires, in addition to a token being
placed in the respective places within PNPSC-1, a token will also be placed into
“SeqComp”. For PNPSC-2 to be able to execute, a token must be present in the place(s)
for the pre-requisites associated to PNPSC-2, and also in the “SeqComp” place. If
“SeqComp” does not contain a toke, the transition to begin the attack for PNPSC-2 will
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not be enabled. Within the second attack model, there is still the opportunity that the
attacker will succeed, be blocked, or fail. Adding transitions to connect more PNPSC
models to the failing place of the attack model that just failed further expands the
composition. Through a similar process of using “connectors” different identified
components may be composed, the compositions may also be considered based on the view
that the model is being evaluated.
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Figure 5.13 Generic sequential composition

The sequential composition of PNPSC-1 and PNPSC-2 is shown in Figure 5.13.
For this project the focus of sequential composition is on coarse-grain which is described
in more detail later.
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5.4.2

Parallel Operation

Through the use of the parallel operation, the composed model represents both
attacks occurring simultaneously. The attacker can succeed, fail, or be blocked. Figure 5.14
represents a PNPSC model; the places and transitions are filled in with color to provide a
graphical demonstration of how the parallel operation for composition works.

Figure 5.14 Partial PNPSC model design 1
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Figure 5.15 Partial PNPSC model design 2

Figure 5.15 represents a second PNPSC model, where some places and transitions
are also colored. The colors between the two models in Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15
represent techniques within the two models that are the same. Each colored technique is
represented by a specific subnet, and using the same technique can be modeled with the
same subnet.
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Figure 5.16 Parallel composition of models found in Figures 5.4 & 5.5

Figure 5.16 illustrates how both of these cyberattacks would run in parallel. The
nodes that correspond to each of the two PNPSC models that are identical are combined so
that the actions are represented only once, and there is no repetition. The attacker can
attempt specific techniques once and have outcomes that he/she would use for either of the
parallel attacks that are currently taking place.
It is important to notice that the order of the operations may affect the result of the
attack. For example, the attacker may try three attacks in sequential order. After failing all
three, the attacker may decide to go for an all or nothing by conducting a parallel attack.
The attacker could also start with a multiple attack in parallel, and failing those decide to
go for a last try through a sequential attack following the failed ones.
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5.4.3

Generalization Operation

With a composition based on generalization, there is no PNPSC model to begin the
composition. The concept of generalization, adopted from database systems, is a reverse
process of abstraction to suppress differences and identify common features that allow
multiple pieces to come together [Elmarsi, 2016]. For example, if there is an identified
class for “cars” and an identified class for “trucks,” these classes could be generalized into
a superclass of “Vehicle.” The composition operation of generalization uses the same
process, except that, for this project, the pieces brought together are models of techniques.
Similar to the sequential operation, there may be other identified pieces in the future that
may be able to be composed through this process.
With a focus on the identified fine-grain components, the person creating the
composed model would want to identify techniques that correspond to a specific phase of
a PNPSC model. Based on the selected techniques of that phase, the person would need to
work backward and determine what techniques in the preceding phase of a PNPSC model
would lead to the ones that have already been composed together.
Therefore, the person creating the model uses generalization by working backward
from the Goals phase through the Explore phase of a PNPSC model. Chapter 8 provides a
more detailed example of this operation.
5.5 Composition Approaches
With the operations for composition defined, this section describes the methods of
composition based on the granularity of a PNPSC model. All four operations described
earlier are applied in this project. In the coarse-grain composition approach, a sequential
composition would imply a failure in the attempt to conduct an attack (as a consequence

99

of the attacker’s actions and not from being detected by a defender) followed by a different
attack that will allow the attacker to attempt to fulfill his/her objective. A parallel
composition implies several attacks occurring concurrently. The composition operation to
be used, whether sequential or parallel, may need additional Petri net places and transitions
to ensure that the model’s design is structurally verified to follow the formal definition of
a PNPSC net. Each composition operation requires the identification and description of
new places and transitions. In the case of a parent-child composition the concept of
inheritance is applied. Two concepts of inheritance are used in this method of composition:
(1) single inheritance or (2) multilevel inheritance [Maxwell, 2020].
Single level inheritance is where subclasses (children) inherit the features of a
superclass (parent). This process is similar to object-oriented programming where a class
inherits the properties of another class. Multilevel inheritance occurs when one subclass
inherits from another [Nygaard, 1978]. While single inheritance is straightforward
regarding a parent-child relationship, there are attack patterns that are children of one attack
pattern and a parent of another attack pattern resulting in the multilevel inheritance. More
details with corresponding examples of these composition methods on coarse-grain
components are discussed further in Chapter 7.
In the fine-grain composition approach, a parallel composition would create one of
the four phases of a PNPSC model. A sequential composition consists of creating a model
where the attacker attempts one technique after an unsuccessful attempt of another
technique. The attacker can also combine multiple newly created phases from a parallel
composition to build a coarse-grain model. In most cases, the creation of a PNPSC model
through the use of fine-grain component composition is a top-down approach. The bottom-
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up approach is also a composition method. Further discussion and examples of fine-grain
component composition methods are provided in Chapter 8.
5.6 Summary
One goal of composability is to show that a composed model is correct from both
the syntactic and semantic perspective. Syntactic composability demonstrates that the
components can be connected and effectively exchange data. However, achieving syntactic
composability does not necessarily produce semantic composability, which determines
whether the composed model is valid, and if the combined computation is semantically
correct [Pratt, 1999] [Petty, 2019a] [Ceranowicz, 2002]. This chapter has discussed the
different levels associated with the documentation of the CAPEC attack pattern
descriptions. In addition, two levels of granularity for the design of PNPSC model
components were described, along with a brief discussion of how these components can be
combined. The next chapter covers the appropriate selection of PNPSC model components
for the composition of different cyberattack models.
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CHAPTER 6. A TOOL FOR COMPONENT SELECTION

In practical applications, producing composite models from reusable component
models requires more than just the component models themselves. A supporting
infrastructure with two interrelated capabilities is also needed. Those capabilities are a
database or repository to store the component models and a process for discovering or
filtering component models in the database and selecting the right component models to be
composed.
With respect to the latter, selecting component models for composition, that process
has been proven in general to be NP-complete [Petty, 2003b] [Petty, 2006]. However, in
practical applications component selection may be possible in acceptable time through the
development and use of appropriate metadata and heuristic selection processes [Taylor,
2015].
This chapter describes a model Repository tool implemented in this work. The
Repository provides both storage for component models and a graphical user interface
designed to assist users with selecting component models for composition based on model
metadata. Different mechanisms can be used to create a framework, including rules,
protocols, standards, programming language structures, interface design, data translators,
converters, and data transport utilities.
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6.1 Background
Multiple definitions of the term “framework” have been proposed. Mili et al.
defines a framework as a “set of interacting objects that, together, realize a set of functions”
[Mili, 2002]. Jacobson et al. explains a framework as a “subsystem that contains abstract
and concrete types and classes designed for reuse” [Jacobson, 1997]. Because it is a flexible
concept, the core ideas of a framework can be adapted to various specific purposes. A
framework for the composition of component models must support their storage and
selection, taking into consideration the application and granularity of the models. However,
consideration must be made based on the use of components, that there is a method in place
that will support their integration and interoperation, and that components may be reused
and combined at different times.
Barnum and Sethi discussed using attack patterns from the attacker’s perspective
as the foundation for capturing and communicating an attacker’s process and techniques
for exploiting software [Barnum, 2007]. In an earlier study, Li et al. stated that their
prototype worked in terms of goals and tasks from the attacker’s perspective [Li, 2014]. In
more recent work, Li et al. adopted the attacker’s perspective and used the CAPEC
database. Li et al., they identify operational attacks and then apply security controls from
the defender’s perspective [Li, 2015].
6.2 Model Selection Process
The implemented model selection process incorporates ideas from prior related
work. Yuan et al. described the development of a tool used to retrieve relevant CAPEC
attack pattern descriptions for software development, based on patterns that are relevant to
STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, denial of service,
Elevation of privilege), and utilized in Microsoft’s SDL (Security Development Lifecycle)
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process. That tool can retrieve relevant attack patterns of a specific STRIDE threat
category, sorted from most relevant and useful to least relevant and useful. Yuan et al.
proposed a metric (U) that measures the usefulness or importance of an attack pattern based
on information found in the CAPEC database and STRIDE categories. They also stated
that the tool would allow for attack patterns to be searched based on keywords. Their
solution focused on the development cycle of an application [Yuan, 2014]. Pauli and
Engebretson described the characteristics of a prototype tool that automates the population
of CAPEC attack pattern hierarchies. That tool, also provides system pre-requisite
information and suggests mitigation strategies for a new system under design. Their
proposed tool has some similarities to the solution forwarded by Yuan et al., except that it
is focused on the system itself taking into consideration the input associated to hardware,
operating system used, and server configurations [Pauli, 2008].
This project aims to model and simulate cyberattacks to any system based on
system vulnerabilities, including those already in production. The selection process is a
key step in modeling and subsequently simulating a cyberattack.
6.3 Design of an Assistive Selection Tool
The software tool developed in this work, which will be referred to as the
Repository, was designed to store CAPEC attack pattern descriptions with a front-facing
web interface to allow users to look up entries based on specific details. The Repository
consists of two parts: (1) a backend database, which stores CAPEC attack pattern
descriptions and information about the PNPSC models, (2) a web interface, which allows
the user to search through the attack pattern descriptions, import PNPSC models and
modify information stored in the database associated to those models.
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Following an agile methodology, one of the first tasks was determining the user
stories needed to implement the Repository. A user may want to:
•

Filter the database by specific attack criteria

•

Enter new attack entries into the database

•

Search for attack patterns with matching purposes

•

Search for attack patterns by level of CIA impact

•

Search for attack patterns by level of typical severity

•

Search for attack patterns by the likelihood of exploit

•

Search for attack patterns by the method of attack

•

Search for attack patterns by abstraction

•

Search for attack patterns by attack motivation

•

Store PNPSC models

•

Modify PNPSC models

•

Enter new PNPSC models

The Repository provides storage and the capability to search through the CAPEC
attack pattern descriptions. It also stores the code to generate graphical models through
Graphviz [Graphviz, 2018]. The Repository allows users to filter through the CAPEC
attack pattern descriptions and add, edit, and delete attack pattern model components. The
Repository also allows users to view a textual representation of the attack pattern models
and images of imported models.
The Repository has two primary components: a database and a graphical user
interface (GUI). A script that reads an XML file of the CAPEC attack pattern descriptions
populates the database with its initial data for this project. The user is then able to use the
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GUI to retrieve information from the database, through the use of scripts that are written
into the interface to provide the appropriate retrieval functionality.
The database is composed of thirteen tables, as shown in Figure 6.1. Some of the
tables contain information associated with the stored models, place, transitions, arc, and
inhibitor arc information, while the other tables store the information drawn from the
CAPEC attack pattern descriptions.
The user does not access the database directly. A web-based GUI runs the set of
scripts that provide information on the formatting and design of the PNPSC models. Scripts
also handle user input and will query the database based on filtering user-selected options
provided by the user. Figure 6.2 displays the home screen of the graphical user interface,
which lists all attacks stored from the CAPEC database. The drop-down option on the top
left side allows the user to filter the data to narrow down the list of attacks. Figure 6.3
displays one of the screens associated with modifying, editing, and adding information to
the database. In Figure 6.3, a PNPSC model place is either being added to a model or
deleted. Across the top portion of the GUI, users can select other options associated with
the PNPSC models, or they can go back to filter attacks further. Lastly, Figure 6.4 displays
the generated information for a PNPSC model. A model of SQL Injection are shown in this
example. At this point, the user needs to transfer the text displayed on the website into
Graphviz, a third-party software. Graphviz will then generate a graphical model [Graphviz,
2018]. An image of the graphical model can be viewed within the Repository, as shown in
Figure 6.5. The selection process must also support the different granularity levels of model
composition in this project’s framework.
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Figure 6.1 Database structure

Figure 6.2 GUI home screen
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Figure 6.3 Editing PNPSC model screen

Figure 6.4 Generated model information for graphical design
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Figure 6.5 PNPSC graphical design display

6.4 Coarse-grain Selection
In a coarse-grain composition, the combination of full models creates a new model.
The selection process matches the target system characteristics, and its weaknesses to the
CAPEC attack pattern descriptions.
For example, in practice, a user would select to search the Repository based on the
CIA Impact, consisting of “confidentiality, access control, authorization, and integrity.”
This will return a list of 158 attack patterns with completeness scores of 15 or higher
identifying the attack pattern descriptions as modelable. When selecting the
“Graph/Relationship” for Leveraging Race Conditions, the relationships to “Leveraging
Race Conditions via Symbolic Links” and “Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use
Race Conditions” are shown. Figure 6.6 illustrates the results in the GUI.
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Figure 6.6 Selection of related attack patterns

Selecting the Graph/Relationship for CAPEC-27or CAPEC-29 will lead back to
pattern CAPEC-26. CAPEC-26 is a parent of both CAPEC-27 and CAPEC-29. Figure 6.7
shows the completion report for attack patterns CAPEC-26, CAPEC-27, and CAPEC-29.
By reviewing the Completion Report, one can see that only descriptions are provided for
CAPEC-26 and CAPEC-29. For CAPEC-27, an x is found in every column which signifies
a fully complete pattern.

ID

Name
26 Leveraging Race Conditions
27 Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links
29 Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions

AbstractionStatus
Meta Stable
Detailed Draft
Detailed Draft

PrerequisiteExplore ExperimentExploit Goals
x
d
d
d
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
d
d
d
x

Score
17
20
17

Figure 6.7 CAPEC report completion scores

All three attack patterns are identified as at least minimally complete (score of 15)
and can be selected as coarse-grain components to be composed into a broader attack
pattern instead of single individual patterns.
The metadata used to identify patterns allows the selection process to become a
simple list search for matching CAPEC patterns, and its search complexity is order n,
where n is the size of the Repository. The algorithm CGS (Coarse-Grain Selection) shows
the necessary steps to execute this selection approach.
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Algorithm CGS:
T: Model to be composed
R: Component repository
S = {Sub-model ID’s used in CAPEC report of T}
C=Ø
For all models M in R
{
If MID ∈ S && completion_score > user_threshold, extract model M
C=C∪M
}
Compose the models in C using coarse-grain composition[Mayfield, 2019b].
6.5 Fine-grain Selection
The selection process needs a more specific algorithm in a fine-grain level
composition, and a greedy solution is used (heuristics). The attacker identified the target
system, and the attacker’s goals are established based on the system’s weaknesses. The
selection process starts by selecting all the Goals phase components that match the target
system vulnerabilities. The complexity of this step will be order n. After these components
have been identified, their input places are matched against Exploit phase components’
output places (there must be a match to have interaction and, therefore, composition).
The complexity of this selection is also of order O(n) for each goal element
previously selected (resulting in an O(n2) complexity). The heuristics identify Experiment
phase components whose output matches the selected Exploit phase components. A
complexity order O(n) is assigned to each selected component. Next, the heuristics will
select Explore phase components matching the Experiment phase components. However,
an attacker may have enough knowledge to not have to explore a system. In that case, the
input places for the Experiment phase must match pre-requisite/knowledge that the attacker
must have to perform the experiments. If the attacker cannot skip the Explore phase, the
last step is to find the input places for the Explore phase, which must match pre-
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requisites/knowledge that the attacker must have to accomplish those techniques. In the
best case, the attacker can skip the Explore phase, equating to a two-level nested loop at
each selection phase. This results in a complexity of O(n2). Figure 6.8 displays the bottomup approach graphically while the algorithm FGS (Fine-Grain Selection) shows the
necessary steps to execute this selection approach.

Figure 6.8 Fine-grain composition bottom-up approach

Algorithm FGS:
T: model to be composed
R: component repository
Tg: Attacker’s goal
G = Ø, E= Ø, Exp = Ø, Expl= Ø;
For all Goal phase components X in R
If Xexitplaces == Tg then G = G ∪ X
For all Exploit phase components Y in R
For all X in G
If Yexitplaces = Xentryplaces then E = E∪Y
For all Experiment phase components W in R
For all Y in E
If Wexitplaces == Yentryplaces then EXP = EXP ∪ W
For all Explore phase components Z in R
For all W in EXP
If Zexitplaces == Wentryplaces
then EXPL = EXPL ∪ Z
Compose the models in G, E, EXP, and EXPL using fine-grain composition (equivalent to
T = G ∪ E ∪ EXP ∪ EXPL).
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6.6 Summary
The Repository’s purpose is to search for specific cyberattack models based on
filtering capabilities provided to the user to narrow down the list of available models from
the 500+ CAPEC attack pattern descriptions. The Repository could be used by a modeler
or analyst to identify component models that can be used to compose a PNPSC model that
represents their target system. Then through the process of execution of the model, the
modeler or analyst may be able to identify vulnerabilities within their system where an
attacker may be able to breach it, and also ways that they are able to secure their system
from cyberattacks.
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CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDY: COARSE-GRAIN COMPOSITION

As defined in Chapter 5, a coarse-grain component is an entire PNPSC model of an
attack pattern, and a fine-grain component is a model component or subnet of a coarsegrain component that models a technique within a phase of an attack pattern. This chapter
documents a case study of coarse-grain composition, i.e., of composing coarse-grain
components. The case study consists of two scenarios. The first scenario composes three
different attack patterns that include a parent-child relationship. The second scenario
composes two different attack patterns that an attacker may attempt in sequential order.
This case study will show how the composition operations defined in Chapter 5 work to
compose coarse-grain components.
7.1 PNPSC Model Naming Conventions
A special naming convention was defined to identify the places and transitions of
the PNPSC nets. It also assists in constructing and verifying the PNPSC nets by uniquely
identifying the places and transitions. Additionally, the naming convention identified
which phases and technique groups the places and transitions belong to. It also identifies
marked places in the same phase, which is important for simulation purposes of the PNPSC
model. Table 7.1 shows the naming convention of the PNPSC nets.
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Table 7.1 PNPSC naming convention
Phase

Place

Transition

Group

Marking

q: Prerequisite

P0: 1st
place

T0: 1st
transition

_0: 1st technique
group

_t: Marked places allowed in the
same group

a: Explore

P1: 2nd
place

T1: 2nd
transition

_1: 2nd technique
group

_p: Marked places allowed in the
same phase

b:
Experiment

_n: Exclusive marked place in the
same phase

c: Exploit
d: Goals

7.2 Attack Patterns and Inheritance
Depending on their classification level (Meta, Standard, or Detailed), each attack
pattern may include a description of common technique(s) used to fulfill the attack. For
this case study, models of Meta level attack patterns are used. Models of other attack
patterns at more detailed levels (Standard or Detailed) could then be “plugged” into the
Meta level pattern model to form a more detailed composite model.
In the CAPEC database, many of the Meta level attack patterns are a parent pattern
to one or more child pattern(s), indicated in the Relationship section of the CAPEC attack
pattern description. One example is CAPEC-26, Leveraging Race Conditions, displayed in
Figure 7-1.
Nature
ParentOf
ParentOf

Type

ID Name
27 Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links
29 Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions

Figure 7.1 Relationship of CAPEC-26 Leveraging Race Conditions (version 3.1)

Object-oriented Programming has a similar view of this type of relationship,
described as inheritance. Inheritance was originally associated with simulation
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programming languages. Developed in the 1960s, Simula 67 introduced the concept of
inheritance [Nygaard, 1978]. As with real-life, children will have characteristics of their
parents and have some of their own that may not reflect the parent. This project uses the
same idea for the parent-child relationship in the CAPEC attack pattern descriptions. This
project uses two concepts of inheritance, (1) single inheritance or (2) multilevel
inheritance.
Single level inheritance is where subclasses (children) inherit the features of a
superclass (parent). Therefore, a class inherits the properties of another class. Multilevel
inheritance is where a subclass is inherited from another subclass [Nygaard, 1978]. While
single inheritance is very straightforward concerning a CAPEC documented parent-child
relationship, there are attack patterns where children of one attack are also a parent of
another attack resulting in the multilevel inheritance.
7.3 Scenario 1: Parent-Child design
This first scenario demonstrates the composition of PNPSC models of attack
patterns that have a parent-child relationship, where the concept of inheritance will be
implemented. It also includes a parallel composition based on the child(ren) model(s)
having the same technique(s) within the same phase(s).
This scenario involves a parent-child relationship, where the parent is a Meta level
attack pattern identified as CAPEC-26 Leveraging Race Conditions. It has two children,
CAPEC-27 Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links, which is at the Detailed level,
and CAPEC-29 Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use Race Conditions, which is
also at the Detailed level. The concept of inheritance, discussed in Chapter 5, is
implemented to conduct this composition.
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Figure 7.2 shows the PNPSC net and Table 7.2 describes the places and transitions
for the model of CAPEC-26. Similarly, Figure 7.3 and Table 7.3 show CAPEC-27 and
Figure 7.4 and Table 7.4 show CAPEC-29.
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Figure 7.2 CAPEC-26 PNPSC model
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Table 7.2 Nodes and transitions for CAPEC-26 attack pattern description
Nodes

Description

Pre-requisites

qP0

A resource is accessed/modified concurrently by multiple processes such that a race
condition exists.

qT0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

qP1

The adversary has the ability to modify the resource.

Explore phase

a_xP0_n

Explore phase of the attack occurring.

a_xT0_0

Attacker attempts - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xP1_0_t

Attack occurring - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xP2_0_t

Attack successful - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xT1_0

Attacker succeeds in - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xT2_0

Attacker fails in - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xT3_0

Defender detects - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.
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Table 7.2 Continued

Nodes

Description

a_xP3_0_t

Attack done - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xP4_0_t

Defender detected - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xT4_0

Attacker completes Explore phase via - The adversary explores to gauge what level of
access he has.

a_xP5_p

Explore phase done.

a_xT5

Attacker moves to Experiment phase.

Experiment phase

b_xP0_p

Experiment phase of the attack occurring.

b_xT0_0

Attacker attempts - The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary modifies the targeted resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the
next normal execution action.

b_xP1_0_t

Attack occurring - The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary modifies the targeted resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the
next normal execution action.

b_xT1_0

Attacker fails in - The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary modifies the targeted resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the
next normal execution action.

b_xT2_0

Defender detects - The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary modifies the targeted resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the
next normal execution action.

b_xP2_0_p

Attack flag - The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The adversary
modifies the targeted resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the next normal
execution action.
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Table 7.2 Continued

Nodes

Description

b_xP3_0_p

Defender detected - The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary modifies the targeted resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the
next normal execution action.

b_xT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary modifies the targeted resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the
next normal execution action.

b_xP4_0_t

Attack successful - The adversary gains access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary modifies the targeted resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the
next normal execution action.

b_xP5_p

Experiment phase done.

b_xT4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

b_xT6

Attacker fails in Experiment phase.

b_xP7_p

Experiment phase failed.

Exploit phase

c_xP0_p

c_xT0_0

c_xP1_0_t

c_xT1_0

Exploit phase of the attack occurring.
Attacker attempts - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple processes.
By using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before it is
consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by the adversary
to abuse the target host.
Attack occurring - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple processes.
By using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before it is
consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by the adversary
to abuse the target host.
Attacker fails in - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple processes.
By using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before it is
consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by the adversary
to abuse the target host.
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Table 7.2 Continued

Nodes

c_xT2_0

c_xP2_0_p

c_xP3_0_p

c_xT3_0

c_xP4_0_t

Description
Defender detects - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple processes.
By using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before it is
consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by the adversary
to abuse the target host.
Attack flag - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple processes. By
using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before it is
consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by the adversary
to abuse the target host.
Defender detected - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple processes.
By using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before it is
consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by the adversary
to abuse the target host.
Attacker succeeds in - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple
processes. By using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just
before it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by
the adversary to abuse the target host.
Attack successful - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by multiple processes.
By using one of the processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before it is
consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited by the adversary
to abuse the target host.

c_xP5_p

Exploit phase done.

c_xT4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

c_xT6

Attacker fails in Exploit phase.

c_xP7_p

Exploit phase failed.

Goals phase

dP0_p

Goal phase of the attack occurring.

dP1_0_p

Goal flag - Gain Privileges.
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Table 7.2 continued
Nodes

Description

dT0_0

Attacker attempts - Gain Privileges.

dP2_0_t

Attack occurring - Gain Privileges.

dT1_0

Attacker fails in - Gain Privileges.

dT2_0

Defender monitors - Gain Privileges.

dT3_0

Defender blocks (active) - Gain Privileges.

dT4_0

Defender blocks (passive) - Gain Privileges.

dT5_0

Attacker succeeds in - Gain Privileges.

dP3_0_t

Attack failed - Gain Privileges.

dP4_0_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Gain Privileges.

dP5_0_t

Attack blocked - Gain Privileges.

dP6_0_t

Attack successful - Gain Privileges.

dT6_0

Attacker tries again - Gain Privileges.
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Table 7.2 Continued

Nodes

Description

dT7_0

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Gain Privileges.

dP7_1_p

Goal flag - Modify Data.

dT8_1

Attacker attempts - Modify Data.

dP8_1_t

Attack occurring - Modify Data.

dT9_1

Attacker fails in - Modify Data.

dT10_1

Defender monitors - Modify Data.

dT11_1

Defender blocks (active) - Modify Data.

dT12_1

Defender blocks (passive) - Modify Data.

dT13_1

Attacker succeeds in - Modify Data.

dP9_1_t

Attack failed - Modify Data.

dP10_1_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Modify Data.

dP11_1_t

Attack blocked - Modify Data.
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Table 7.2 Continued

Nodes

Description

dP12_1_t

Attack successful - Modify Data.

dT14_1

Attacker tries again - Modify Data.

dT15_1

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Modify Data.

dT16

Attacker fails in Goals phase.

dP13_p

Goals phase failed.
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Figure 7.3 CAPEC-27 PNPSC model
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Table 7.3 Nodes and transitions for CAPEC-27 attack pattern description
Nodes

Description

Pre-requisites

qP0

The attacker is able to create Symlink links on the target host.

qT0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

qP1

Tainted data from the attacker is used and copied to temporary files.

qP2

The target host does insecure temporary file creation.

Explore phase

aP0_n

Explore phase of the attack occurring.

aT0_0

Attacker attempts - Research target platform to determine whether it supports symbolic
links.

aP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Research target platform to determine whether it supports symbolic
links.

aP2_0_t

Attack successful - Research target platform to determine whether it supports symbolic
links.

aT1_0

Attacker succeeds in - Research target platform to determine whether it supports
symbolic links.

aT2_0

Attacker fails in - Research target platform to determine whether it supports symbolic
links.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

aP3_0_t

Attack done - Research target platform to determine whether it supports symbolic links.

aP4_0_t

Defender detected - Research target platform to determine whether it supports symbolic
links.

aT4_0

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Research target platform to determine whether it
supports symbolic links.

aP5_p

Explore phase done.

aT5

Attacker moves to Experiment phase.

aT6_1

Attacker attempts - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the
given platform.

aP6_1_t

Attack occurring - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the
given platform.

aP7_1_t

Attack successful - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the
given platform.

aT7_1

Attacker succeeds in - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the
given platform.

aT8_1

Attacker fails in - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the
given platform.

aT9_1

Defender detects - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the
given platform.

aP8_1_t

Attack done - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the given
platform.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

aP9_1_t

Defender detected - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as expected on the
given platform.

aT10_1

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works as
expected on the given platform.

aT12_2

Attacker attempts - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application
behavior.

aP11_2_t

Attack occurring - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application
behavior.

aP12_2_t

Attack successful - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application
behavior.

aT13_2

Attacker succeeds in - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application
behavior.

aT14_2

Attacker fails in - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application
behavior.

aT15_2

Defender detects - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application
behavior.

aP13_2_t

Attack done - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application behavior.

aP14_2_t

Defender detected - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to monitor application
behavior.

aT16_2

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to
monitor application behavior.

aT18_3

Attacker attempts - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the
application’s filesystem I/O calls.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

aP16_3_t

Attack occurring - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the
application’s filesystem I/O calls.

aP17_3_t

Attack successful - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the
application’s filesystem I/O calls.

aT19_3

Attacker succeeds in - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the
application’s filesystem I/O calls.

aT20_3

Attacker fails in - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the application’s
filesystem I/O calls.

aT21_3

Defender detects - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the
application’s filesystem I/O calls.

aP18_3_t

Attack done - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the application’s
filesystem I/O calls.

aP19_3_t

Defender detected - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to monitor the
application’s filesystem I/O calls.

aT22_3

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to
monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

aT24_4

Attacker attempts - Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are created,
modified and deleted..

aP21_4_t

Attack occurring - Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are created,
modified and deleted.

aP22_4_t

Attack successful - Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are created,
modified and deleted.

aT25_4

Attacker succeeds in - Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are
created, modified and deleted.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

aT26_4

Attacker fails in - Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are created,
modified and deleted.

aT27_4

Defender detects - Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are created,
modified and deleted.

aP23_4_t

Attack done - Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are created,
modified and deleted.

aP24_4_t

Defender detected - Watch temporary directories to see when temporary files are created,
modified and deleted.

aT28_4

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Watch temporary directories to see when
temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

aT30_5

Attacker attempts - Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache,
etc..

aP26_5_t

Attack occurring - Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

aP27_5_t

Attack successful - Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache,
etc..

aT31_5

Attacker succeeds in - Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache,
etc..

aT32_5

Attacker fails in - Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

aT33_5

Defender detects - Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

aP28_5_t

Attack done - Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache, etc..
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

aP29_5_t

Defender detected - Analyze source code for open-source systems like Linux, Apache,
etc..

aT34_5

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Analyze source code for open-source systems
like Linux, Apache, etc..

Experiment phase

bP0_p

Experiment phase of the attack occurring.

bT0_0

Attacker attempts - Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g., “touch
temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

bP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g., “touch
temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

bT1_0

Attacker fails in - Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g., “touch
temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

bT2_0

Defender detects - Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g., “touch
temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

bP2_0_p

Attack flag - Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt”
in UNIX-like systems).

bP3_0_p

Defender detected - Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g., “touch
temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

bT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g., “touch
temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

bP4_0_t

Attack successful - Create a file that does not exist in the target directory (e.g., “touch
temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

132

Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

bP5_p

Experiment phase done.

bT4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

bT5_1

Attacker attempts - On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file
modification, if the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to
modify it.

bP6_1_t

Attack occurring - On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file
modification, if the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to
modify it.

bT6_1

Attacker fails in - On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file
modification, if the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to
modify it.

bT7_1

Defender detects - On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file
modification, if the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to
modify it.

bP7_1_p

Attack flag - On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file modification, if
the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

bP8_1_p

Defender detected - On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file
modification, if the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to
modify it.

bT8_1

Attacker succeeds in - On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file
modification, if the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to
modify it.

bP9_1_t

Attack successful - On platforms that differentiate between file creation and file
modification, if the target file that the application writes to already exists, attempt to
modify it.

bT9_2

Attacker attempts - Verify permissions on target directory.

bP10_2_t

Attack occurring - Verify permissions on target directory.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

bT10_2

Attacker fails in - Verify permissions on target directory.

bT11_2

Defender detects - Verify permissions on target directory.

bP11_2_p

Attack flag - Verify permissions on target directory.

bP12_2_p

Defender detected - Verify permissions on target directory.

bT12_2

Attacker succeeds in - Verify permissions on target directory.

bP13_2_t

Attack successful - Verify permissions on target directory.

bT13

Attacker fails in Experiment phase.

bP14_p

Experiment phase failed.

Exploit phase

cP0_p

Exploit phase of the attack occurring.

cT0_0

Attacker attempts - Create an infinite loop containing commands such as “rm -f
tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following
steps occur in the given order.

cP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Create an infinite loop containing commands such as “rm -f
tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following
steps occur in the given order.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

cT1_0

Attacker fails in - Create an infinite loop containing commands such as “rm -f
tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following
steps occur in the given order.

cT2_0

Defender detects - Create an infinite loop containing commands such as “rm -f
tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following
steps occur in the given order.

cP2_0_p

Attack flag - Create an infinite loop containing commands such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln
-s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following steps occur in the
given order.

cP3_0_p

Defender detected - Create an infinite loop containing commands such as “rm -f
tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following
steps occur in the given order.

cT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - Create an infinite loop containing commands such as “rm -f
tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following
steps occur in the given order.

cP4_0_t

Attack successful - Create an infinite loop containing commands such as “rm -f
tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following
steps occur in the given order.

cP5_p

Exploit phase done.

cT4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

cT5_1

Attacker attempts - Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file between
the time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.

cP6_1_t

Attack occurring - Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file between
the time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.

cT6_1

Attacker fails in - Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file between
the time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.

cT7_1

Defender detects - Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file between
the time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

cP7_1_p

Attack flag - Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file between the
time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.

cP8_1_p

Defender detected - Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file
between the time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.

cT8_1

Attacker succeeds in - Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file
between the time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.

cP9_1_t

Attack successful - Use other techniques with debugging tools to replace the file between
the time the application checks the file and the time the application opens it.

cT9

Attacker fails in Exploit phase.

cP10_p

Exploit phase failed.

Goals phase

dP0_p

Goal phase of the attack occurring.

dP1_0_p

Goal flag - Modify Data.

dT0_0

Attacker attempts - Modify Data.

dP2_0_t

Attack occurring - Modify Data.

dT1_0

Attacker fails in - Modify Data.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

dT2_0

Defender monitors - Modify Data.

dT3_0

Defender blocks (active) - Modify Data.

dT4_0

Defender blocks (passive) - Modify Data.

dT5_0

Attacker succeeds in - Modify Data.

dP3_0_t

Attack failed - Modify Data.

dP4_0_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Modify Data.

dP5_0_t

Attack blocked - Modify Data.

dP6_0_t

Attack successful - Modify Data.

dT6_0

Attacker tries again - Modify Data.

dT7_0

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Modify Data.

dP7_1_p

Goal flag - Gain Privileges.

dT8_1

Attacker attempts - Gain Privileges.

137

Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

dP8_1_t

Attack occurring - Gain Privileges.

dT9_1

Attacker fails in - Gain Privileges.

dT10_1

Defender monitors - Gain Privileges.

dT11_1

Defender blocks (active) - Gain Privileges.

dT12_1

Defender blocks (passive) - Gain Privileges.

dT13_1

Attacker succeeds in - Gain Privileges.

dP9_1_t

Attack failed - Gain Privileges.

dP10_1_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Gain Privileges.

dP11_1_t

Attack blocked - Gain Privileges.

dP12_1_t

Attack successful - Gain Privileges.

dT14_1

Attacker tries again - Gain Privileges.

dT15_1

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Gain Privileges.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

dP13_2_p

Goal flag - Resource Consumption.

dT16_2

Attacker attempts - Resource Consumption.

dP14_2_t

Attack occurring - Resource Consumption.

dT17_2

Attacker fails in - Resource Consumption.

dT18_2

Defender monitors - Resource Consumption.

dT19_2

Defender blocks (active) - Resource Consumption.

dT20_2

Defender blocks (passive) - Resource Consumption.

dT21_2

Attacker succeeds in - Resource Consumption.

dP15_2_t

Attack failed - Resource Consumption.

dP16_2_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Resource Consumption.

dP17_2_t

Attack blocked - Resource Consumption.

dP18_2_t

Attack successful - Resource Consumption.
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Table 7.3 continued
Nodes

Description

dT22_2

Attacker tries again - Resource Consumption.

dT23_2

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Resource Consumption.

dT24

Attacker fails in Goals phase.

dP19_p

Goals phase failed.

140

Figure 7.4 CAPEC-29 PNPSC model
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Table 7.4 Nodes and transitions for CAPEC-29 attack pattern description
Nodes

Description

Pre-requisites

qP0

A resource is access/modified concurrently by multiple processes.

qT0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

qP1

The adversary is able to modify resource.

qP2

A race condition exists while accessing a resource.

Explore phase

a_xP0_n

Explore phase of the attack occurring.

a_xT0_0

Attacker attempts - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xP1_0_t

Attack occurring - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xP2_0_t

Attack successful - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xT1_0

Attacker succeeds in - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xT2_0

Attacker fails in - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.
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Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

Description

a_xT3_0

Defender detects - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xP3_0_t

Attack done - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xP4_0_t

Defender detected - The adversary explores to gauge what level of access he has.

a_xT4_0

Attacker completes Explore phase via - The adversary explores to gauge what level of
access he has.

a_xP5_p

Explore phase done.

a_xT5

Attacker moves to Experiment phase.

Experiment phase

b_xP0_p

Experiment phase of the attack occurring.

b_xT0_0

Attacker attempts - The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.

b_xP1_0_t

Attack occurring - The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.

b_xT1_0

Attacker fails in - The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.

b_xT2_0

Defender detects - The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.
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Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

Description

b_xP2_0_p

Attack flag - The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.

b_xP3_0_p

Defender detected - The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.

b_xT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.

b_xP4_0_t

Attack successful - The adversary confirms access to a resource on the target host. The
adversary confirms ability to modify the targeted resource.

b_xP5_p

Experiment phase done.

b_xT4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

b_xT6

Attacker fails in Experiment phase.

b_xP7_p

Experiment phase failed.

Exploit phase

c_xP0_p

c_xT0_0

c_xP1_0_t

Exploit phase of the attack occurring.
Attacker attempts - The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by “running the
race”, meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period
of time, the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.
Attack occurring - The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by “running the
race”, meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period
of time, the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.
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Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

c_xT1_0

c_xT2_0

c_xP2_0_p

c_xP3_0_p

c_xT3_0

c_xP4_0_t

Description
Attacker fails in - The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by “running the
race”, meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period
of time, the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.
Defender detects - The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by “running the
race”, meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period
of time, the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.
Attack flag - The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by “running the race”,
meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the target program
accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time,
the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.
Defender detected - The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by “running the
race”, meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period
of time, the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.
Attacker succeeds in - The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by “running
the race”, meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period
of time, the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.
Attack successful - The adversary decides to leverage the race condition by “running the
race”, meaning that he would modify the resource between the first time the target
program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period
of time, the adversary can replace the resource and cause an escalation of privilege.

c_xP5_p

Exploit phase done.

c_xT4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

c_xT6

Attacker fails in Exploit phase.

c_xP7_p

Exploit phase failed.

Goals phase

dP0_p

Goal phase of the attack occurring.
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Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

Description

dP1_0_p

Goal flag - Modify Data.

dT0_0

Attacker attempts - Modify Data.

dP2_0_t

Attack occurring - Modify Data.

dT1_0

Attacker fails in - Modify Data.

dT2_0

Defender monitors - Modify Data.

dT3_0

Defender blocks (active) - Modify Data.

dT4_0

Defender blocks (passive) - Modify Data.

dT5_0

Attacker succeeds in - Modify Data.

dP3_0_t

Attack failed - Modify Data.

dP4_0_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Modify Data.

dP5_0_t

Attack blocked - Modify Data.

dP6_0_t

Attack successful - Modify Data.
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Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

Description

dT6_0

Attacker tries again - Modify Data.

dT7_0

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Modify Data.

dP7_1_p

Goal flag - Gain Privileges.

dT8_1

Attacker attempts - Gain Privileges.

dP8_1_t

Attack occurring - Gain Privileges.

dT9_1

Attacker fails in - Gain Privileges.

dT10_1

Defender monitors - Gain Privileges.

dT11_1

Defender blocks (active) - Gain Privileges.

dT12_1

Defender blocks (passive) - Gain Privileges.

dT13_1

Attacker succeeds in - Gain Privileges.

dP9_1_t

Attack failed - Gain Privileges.

dP10_1_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Gain Privileges.
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Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

Description

dP11_1_t

Attack blocked - Gain Privileges.

dP12_1_t

Attack successful - Gain Privileges.

dT14_1

Attacker tries again - Gain Privileges.

dT15_1

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Gain Privileges.

dP13_2_p

Goal flag - Alter Execution Logic.

dT16_2

Attacker attempts - Alter Execution Logic.

dP14_2_t

Attack occurring - Alter Execution Logic.

dT17_2

Attacker fails in - Alter Execution Logic.

dT18_2

Defender monitors - Alter Execution Logic.

dT19_2

Defender blocks (active) - Alter Execution Logic.

dT20_2

Defender blocks (passive) - Alter Execution Logic.

dT21_2

Attacker succeeds in - Alter Execution Logic.
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Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

Description

dP15_2_t

Attack failed - Alter Execution Logic.

dP16_2_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Alter Execution Logic.

dP17_2_t

Attack blocked - Alter Execution Logic.

dP18_2_t

Attack successful - Alter Execution Logic.

dT22_2

Attacker tries again - Alter Execution Logic.

dT23_2

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Alter Execution Logic.

dP19_3_p

Goal flag - Read Data.

dT24_3

Attacker attempts - Read Data.

dP20_3_t

Attack occurring - Read Data.

dT25_3

Attacker fails in - Read Data.

dT26_3

Defender monitors - Read Data.

dT27_3

Defender blocks (active) - Read Data.
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Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

Description

dT28_3

Defender blocks (passive) - Read Data.

dT29_3

Attacker succeeds in - Read Data.

dP21_3_t

Attack failed - Read Data.

dP22_3_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Read Data.

dP23_3_t

Attack blocked - Read Data.

dP24_3_t

Attack successful - Read Data.

dT30_3

Attacker tries again - Read Data.

dT31_3

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Read Data.

dP25_4_p

Goal flag - Resource Consumption.

dT32_4

Attacker attempts - Resource Consumption.

dP26_4_t

Attack occurring - Resource Consumption.

dT33_4

Attacker fails in - Resource Consumption.

150

Table 7.4 continued
Nodes

Description

dT34_4

Defender monitors - Resource Consumption.

dT35_4

Defender blocks (active) - Resource Consumption.

dT36_4

Defender blocks (passive) - Resource Consumption.

dT37_4

Attacker succeeds in - Resource Consumption.

dP27_4_t

Attack failed - Resource Consumption.

dP28_4_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Resource Consumption.

dP29_4_t

Attack blocked - Resource Consumption.

dP30_4_t

Attack successful - Resource Consumption.

dT38_4

Attacker tries again - Resource Consumption.

dT39_4

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Resource Consumption.

dT40

Attacker fails in Goals phase.

dP31_p

Goals phase failed.
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7.3.1

Parent and Child Composition

For simplification purposes, in Figures 7.5-7.9, the labels have been slightly
modified to indicate which of the three PNPSC models the places and transitions belonged
to as some of the places and transitions were combined. Table 7.5 displays the modified
convention.
Table 7.5 Modified naming convention for composed models
Phase

CAPEC Pattern

Place

Transition

Group

Marking

q:Prerequisite

26
Element appears in
CAPEC 26

P0: 1st
place

T0: 1st
transition

_0: 1st
technique
group

_t: Marked places allowed
in the same group

a: Explore

27
Element appears in
CAPEC 27

P1: 2nd
place

T1: 2nd
transition

_1: 2nd
technique
group

_p: Marked places allowed
in the same phase

b:
Experiment

29
Element appears in
CAPEC 29

c: Exploit

x2629
Element appears in
CAPEC 26 & 29

d: Goals

x262729
Element appears in
CAPEC 26, 27, & 29

_n: Exclusive marked
place in the same phase

By reviewing the descriptions of each place and transition, one can manually
determine if that place and transition are applicable for a parallel attack. If places and
transitions are part of a parallel attack, the composition will not have duplicate
technique(s). A manual review of the technique descriptions is necessary because the
CAPEC attack pattern descriptions are not consistent in their wording. Developing a
process to automatically resolve inconsistent wording in the CAPEC database is an area
for future research. In this example, Table 7.2 and Table 7.4 show that the Explore and
Experiment phases of CAPEC-26 and CAPEC-29 are the same, eliminating any
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duplication, and that the goals from CAPEC-26, CAPEC-27, and CAPEC-29
corresponding to modify data and gain privileges will become a single goal. In addition to
combining those places and transitions to avoid duplication, the same will be done for the
Experiment phase and multiple failure places, only having one identified place that all
techniques would lead to if failed.

It is only displayed once, along with the experiment

failure and the failure of the goal. There are some added features because the child attacks
run in parallel, and they contain their pre-requisites and those inherited by the parent. There
must be a “loopback” from when one attack begins going back to the other attacks so that
they can also occur simultaneously. Otherwise, the token representing the state of the attack
will only follow one path and will not represent an attack occurring, possibly,
simultaneously with others.
The composition of CAPEC-26, CAPEC-27, and CAPEC-29 based on their parentchild relationship is shown in Figures 7.5 through 7.9 and described in Table 7.6. Color is
used to identify the different techniques within the phases for easier identification in the
figures. The colored sections correspond directly to the colors shown in Table 7.6. Sections
colored in yellow have two purposes (1) easier identification in the figure and (2)
representation of combined places and transitions into one instead of duplicating in the
diagram. While the naming convention of all places and transitions was updated to
represent which CAPEC attack pattern description the places and transitions comes from,
a column on Table 7.6 specifies which CAPEC attack pattern description(s) the places and
transitions appears in. Table rows with a thicker double border around them represent the
single failure states for all CAPEC attack patterns.
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Figure 7.5 Pre-requisite of attacks with loop back for parallel processing
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Figure 7.6 Explore phase of parent & child composition
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Figure 7.7 Experiment phase of parent & child composition
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Figure 7.8 Exploit phase of parent & child composition
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Figure 7.9 Goals phase parents & child composition
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Table 7.6 Parent-child composition (CAPEC-26 Parent, CAPEC-27 & 29 Children)
Nodes

Description

CAPEC

Pre-requisites

q27P0

The attacker is able to create Symlink links on the target host.

27

q27T0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

27

q27P1

Tainted data from the attacker is used and copied to temporary
files.

27

q27P2

The target host does insecure temporary file creation.

27

q2629P0

A resource is accessed/modified concurrently by multiple
processes such that a race condition exists.

q26T0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

27

q26P1

The adversary has the ability to modify the resource.

26

q29T0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

29
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26 ∪ 29

Table 7.6 continued

Nodes

Description

CAPEC

q29P1

The adversary is able to modify resource.

29

q29P2

A race condition exists while accessing a resource.

29

Explore phase

a27P0_n

Explore phase of the attack occurring.

27

a27T0_0

Attacker attempts - Research target platform to determine
whether it supports symbolic links.

27

a27P1_0_t

Attack occurring - Research target platform to determine
whether it supports symbolic links.

27

a27P2_0_t

Attack successful - Research target platform to determine
whether it supports symbolic links.

27

a27T1_0

Attacker succeeds in - Research target platform to determine
whether it supports symbolic links.

27
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Table 7.6 continued

Nodes

Description

CAPEC

a27T2_0

Attacker fails in - Research target platform to determine
whether it supports symbolic links.

27

a27T3_0

Defender detects - Research target platform to determine
whether it supports symbolic links.

27

a27P3_0_t

Attack done - Research target platform to determine whether it
supports symbolic links.

27

a27P4_0_t

Defender detected - Research target platform to determine
whether it supports symbolic links.

27

a27T4_0

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Research target
platform to determine whether it supports symbolic links.

27

a27P5_p

Explore phase done.

27

a27T5

Attacker moves to Experiment phase.

27

a27T6_1

Attacker attempts - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it
works as expected on the given platform.

27
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Nodes

Description

CAPEC

a27P6_1_t

Attack occurring - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it
works as expected on the given platform.

27

a27P7_1_t

Attack successful - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it
works as expected on the given platform.

27

a27T7_1

Attacker succeeds in - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it
works as expected on the given platform.

27

a27T8_1

Attacker fails in - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it
works as expected on the given platform.

27

a27T9_1

Defender detects - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it
works as expected on the given platform.

27

a27P8_1_t

Attack done - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it works
as expected on the given platform.

27

a27P9_1_t

Defender detected - Create a symbolic link and ensure that it
works as expected on the given platform.

27

a27T10_1

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Create a symbolic link
and ensure that it works as expected on the given platform.

27
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Table 7.6 continued

Nodes

Description

CAPEC

a27T12_2

Attacker attempts - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to
monitor application behavior.

27

a27P11_2_t

Attack occurring - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to
monitor application behavior.

27

a27P12_2_t

Attack successful - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to
monitor application behavior.

27

a27T13_2

Attacker succeeds in - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace
to monitor application behavior.

27

a27T14_2

Attacker fails in - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to
monitor application behavior.

27

a27T15_2

Defender detects - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to
monitor application behavior.

27

a27P13_2_t

Attack done - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to
monitor application behavior.

27

a27P14_2_t

Defender detected - Use kernel tracing utility such as ktrace to
monitor application behavior.

27
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Table 7.6 continued

Nodes

Description

CAPEC

a27T16_2

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Use kernel tracing
utility such as ktrace to monitor application behavior.

27

a27T18_3

Attacker attempts - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor
to monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

27

a27P16_3_t

Attack occurring - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor
to monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

27

a27P17_3_t

Attack successful - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor
to monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

27

a27T19_3

Attacker succeeds in - Use debugging utility such as File
Monitor to monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

27

a27T20_3

Attacker fails in - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor
to monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

27

a27T21_3

Defender detects - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor
to monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

27

a27P18_3_t

Attack done - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor to
monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

27
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Nodes

Description

CAPEC

a27P19_3_t

Defender detected - Use debugging utility such as File Monitor
to monitor the application’s filesystem I/O calls.

27

a27T22_3

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Use debugging utility
such as File Monitor to monitor the application’s filesystem I/O
calls.

27

a27T24_4

Attacker attempts - Watch temporary directories to see when
temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

27

a27P21_4_t

Attack occurring - Watch temporary directories to see when
temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

27

a27P22_4_t

Attack successful - Watch temporary directories to see when
temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

27

a27T25_4

Attacker succeeds in - Watch temporary directories to see
when temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

27

a27T26_4

Attacker fails in - Watch temporary directories to see when
temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

27

a27T27_4

Defender detects - Watch temporary directories to see when
temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

27
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a27P23_4_t

Attack done - Watch temporary directories to see when
temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

27

a27P24_4_t

Defender detected - Watch temporary directories to see when
temporary files are created, modified and deleted.

27

a27T28_4

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Watch temporary
directories to see when temporary files are created, modified
and deleted.

27

a27T30_5

Attacker attempts - Analyze source code for open-source
systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

27

a27P26_5_t

Attack occurring - Analyze source code for open-source
systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

27

a27P27_5_t

Attack successful - Analyze source code for open-source
systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

27

a27T31_5

Attacker succeeds in - Analyze source code for open-source
systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

27

a27T32_5

Attacker fails in - Analyze source code for open-source
systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

27
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a27T33_5

Defender detects - Analyze source code for open-source
systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

27

a27P28_5_t

Attack done - Analyze source code for open-source systems
like Linux, Apache, etc..

27

a27P29_5_t

Defender detected - Analyze source code for open-source
systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

27

a27T34_5

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Analyze source code
for open-source systems like Linux, Apache, etc..

27

a_x2629P0_n

Explore phase of the attack occurring.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629T0_0

Attacker attempts - The adversary explores to gauge what level
of access he has.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629P1_0_t

Attack occurring - The adversary explores to gauge what level
of access he has.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629P2_0_t

Attack successful - The adversary explores to gauge what level
of access he has.

26 ∪ 29
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a_x2629T1_0

Attacker succeeds in - The adversary explores to gauge what
level of access he has.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629T2_0

Attacker fails in - The adversary explores to gauge what level
of access he has.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629T3_0

Defender detects - The adversary explores to gauge what level
of access he has.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629P3_0_t

Attack done - The adversary explores to gauge what level of
access he has.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629P4_0_t

Defender detected - The adversary explores to gauge what
level of access he has.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629T4_0

Attacker completes Explore phase via - The adversary explores
to gauge what level of access he has.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629P5_p

Explore phase done.

26 ∪ 29

a_x2629T5

Attacker moves to Experiment phase.

26 ∪ 29
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Experiment phase

b_x2629P0_p

Experiment phase of the attack occurring.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629T0_0

Attacker attempts - The adversary gains access to a resource on
the target host. The adversary modifies the targeted resource.
The resource’s value is used to determine the next normal
execution action.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629P1_0_t

Attack occurring - The adversary gains access to a resource on
the target host. The adversary modifies the targeted resource.
The resource’s value is used to determine the next normal
execution action.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629T1_0

Attacker fails in - The adversary gains access to a resource on
the target host. The adversary modifies the targeted resource.
The resource’s value is used to determine the next normal
execution action.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629T2_0

Defender detects - The adversary gains access to a resource on
the target host. The adversary modifies the targeted resource.
The resource’s value is used to determine the next normal
execution action.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629P2_0_p

Attack flag - The adversary gains access to a resource on the
target host. The adversary modifies the targeted resource. The
resource’s value is used to determine the next normal execution
action.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629P3_0_p

Defender detected - The adversary gains access to a resource
on the target host. The adversary modifies the targeted
resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the next
normal execution action.

26 ∪ 29
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b_x2629T3_0

Attacker succeeds in - The adversary gains access to a resource
on the target host. The adversary modifies the targeted
resource. The resource’s value is used to determine the next
normal execution action.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629P4_0_t

Attack successful - The adversary gains access to a resource on
the target host. The adversary modifies the targeted resource.
The resource’s value is used to determine the next normal
execution action.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629P5_p

Experiment phase done.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629T4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

26 ∪ 29

b_x2629T6

Attacker fails in Experiment phase .

26 ∪ 29

b_x262729P7_p

Experiment phase failed.

b27P0_p

Experiment phase of the attack occurring.

27

b27T0_0

Attacker attempts - Create a file that does not exist in the target
directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

27
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b27P1_0_t

Attack occurring - Create a file that does not exist in the target
directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

27

b27T1_0

Attacker fails in - Create a file that does not exist in the target
directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

27

b27T2_0

Defender detects - Create a file that does not exist in the target
directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

27

b27P2_0_p

Attack flag - Create a file that does not exist in the target
directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

27

b27P3_0_p

Defender detected - Create a file that does not exist in the
target directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

27

b27T3_0

Attacker succeeds in - Create a file that does not exist in the
target directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

27

b27P4_0_t

Attack successful - Create a file that does not exist in the target
directory (e.g., “touch temp.txt” in UNIX-like systems).

27

b27T5_1

Attacker attempts - On platforms that differentiate between file
creation and file modification, if the target file that the
application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

27
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b27P6_1_t

Attack occurring - On platforms that differentiate between file
creation and file modification, if the target file that the
application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

27

b27T6_1

Attacker fails in - On platforms that differentiate between file
creation and file modification, if the target file that the
application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

27

b27T7_1

Defender detects - On platforms that differentiate between file
creation and file modification, if the target file that the
application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

27

b27P7_1_p

Attack flag - On platforms that differentiate between file
creation and file modification, if the target file that the
application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

27

b27P8_1_p

Defender detected - On platforms that differentiate between
file creation and file modification, if the target file that the
application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

27

b27T8_1

Attacker succeeds in - On platforms that differentiate between
file creation and file modification, if the target file that the
application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

27

b27P9_1_t

Attack successful - On platforms that differentiate between file
creation and file modification, if the target file that the
application writes to already exists, attempt to modify it.

27

b27T9_2

Attacker attempts - Verify permissions on target directory.

27

b27P10_2_t

Attack occurring - Verify permissions on target directory.

27
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b27T10_2

Attacker fails in - Verify permissions on target directory.

27

b27T11_2

Defender detects - Verify permissions on target directory.

27

b27P11_2_p

Attack flag - Verify permissions on target directory.

27

b27P12_2_p

Defender detected - Verify permissions on target directory.

27

b27T12_2

Attacker succeeds in - Verify permissions on target directory.

27

b27P13_2_t

Attack successful - Verify permissions on target directory.

27

b27T13

Attacker fails in Experiment phase.

27

b27P5_p

Experiment phase done.

27
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27

Exploit phase

26 ∪ 29

c_x2629P0_p

Exploit phase of the attack occurring.

c_x26T0_0

Attacker attempts - The resource is modified/checked
concurrently by multiple processes. By using one of the
processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before
it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs
and is exploited by the adversary to abuse the target host.

26

c_x26P1_0_t

Attack occurring - The resource is modified/checked
concurrently by multiple processes. By using one of the
processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before
it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs
.and is exploited by the adversary to abuse the target host.

26

c_x26T1_0

Attacker fails in - The resource is modified/checked
concurrently by multiple processes. By using one of the
processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before
it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs
.and is exploited by the adversary to abuse the target host.

26

c_x26T2_0

Defender detects - The resource is modified/checked
concurrently by multiple processes. By using one of the
processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before
it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs
and is exploited by the adversary to abuse the target host.

26
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c_x26P2_0_p

Attack flag - The resource is modified/checked concurrently by
multiple processes. By using one of the processes, the
adversary is able to modify the value just before it is consumed
by a different process. A race condition occurs and is exploited
by the adversary to abuse the target host.

26

c_x26P3_0_p

Defender detected - The resource is modified/checked
concurrently by multiple processes. By using one of the
processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before
it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs
and is exploited by the adversary to abuse the target host.

26

c_x26T3_0

Attacker succeeds in - The resource is modified/checked
concurrently by multiple processes. By using one of the
processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before
it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs
and is exploited by the adversary to abuse the target host.

26

c_x26P4_0_t

Attack successful - The resource is modified/checked
concurrently by multiple processes. By using one of the
processes, the adversary is able to modify the value just before
it is consumed by a different process. A race condition occurs
and is exploited by the adversary to abuse the target host.

26

c_x26P5_p

Exploit phase done.

26

c_x26T4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

26

c_x2629T6

Attacker fails in Exploit phase.

c_x262729P7_p

Exploit phase failed.

26 ∪ 29

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29
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c27P0_p

Exploit phase of the attack occurring.

27

c27T0_0

Attacker attempts - Create an infinite loop containing
commands such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow
tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following steps
occur in the given order.

27

c27P1_0_t

Attack occurring - Create an infinite loop containing
commands such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow
tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following steps
occur in the given order.

c27T1_0

Attacker fails in - Create an infinite loop containing commands
such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”.
Wait for an instance where the following steps occur in the
given order.

27

c27T2_0

Defender detects - Create an infinite loop containing
commands such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow
tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following steps
occur in the given order.

27

c27P2_0_p

Attack flag - Create an infinite loop containing commands
such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow tempfile.dat”.
Wait for an instance where the following steps occur in the
given order.

27

c27P3_0_p

Defender detected - Create an infinite loop containing
commands such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow
tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following steps
occur in the given order.

27

c27T3_0

Attacker succeeds in - Create an infinite loop containing
commands such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow
tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following steps
occur in the given order.

27
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c27P4_0_t

Attack successful - Create an infinite loop containing
commands such as “rm -f tempfile.dat; ln -s /etc/shadow
tempfile.dat”. Wait for an instance where the following steps
occur in the given order.

27

c27P5_p

Exploit phase done.

27

c27T4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

27

c27T5_1

Attacker attempts - Use other techniques with debugging tools
to replace the file between the time the application checks the
file and the time the application opens it.

27

c27P6_1_t

Attack occurring - Use other techniques with debugging tools
to replace the file between the time the application checks the
file and the time the application opens it.

27

c27T6_1

Attacker fails in - Use other techniques with debugging tools to
replace the file between the time the application checks the file
and the time the application opens it.

27

c27T7_1

Defender detects - Use other techniques with debugging tools
to replace the file between the time the application checks the
file and the time the application opens it.

27

c27P7_1_p

Attack flag - Use other techniques with debugging tools to
replace the file between the time the application checks the file
and the time the application opens it.

27
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c27P8_1_p

Defender detected - Use other techniques with debugging tools
to replace the file between the time the application checks the
file and the time the application opens it.

27

c27T8_1

Attacker succeeds in - Use other techniques with debugging
tools to replace the file between the time the application checks
the file and the time the application opens it.

27

c27P9_1_t

Attack successful - Use other techniques with debugging tools
to replace the file between the time the application checks the
file and the time the application opens it.

27

c27T9

Attacker fails in Exploit phase.

27

c_x29T0_0

c_x29P1_0_t

c_x29T1_0

c_x29T2_0

Attacker attempts - The adversary decides to leverage the race
condition by “running the race”, meaning that he would modify
the resource between the first time the target program accesses
the file and the time the target program uses the file. During
that period of time, the adversary can replace the resource and
cause an escalation of privilege.
Attack occurring - The adversary decides to leverage the race
condition by “running the race”, meaning that he would modify
the resource between the first time the target program accesses
the file and the time the target program uses the file. During
that period of time, the adversary can replace the resource and
cause an escalation of privilege.
Attacker fails in - The adversary decides to leverage the race
condition by “running the race”, meaning that he would modify
the resource between the first time the target program accesses
the file and the time the target program uses the file. During
that period of time, the adversary can replace the resource and
cause an escalation of privilege.
Defender detects - The adversary decides to leverage the race
condition by “running the race”, meaning that he would modify
the resource between the first time the target program accesses
the file and the time the target program uses the file. During
that period of time, the adversary can replace the resource and
cause an escalation of privilege.
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c_x29P2_0_p

c_x29P3_0_p

c_x29T3_0

c_x29P4_0_t

Description
Attack flag - The adversary decides to leverage the race
condition by “running the race”, meaning that he would modify
the resource between the first time the target program accesses
the file and the time the target program uses the file. During
that period of time, the adversary can replace the resource and
cause an escalation of privilege.
Defender detected - The adversary decides to leverage the race
condition by “running the race”, meaning that he would modify
the resource between the first time the target program accesses
the file and the time the target program uses the file. During
that period of time, the adversary can replace the resource and
cause an escalation of privilege.
Attacker succeeds in - The adversary decides to leverage the
race condition by “running the race”, meaning that he would
modify the resource between the first time the target program
accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file.
During that period of time, the adversary can replace the
resource and cause an escalation of privilege.
Attack successful - The adversary decides to leverage the race
condition by “running the race”, meaning that he would modify
the resource between the first time the target program accesses
the file and the time the target program uses the file. During
that period of time, the adversary can replace the resource and
cause an escalation of privilege.

CAPEC

29

29

29

29

c_x29P5_p

Exploit phase done.

29

c_x29T4

Attacker moves to exploit/goal phase.

29

Goals phase

d27P0_p

Goal phase of the attack occurring.

179

27

Table 7.6 continued

Nodes

Description

CAPEC

d26P0_p

Goal phase of the attack occurring.

26

d29P0_p

Goal phase of the attack occurring.

29

d262729P1_0_p

Goal flag - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T0_0

Attacker attempts - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P2_0_t

Attack occurring - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T1_0

Attacker fails in - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T2_0

Defender monitors - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T3_0

Defender blocks (active) - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29
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d262729T4_0

Defender blocks (passive) - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T5_0

Attacker succeeds in - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P3_0_t

Attack failed - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P4_0_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P5_0_t

Attack blocked - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P6_0_t

Attack successful - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T6_0

Attacker tries again - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T7_0

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Modify Data.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29
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d262729P7_1_p

Goal flag - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T8_1

Attacker attempts - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P8_1_t

Attack occurring - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T9_1

Attacker fails in - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T10_1

Defender monitors - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T11_1

Defender blocks (active) - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T12_1

Defender blocks (passive) - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T13_1

Attacker succeeds in - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29
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d262729P9_1_t

Attack failed - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P10_1_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P11_1_t

Attack blocked - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P12_1_t

Attack successful - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T14_1

Attacker tries again - Gain Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729T15_1

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Gain
Privileges.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d262729P13_p

Goals phase failed.

26 ∪ 27 ∪ 29

d29P13_2_p

Goal flag - Alter Execution Logic.
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d29T16_2

Attacker attempts - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29P14_2_t

Attack occurring - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29T17_2

Attacker fails in - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29T18_2

Defender monitors - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29T19_2

Defender blocks (active) - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29T20_2

Defender blocks (passive) - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29T21_2

Attacker succeeds in - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29P15_2_t

Attack failed - Alter Execution Logic.

29
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d29P16_2_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29P17_2_t

Attack blocked - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29P18_2_t

Attack successful - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29T22_2

Attacker tries again - Alter Execution Logic.

29

d29T23_2

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Alter
Execution Logic.

29

d29P19_3_p

Goal flag - Read Data.

29

d29T24_3

Attacker attempts - Read Data.

29

d29P20_3_t

Attack occurring - Read Data.

29
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d29T25_3

Attacker fails in - Read Data.

29

d29T26_3

Defender monitors - Read Data.

29

d29T27_3

Defender blocks (active) - Read Data.

29

d29T28_3

Defender blocks (passive) - Read Data.

29

d29T29_3

Attacker succeeds in - Read Data.

29

d29P21_3_t

Attack failed - Read Data.

29

d29P22_3_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Read Data.

29

d29P23_3_t

Attack blocked - Read Data.

29
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d29P24_3_t

Attack successful - Read Data.

29

d29T30_3

Attacker tries again - Read Data.

29

d29T31_3

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Read Data.

29

d29P25_4_p

Goal flag - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29T32_4

Attacker attempts - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29P26_4_t

Attack occurring - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29T33_4

Attacker fails in - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29T34_4

Defender monitors - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29
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d29T35_4

Defender blocks (active) - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29T36_4

Defender blocks (passive) - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29T37_4

Attacker succeeds in - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29P27_4_t

Attack failed - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29P28_4_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29P29_4_t

Attack blocked - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29P30_4_t

Attack successful - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29

d29T38_4

Attacker tries again - Resource Consumption.

27 ∪ 29
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d29T39_4

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Resource
Consumption.

d29T40

Attacker fails in Goals phase.

29

d27T24

Attacker fails in Goals phase.

29

d26t16

Attacker fails in Goals phase.

29

27 ∪ 29

Figure 7.10 is the full representation of the composite model. While the figure is
illegible and not as organized as those shown before, it is the full design of the three PNPSC
models that were composed together. The figure is intended to illustrate how large and
complex PNPSC models can become when multiple component models, each representing
a single attack pattern, are composed to form composite models, representing a target’s
systems complete vulnerabilities.
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Figure 7.10 Composite PNSPC model
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7.3.2

Verification of Parent-Child Composition

Cantrell et al. introduced an automated PNPSC Verifier to verify the creation of
auto-generated PNPSC models against the PNPSC formalism [Cantrell, 2019]. The autogenerated models representing a single CAPEC attack pattern description were input to the
Verifier, which checked whether the auto-generated nets complied with the PNPSC model
formalism.
This composition example composed three auto-generated PNPSC models into a
simple composite PNPSC model representing a parent-child relation. The composite
model detailed in this scenario was input to the Verifier. The focus of the Verifier was on
the structure of the composition associated with: (1) initial markings, (2) places, (3)
transitions, and (4) arcs. The Verifier determine that the composite model complied with
the formalism of a PNPSC net (when focusing on the attributes that make up the model
structure).
7.3.3

Execution of Parent-Child Composition

After verifying that the composite model complied with the PNPSC formalism, it
was tested by executing it using the PNPSC Simulator. The PNPSC Simulator is a software
program developed as part of another project in the overall PNPSC research program. The
PNPSC Simulator reads PNPSC nets as input, executes them according to the execution
semantics for PNPSC nets defined in Chapter 3, and produces an output file reporting the
results of the execution. The latter report includes the number of executions of the net, the
places’ markings and transitions’ firing sequences during the executions, the associated
transitions’ firing costs, and other relevant details.
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Because the format of the file representing the manually-constructed composite
model was somewhat different from the format of the files for the auto-generated singlepattern component models, the simulator was modified to accept the composite model’s
file format. The input to the simulator consists of two files. One input file lists the places
in the model, and the initial marking and observing player(s) for each place. The other input
file lists the transitions in the model and the initial firing rate, the cost, the controlling
player, the input and output places, and any inhibiting places for each transition.
Once the composite model was input to the PNPSC Simulator, the Simulator was
able to execute it successfully. In 10,000 executions of the model, i.e., 10,000 simulated
attacks, the attacker was successful in 408 executions or approximately 4% of the attacks.
Because the individual transitions’ rates stochastically determine which transitions fire
during execution, the attacker success rates are ultimately determined by the transitions’
rates. The transition rates used in the execution testing were preliminary estimates, not
precise validated value, but even so they produced attacker success rates reasonably
consistent with real-world experiences. Transition rates set by a subject matter expert
would be expected to produce more accurate success rates.
7.4 Scenario 2: Independent Sequential Attacks
In the second scenario, two independent PNPSC components models were
sequentially composed into a composite model. A sequential attack based on an attacker’s
failure was proposed in [Mayfield, 2018b]. In that work, if an attacker fails an attack, there
is no need to have a sequential composition, because the attack may then just independently
attempt a different type of attack with similar goals. In contrast, this case study sequentially
composes two attack patterns that might reasonably be used by an attacker in sequence,
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one after the other. In particular, an attacker might start by gaining information with
CAPEC-170 Web Application Fingerprinting, and then immediately continue by
manipulating web input with CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File Systems Calls.
7.4.1

Sequential Attack Composition

The labels for the PNPSC models in this scenario follow the same naming
convention as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. This sequential composition is
different from the previous scenario because models of techniques are not combined if they
appear as part of the different attack patterns. In CAPEC-170, the following statement
describes Web Application Fingerprinting:
“An attacker sends a series of probes to a web application in order to elicit versiondependent and type-dependent behavior that assists in identifying the target. An attacker
could learn information such as software versions, error pages, and response headers,
variations in implementations of the HTTP protocol, directory structures, and other similar
information about the targeted service. An attacker can then use this information to
formulate a targeted attack plan. While web application fingerprinting is not intended to be
damaging (although certain activities, such as network scans, can sometimes cause
disruptions to vulnerable applications inadvertently), it may often pave the way for more
damaging attacks.”
The fact that this attack pattern “…may often pave the way for more damaging
attacks” is where we can apply the sequential composition. This attack pattern then allows
for an attacker to attempt CAPEC-76, Manipulating Web Input to File Systems Calls. This
attack pattern is described by the following statement:
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“An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software, which the target software
passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify,
areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.”
Figure 7.11 shows the PNPSC net and Table 7.7 describes the places and transitions
for the model of CAPEC-170. Similarly, Figure 7.12 and Table 7.8 show CAPEC-76.
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Figure 7.11 CAPEC-170 PNPSC model

195

Table 7.7 Nodes and transitions for CAPEC-170 attack pattern description
Nodes

Description
Pre-requisites

qP0

Any web application can be fingerprinted. However, some configuration choices can
limit the useful information an attacker may collect during a fingerprinting attack.

qT0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

aP0_n

Explore phase of the attack occurring.
Explore phase

aT0_0

Attacker attempts - Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to
web server and then receive server’s response.

aP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to
web server and then receive server’s response.

aP2_0_t

Attack successful - Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to
web server and then receive server’s response.

aT1_0

Attacker succeeds in - Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to
web server and then receive server’s response.

aT2_0

Attacker fails in - Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to
web server and then receive server’s response.

aT3_0

Defender detects - Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to
web server and then receive server’s response.

aP3_0_t

Attack done - Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to web
server and then receive server’s response.

aP4_0_t

Defender detected - Use automated tools or send web server specific commands to
web server and then receive server’s response.

aT4_0

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Use automated tools or send web server
specific commands to web server and then receive server’s response.

aP5_p

Explore phase done.

aT5

Attacker moves to Experiment phase.
Experiment phase

bP0_p

Experiment phase of the attack occurring.

bT0_0

Attacker attempts - Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers. The
ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.

bP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers. The
ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.
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Table 7.7 continued

Nodes

Description

bT1_0

Attacker fails in - Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers. The
ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.

bT2_0

Defender detects - Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers. The
ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.

bP2_0_p

Technique failed - Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers. The
ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.

bP3_0_p

Defender detected - Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers.
The ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.

bT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers.
The ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.

bP4_0_t

Attack successful - Observe the ordering of the several HTTP response headers. The
ordering of the header of each server may have unique identities.

bP5_p

Experiment phase done.

bT4

Attacker moves to Exploit/Goals phase.

bT5_1

Attacker attempts - Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server.

bP6_1_t

Attack occurring - Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server.

bT6_1

Attacker fails in - Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server.

bT7_1

Defender detects - Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server.

bP7_1_p

Technique failed - Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server.

bP8_1_p

Defender detected - Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server.

bT8_1

Attacker succeeds in - Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the
server.

bP9_1_t

Attack successful - Send bad requests or requests of nonexistent pages to the server.

bT9_2

Attacker attempts - Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type and
the version of the web server in use.

bP10_2_t

Attack occurring - Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type and
the version of the web server in use.

bT10_2

Attacker fails in - Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type and
the version of the web server in use.

bT11_2

Defender detects - Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type and
the version of the web server in use.
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Nodes

Description

bP11_2_p

Technique failed - Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type and
the version of the web server in use.

bP12_2_p

Defender detected - Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type
and the version of the web server in use.

bT12_2

Attacker succeeds in - Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type
and the version of the web server in use.

bP13_2_t

Attack successful - Attacker takes existing automated tools to recognize the type and
the version of the web server in use.

bT13_3

Attacker attempts - Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php
indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.

bP14_3_t

Attack occurring - Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php
indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.

bT14_3

Attacker fails in - Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php
indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.

bT15_3

Defender detects - Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php
indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.

bP15_3_p

Technique failed - Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php
indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.

bP16_3_p

Defender detected - Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php
indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.

bT16_3

Attacker succeeds in - Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php
indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.

bP17_3_t

Attack successful - Examine the file name extensions in URL, for example .php
indicates PHP script interfaced with Apache server.

bT17_4

Attacker attempts - Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak
information about software signatures.

bP18_4_t

Attack occurring - Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak
information about software signatures.

bT18_4

Attacker fails in - Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak information
about software signatures.

bT19_4

Defender detects - Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak
information about software signatures.

bP19_4_p

Technique failed - Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak
information about software signatures

bP20_4_p

Defender detected - Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak
information about software signatures.

bT20_4

Attacker succeeds in - Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak
information about software signatures.
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Nodes

Description

bP21_4_t

Attack successful - Examine the HTTP Response Headers. This may leak
information about software signatures.

bT21_5

Attacker attempts - Examine Cookies that may contain server’s software
information.

bP22_5_t

Attack occurring - Examine Cookies that may contain server’s software information.

bT22_5

Attacker fails in - Examine Cookies that may contain server’s software information.

bT23_5

Defender detects - Examine Cookies that may contain server’s software information.

bP23_5_p

Technique failed - Examine Cookies that may contain server’s software information.

bP24_5_p

Defender detected - Examine Cookies that may contain server’s software
information.

bT24_5

Attacker succeeds in - Examine Cookies that may contain server’s software
information.

bP25_5_t

Attack successful - Examine Cookies that may contain server’s software
information.

bT25_6

Attacker attempts - Check error pages.

bP26_6_t

Attack occurring - Check error pages.

bT26_6

Attacker fails in - Check error pages.

bT27_6

Defender detects - Check error pages.

bP27_6_p

Technique failed - Check error pages.

bP28_6_p

Defender detected - Check error pages.

bT28_6

Attacker succeeds in - Check error pages.

bP29_6_t

Attack successful - Check error pages.

bT29_7

Attacker attempts - Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check error
pages.

bP30_7_t

Attack occurring - Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check error
pages.

bT30_7

Attacker fails in - Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check error
pages.
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Nodes

Description

bT31_7

Defender detects - Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check error
pages.

bP31_7_p

Technique failed - Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check error
pages.

bP32_7_p

Defender detected - Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check error
pages.

bT32_7

Attacker succeeds in - Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check
error pages.

bP33_7_t

Attack successful - Use tools to send bogus SQL query to the server and check error
pages.

bT33

Attacker fails in Experiment phase.

bP34_p

Experiment phase failed.
Goals phase

dP0_p

Goals phase of the attack occurring.

dP1_0_p

Goal flag – Other.

dT0_0

Attacker attempts – Other.

dP2_0_t

Attack occurring – Other.

dT1_0

Attacker fails in – Other.

dT2_0

Defender monitors – Other.

dT3_0

Defender blocks (active) – Other.

dT4_0

Defender blocks (passive) – Other.

dT5_0

Attacker succeeds in – Other.

dP3_0_t

Attack failed – Other.

dP4_0_p

Defense knowledge of attack – Other.
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Description

dP5_0_t

Attack blocked – Other.

dP6_0_t

Attack successful – Other.

dT6_0

Attacker tries again – Other.

dT7_0

Defender monitors system due to failed attack – Other.

dT8

Attacker fails in Goals phase.

dP7_p

Goals phase failed.
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Figure 7.12 CAPEC-76 PNPSC model
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Table 7.8 Nodes and transitions for CAPEC-76 attack pattern description
Nodes

Description

Pre-requisites

qP0

Program must allow for user-controlled variables to be applied directly to the filesystem.

qT0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

Explore phase

aP0_n

Explore phase of the attack occurring.

aT0_0

Attacker attempts - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and
attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.

aP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt
to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.

aP2_0_t

Attack successful - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and
attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.

aT1_0

Attacker succeeds in - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and
attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.

aT2_0

Attacker fails in - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt
to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.

aT3_0

Defender detects - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt
to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.

aP3_0_t

Attack done - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and attempt to
identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.
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Nodes
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aP4_0_t

Defender detected - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is listening on, and
attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.

aT4_0

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Port mapping. Identify ports that the system is
listening on, and attempt to identify inputs and protocol types on those ports.

aP5_p

Explore phase done.

aT5

Attacker moves to Experiment phase.

aT6_1

Attacker attempts - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make
connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating
system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating system.

aP6_1_t

Attack occurring - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make
connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating
system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating system.

aP7_1_t

Attack successful - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make
connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating
system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating system.

aT7_1

Attacker succeeds in - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make
connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating
system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating system.

aT8_1

Attacker fails in - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make
connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating
system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating system.

aT9_1

Defender detects - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make
connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating
system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating system.

aP8_1_t

Attack done - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make
connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating
system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating system.
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aP9_1_t

Defender detected - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various software to make
connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses from the operating
system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating system.

aT10_1

Attacker completes Explore phase via - TCP/IP Fingerprinting. The attacker uses various
software to make connections or partial connections and observe idiosyncratic responses
from the operating system. Using those responses, he attempts to guess the actual operating
system.

aT12_2

Attacker attempts - Induce errors to find informative error messages.

aP11_2_t

Attack occurring - Induce errors to find informative error messages.

aP12_2_t

Attack successful - Induce errors to find informative error messages.

aT13_2

Attacker succeeds in - Induce errors to find informative error messages.

aT14_2

Attacker fails in - Induce errors to find informative error messages.

aT15_2

Defender detects - Induce errors to find informative error messages.

aP13_2_t

Attack done - Induce errors to find informative error messages.

aP14_2_t

Defender detected - Induce errors to find informative error messages.

aT16_2

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Induce errors to find informative error messages.
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Description

aT18_3

Attacker attempts - Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.

aP16_3_t

Attack occurring - Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.

aP17_3_t

Attack successful - Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.

aT19_3

Attacker succeeds in - Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.

aT20_3

Attacker fails in - Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.

aT21_3

Defender detects - Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.

aP18_3_t

Attack done - Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.

aP19_3_t

Defender detected - Spider web sites for all available links, entry points to the web site.

aT22_3

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Spider web sites for all available links, entry
points to the web site.

aT24_4

Attacker attempts - Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs.

aP21_4_t

Attack occurring - Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs.

206

Table 7.8 continued

Nodes

Description

aP22_4_t

Attack successful - Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs.

aT25_4

Attacker succeeds in - Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs.

aT26_4

Attacker fails in - Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs.

aT27_4

Defender detects - Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs.

aP23_4_t

Attack done - Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs.

aP24_4_t

Defender detected - Manually explore application and inventory all application inputs.

aT28_4

Attacker completes Explore phase via - Manually explore application and inventory all
application inputs.

Experiment phase

bP0_p

Experiment phase of the attack occurring.

bT0_0

Attacker attempts - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet
injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.).

bP1_0_t

Attack occurring - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet
injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.).
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bT1_0

Attacker fails in - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet
injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.).

bT2_0

Defender detects - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet
injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.).

bP2_0_p

Technique failed - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet
injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.).

bP3_0_p

Defender detected - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet
injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.).

bT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet
injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.).

bP4_0_t

Attack successful - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using network packet
injection tools (netcat, nemesis, etc.).

bP5_p

Experiment phase done.

bT4

Attacker moves to Exploit/Goals phase.

bT5_1

Attacker attempts - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test
frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests.

bP6_1_t

Attack occurring - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test
frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests.

bT6_1

Attacker fails in - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test frameworks
(proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests.
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bT7_1

Defender detects - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test
frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests.

bP7_1_p

Technique failed - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test
frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests.

bP8_1_p

Defender detected - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test
frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests.

bT8_1

Attacker succeeds in - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test
frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests.

bP9_1_t

Attack successful - Inject context-appropriate malicious file path using web test
frameworks (proxies, TamperData, custom programs, etc.) or simple HTTP requests.

bT9_2

Attacker attempts - Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax.

bP10_2_t

Attack occurring - Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax.

bT10_2

Attacker fails in - Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax.

bT11_2

Defender detects - Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax.

bP11_2_p

Technique failed - Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax.

bP12_2_p

Defender detected - Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax.
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bT12_2

Attacker succeeds in - Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax.

bP13_2_t

Attack successful - Inject context-appropriate malicious file system control syntax.

bT13

Attacker fails in Experiment phase.

bP14_p

Experiment phase failed.

Exploit phase

cP0_p

Exploit phase of the attack occurring.

cT0_0

Attacker attempts - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to access
the content of the targeted file.

cP1_0_t

Attack occurring - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to access
the content of the targeted file.

cT1_0

Attacker fails in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to access the
content of the targeted file.

cT2_0

Defender detects - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to access
the content of the targeted file.

cP2_0_p

Technique failed - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to access
the content of the targeted file.
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cP3_0_p

Defender detected - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to access
the content of the targeted file.

cT3_0

Attacker succeeds in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to
access the content of the targeted file.

cP4_0_t

Attack successful - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to access
the content of the targeted file.

cP5_p

Exploit phase done.

cT4

Attacker moves to Exploit/Goals phase.

cT5_1

Attacker attempts - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to access the content of the targeted file.

cP6_1_t

Attack occurring - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to access the content of the targeted file.

cT6_1

Attacker fails in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to access the content of the targeted file.

cT7_1

Defender detects - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to access the content of the targeted file.

cP7_1_p

Technique failed - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to access the content of the targeted file.

cP8_1_p

Defender detected - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to access the content of the targeted file.
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cT8_1

Attacker succeeds in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system
control syntax to access the content of the targeted file.

cP9_1_t

Attack successful - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to access the content of the targeted file.

cT9_2

Attacker attempts - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause
the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cP10_2_t

Attack occurring - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause the
application to create, delete a targeted file.

cT10_2

Attacker fails in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause the
application to create, delete a targeted file.

cT11_2

Defender detects - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause the
application to create, delete a targeted file.

cP11_2_p

Technique failed - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause the
application to create, delete a targeted file.

cP12_2_p

Defender detected - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause
the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cT12_2

Attacker succeeds in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause
the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cP13_2_t

Attack successful - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path to cause
the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cT13_3

Attacker attempts - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.
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cP14_3_t

Attack occurring - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cT14_3

Attacker fails in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cT15_3

Defender detects - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cP15_3_p

Technique failed - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cP16_3_p

Defender detected - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cT16_3

Attacker succeeds in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system
control syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cP17_3_t

Attack successful - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax to cause the application to create, delete a targeted file.

cT17_4

Attacker attempts - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order to
manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cP18_4_t

Attack occurring - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order to
manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cT18_4

Attacker fails in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order to
manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cT19_4

Defender detects - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order to
manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.
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Table 7.8 continued

Nodes

Description

cP19_4_p

Technique failed - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order to
manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cP20_4_p

Defender detected - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order to
manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cT20_4

Attacker succeeds in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order
to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cP21_4_t

Attack successful - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file path in order to
manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cT21_5

Attacker attempts - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax in order to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cP22_5_t

Attack occurring - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax in order to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cT22_5

Attacker fails in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax in order to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cT23_5

Defender detects - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax in order to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cP23_5_p

Technique failed - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax in order to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cP24_5_p

Defender detected - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax in order to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cT24_5

Attacker succeeds in - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system
control syntax in order to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.
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Table 7.8 continued

Nodes

Description

cP25_5_t

Attack successful - The attacker injects context-appropriate malicious file system control
syntax in order to manipulate the metadata of the targeted file.

cT25

Attacker fails in Exploit phase.

cP26_p

Exploit phase failed.

Goals phase

dP0_p

Goals phase of the attack occurring.

dP1_0_p

Goal flag - Gain Privileges.

dT0_0

Attacker attempts - Gain Privileges.

dP2_0_t

Attack occurring - Gain Privileges.

dT1_0

Attacker fails in - Gain Privileges.

dT2_0

Defender monitors - Gain Privileges.

dT3_0

Defender blocks (active) - Gain Privileges.
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Table 7.8 continued

Nodes

Description

dT4_0

Defender blocks (passive) - Gain Privileges.

dT5_0

Attacker succeeds in - Gain Privileges.

dP3_0_t

Attack failed - Gain Privileges.

dP4_0_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Gain Privileges.

dP5_0_t

Attack blocked - Gain Privileges.

dP6_0_t

Attack successful - Gain Privileges.

dT6_0

Attacker tries again - Gain Privileges.

dT7_0

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Gain Privileges.

dP7_1_p

Goal flag - Modify Data.

dT8_1

Attacker attempts - Modify Data.

dP8_1_t

Attack occurring - Modify Data.
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Table 7.8 continued

Nodes

Description

dT9_1

Attacker fails in - Modify Data.

dT10_1

Defender monitors - Modify Data.

dT11_1

Defender blocks (active) - Modify Data.

dT12_1

Defender blocks (passive) - Modify Data.

dT13_1

Attacker succeeds in - Modify Data.

dP9_1_t

Attack failed - Modify Data.

dP10_1_p

Defense knowledge of attack - Modify Data.

dP11_1_t

Attack blocked - Modify Data.

dP12_1_t

Attack successful - Modify Data.

dT14_1

Attacker tries again - Modify Data.

dT15_1

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - Modify Data.
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Table 7.8 continued

Nodes

Description

dT16

Attacker fails in Goals phase.

dP13_p

Goals phase failed.

A review of the place and transition descriptions reveals that there are no repeated
techniques in the two attack patterns’ models. Therefore, the composition is completed
based on the Goals phase of the first attack being successful. The success transition, such
as dP12_1_t, will generate a token which will mark the success place of the attack and
another that will mark an added place “Attacker chooses to attempt a sequential attack,”
this place will have to be marked along with the pre-requisite knowledge of the sequential
attack for the sequential attack to take place. The added place is visible in the composed
PNPSC model in Figure 7.13. This scenario does not show a composition where the
PNPSC models do have a technique in common. In that type of composition, the transitions
representing success, fail, or block of a common technique would generate two tokens
instead of one. One token will go to the respective place within the first model, while the
second generated token would be added to the corresponding output place of the technique
found in the second model. For the attack to flow from one PNPSC model to the next, a
new arc is added from transition to the corresponding place of the proceeding PNPSC
model.
For the composition of these two PNPSC models, there are three arcs, and one place
added. For design purposes, the nodes and descriptions are the same for each model;
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however, they also contain the CAPEC number after the first character of the node label.
The place added to connect the two models is labeled “SeqComp” and displayed in an
indigo color in Figure 7.13. The added arcs are from transitions d76T5_0, attacker
succeeds to gain privileges, d76T13_1, attacker succeeds to modify data, and the third arc
is from “SeqComp” to q170T0, which is the transition of the second attack pattern where
the attacker proceeds to the Explore phase. With the only change occurring between the
Goals phase of the first attack and the pre-requisites of the second attack, Figure 7.14
allows a closer view of this section of the model.
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Figure 7.13 Composed sequential attack between CAPEC-170 & 76
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Figure 7.14 Focused sequential composition

7.4.2

Verification of Sequential Attack Composition

Cantrell et al. introduced an automated PNPSC Verifier to verify the creation of
auto-generated PNPSC models against the PNPSC formalism [Cantrell, 2019]. The auto221

generated models representing a single CAPEC attack pattern description were used as
input to the Verifier to check if the auto-generated nets complied with the PNPSC model
formalism.
This composition example used two auto-generated PNPSC models to make up a
single PNPSC model representing a sequential composition. The Verifier ran with the
manual composition as its input.
The focus of the Verifier was on the structure of the composition associated with:
(1) initial markings, (2) places, (3) transitions, and (4) arcs. The Verifier determine that
the composite model complied with the formalism of a PNPSC net (when focusing on the
attributes that make up the model structure).
7.4.3

Execution of Sequential Composition

After verifying that the composite model complied with the PNPSC formalism, it
was tested by executing it using the PNPSC Simulator. The same process as described in
section 7.3.3 was used.
Once the composite model was input to the PNPSC Simulator, the Simulator was
able to execute it successfully. In 10,000 executions of the model, i.e., 10,000 simulated
attacks, the attacker was successful with the first attack 869 executions and in the second
attack 312 executions or approximately a total of 12% of the attacks. Because the individual
transitions’ rates stochastically determine which transitions fire during execution, the
attacker success rates are ultimately determined by the transitions’ rates. The transition
rates used in the execution testing were preliminary estimates, not precise validated value,
but even so they produced attacker success rates reasonably consistent with real-world
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experiences. Transition rates set by a subject matter expert would be expected to produce
more accurate success rates.
7.5 Summary
This chapter has provided examples of coarse-grain composition. The first scenario
was a Parent-Child relationship where the models were composed based on the parallel
composition algorithm, where multiple models use the same technique. The second
scenario displayed the composition of a sequential attack. In each scenario, the composite
model was first verified for compliance with the PNPSC formalism. Then it was executed
to simulate an attack 10,000 times. Both composite models were successfully verified
against the formalism, and both models were executable. In the test executions of the
composite models, the attacker’s success rate was small. A small rate was expected and is
consistent with real-world outcomes. If attacks of the types modeled had high success rates,
then there would be many more successful real-world attacks taking place than there
actually are.
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CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY: FINE-GRAIN COMPOSITION

Chapter 7 described several compositions of coarse-grain component models of
complete attack patterns. In contrast, this chapter explains compositions of fine-grain
components. The definition and implementation of fine-grain components enables the
composition of models of attack patterns that are not documented in the CAPEC database.
Developing such a model using fine-grain components would require a modeler or analyst
to have expert knowledge of which individual techniques would be used to perform an
attack of the type or pattern to be modeled.
Building a model of a new attack pattern would be done bottom-up and involve
using the repository to find and select fine-grain component models of the relevant
techniques so that those models can be composed. The process would likely begin with the
modeler or analyst having the goal of the attack pattern in mind. Based on that goal and the
type of computer system that the attack pattern would target, the model selection process
would involve working backwards from the goal, selecting fine-grain component models
from the already documented and modeled attack patterns’ Exploit phases that would lead
to the attacker’s goal in the target system. Once techniques to use in the Exploit phase have
been identified and selected, the process would continue in the same manner, working
backwards from the Experiment phase, and then the Explore phase. Lastly, the pre-requisite
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knowledge that would be required to begin the attack patter in the Explore phase techniques
would be identified.
Three different example scenarios are covered in this chapter. The first two
scenarios will set the concepts of the fine-grain composition process. The first scenario is
based on the situation of an attacker walking through an attack, and the composite model
represents that walkthrough. The second scenario presents a process of composition
wherein the fine-grain components use the composition of an already documented attack
pattern model. In this scenario, the documented PNPSC attack model is used to verify the
fine-grain component composition. The third scenario steps through the bottom-up
“working backward” process used to compose a complete model of an attack pattern from
fine-grain components, starting from the ultimate goal of the attack.
8.1 Fine-grain Composition Skeleton Model
Chapter 5 established the foundation for creating a fine-grain component PNPSC
model. For each of the different phases, each technique found in the phase becomes a finegrain component. These components included multiple “plug-in” places, beginning and
end places of a phase, and the technique’s success, block, or failure places.
During the development of fine-grain components, analysis determined that the
success, block, and failure places for a technique within a phase could not serve as a “plugin” place. These places cannot be used as “plug-ins” because a modeler or analyst does
not know in advance how many techniques an attacker will attempt. Therefore, an abstract
skeleton model was designed as a connecting structure of places and transitions within
which fine-grain components could be inserted to be composed. (The idea of a skeleton
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model as it is used in this work is similar to the software framework concept from software
engineering and the model framework concepts described in [Petty, 2014] and [Petty,
2016]. That skeleton model is shown in Figure 8.1, where the octagon shapes are
placeholders, and Table 8.1 lists the corresponding places, transitions, placeholder nodes,
and descriptions. In Figure 8.1, the gray octagons show where the fine-grain components
are inserted into the skeleton model, with the preceding and succeeding places being the
“plug-ins.” Based on Figure 8.1, the Explore phase would expand the placeholder node aT,
where aP_B and aP_E are the “plug-in” places.
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Table 8.1 Nodes & Descriptions
Node
qP0
aP_B
aP_E
bP_B
bP_E
bP_F
cP_B
cP_E
cP_F
dP_B
dP_S
dP_D
dP_F
qT
aT0
bT0
cT0
aT
bT
cT
dT

Figure 8.1 Fine-grain component
skeleton model
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Description
pre-requisite requirements
Explore phase of the attack occurring
Explore phase complete
Experiment phase of the attack occurring
Experiment phase complete
Experiment phase failed
Exploit phase of the attack occurring
Exploit phase complete
Exploit phase failed
Goals phase of the attack occurring
Attack successful
Attack blocked
Attack failed
transition to begin attack
transition to move to Experiment phase
transition to move to Explore phase
transition to move to Exploit phase
expand for number of techniques required
expand for number of techniques required
expand for number of techniques required
expand for number of techniques required

Figure 8.2 Adding technique to fine-grain skeletal

Figure 8.2 shows how one technique will “plug-in” to the skeleton model with
places a_XP0_n and a_xP5_p corresponding to the plug-ins. If a second technique were
used, the places a_xP0_n and a_xP5_p would overlay on the previous “plugged-in” to
aP_B and aP_E. There are two different ways to adapt to the new situation where an attack
pattern does not have one of the phases shown in the skeleton model. The first is to change
the octagonal node into a regular transition that will automatically be enabled and fire to
the next phase, while the second option is to remove the nodes associated with that specific
phase from the skeleton model. This composition concept of “plugging-in” the techniques
into the skeleton model works in the same fashion for all phases of a PNPSC model. The
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implementation of three different fine-grain composition examples follows in the next three
sections.
8.2 Scenario 1: Building a PNPSC from the attacker’s walkthrough
In earlier work within the PNPSC research program, Christiansen documented the
process for performing a SQL Injection cyberattack on a section of a Metasploitable-hosted
web application known as Damn Vulnerable Web Application, or DVWA [Christiansen,
2017]. This scenario followed Christiansen’s process to create a PNPSC model through
fine-grain composition.
8.2.1

Walkthrough Composition

To initialize the design, the skeleton model with “plug-ins” is used as the starting
point of the composition. As part of his documentation, Christiansen does not mention the
pre-requisite knowledge that an attacker must have to start the SQL Injection attack.
Therefore, the pre-requisite portion of the skeleton model remains with only a single place
to represent all required knowledge necessary to perform the attack. Christiansen begins
by stating that “The first step of the SQL injection attack is to explore the website searching
for all available links or sniff network traffic to find where input data would be entered.”
Based on his statement, it is easy to identify that the attacker is exploring the system and
has two techniques he/she can attempt; (1) search for all available links, otherwise known
as spidering, or (2) sniff the network. The fine-grain component of these two techniques
is used to create the Explore phase.
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Figure 8.3 Explore phase build

Figure 8.3 shows the skeleton model with two fine-grain components, one for each
technique, inserted into it. The places and transitions numbered 1 - 8 document the places
and transitions for the technique, spidering, shown with an image. The places and
transitions numbered 9 - 16 along with the nose image are associated to sniffing. For each
technique, aP_B and aP_E are shown in the image as overlapping, serving as the places
that allow the fine-grain component to be “plugged-in” to the model. The grayed dashed
outline delimits the boundary of the placeholder node, in the skeleton model that was
replaced with the fine-grain components.

230

Once Christiansen describes the spidering and sniffing techniques, he mentions that
this leads to the “Experiment phase of the attack.” This action supports the arc that leads
to the place bP_B of the skeleton model. When describing the steps used to experiment in
performing a SQL Injection, a “logical OR” is written to cause the server to provide an
error message that confirms to the attacker that the server is running MySQL.

Figure 8.4 Experiment phase build
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Figure 8.4 shows the technique, SQL Injection, which is the only technique that
Christiansen described in his walkthrough, and therefore is the only technique mapped to
the Experiment phase of the skeleton model. The bP_B and bP_E places are the “plug-ins”
of the model in Figure 8.4. Included in the figure is only one fine-grain component. Once
the attacker receives the error message making him/her aware that MySQL is running,
Christiansen states that the attacker will then begin an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities of
the system.

Figure 8.5 Exploit phase build
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The techniques described to exploit vulnerabilities are using a public resource, such
as a cheat sheet or adding logic to the queries that are being injected. The technique
described is a single activity for exploitation purposes. Therefore, a single fine-grain
component technique for the Exploit phase is added to the skeleton model of the attack, as
shown in Figure 8.5.
In the Exploit phase of the skeleton model, the “plug-ins” are cP_B and cP_E. The
last phase of a PNPSC model is that of the attacker’s overall goals. While a SQL Injection
attack can lead to multiple goals, Christiansen only describes one goal: the attacker gaining
unauthorized system access by obtaining usernames and password hashes. Therefore, a
single Goal phase component is added to the skeleton model to complete the fine-grain
composed model, as displayed in Figure 8.6. Figure 8.7 shows the full PNPSC model. For
identification purposes, an image shown for the technique, which is the first place of the
technique, and numbers label the other places and transitions. In Table 8.2 each place and
transition label and their descriptions are provided for the full PNPSC model.
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Figure 8.6 Goals phase build
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Figure 8.7 Full PNPSC model
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Table 8.2 Nodes and descriptions of full PNPSC composed model
Node

Description

qP0

Pre-requisite knowledge required for attack.

qT0

Attacker moves to the Explore phase.

aP_B

Explore phase of the attack occurring.

1

Attacker attempts – spidering.
Attack occurring – spidering.

3

Attacker fails – spidering.

4

Attacker succeeds – spidering.

5

Defender detects – spidering.

6

Attacker failed – spidering.

7

Spidering attack done.

8

Defender detected – spidering.

9

Attacker completes Explore phase through spidering.

10

Attacker attempts – sniffing.
Attack occurring – sniffing.

12

Attacker fails – sniffing.

13

Attacker succeeds – sniffing.

14

Defender detects – sniffing.

15

Attacker failed – sniffing.
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Table 8.2 continued
Node

Description

16

Attacked succeeded – sniffing.

17

Defender detected – sniffing.

18

Attacker completes Explore phase through sniffing.

aP_E

Explore phase done.

aT0

Attacker moves to Experiment phase.

bP_B

Experiment phase of attack occurring.

bF
bP_F
19

Attacker fails techniques in Experiment phase technique(s).
Experiment phase failed – Attacker not able to perform techniques.
Attacker attempts – Injection with logical OR.
Attack occurring - Injection with logical OR.

21

Attacker fails – Injection with logical OR.

22

Defender detects – Injection with logical OR.

23

Attacker succeeds – Injection with logical OR.

24

Attacker failed – Injection with logical OR.

25

Defender detected – Injection with logical OR.

26

Attacker successful – Injection with logical OR.

bP_E

Experiment phase done.

bT0

Attacker moves to Explore phase.

cP_B

Exploit phase of attack occurring.
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Table 8.2 continued
Node
cF
cP_F
27

Description
Attacker fails to conduct Exploit phase technique(s).
Exploit phase failed – Attacker not able to perform techniques.
Attacker attempts - using a public resource, such as a cheat sheet, or to add logic to
the queries that are being injected.
Attack occurring - using a public resource, such as a cheat sheet, or to add logic to
the queries that are being injected.

29

Attacker fails - using a public resource, such as a cheat sheet, or to add logic to the
queries that are being injected.

30

Defender detects - using a public resource, such as a cheat sheet, or to add logic to
the queries that are being injected.

31

Defender detected - using a public resource, such as a cheat sheet, or to add logic to
the queries that are being injected.

32

Attacker failed - using a public resource, such as a cheat sheet, or to add logic to the
queries that are being injected.

33

Defender detected - using a public resource, such as a cheat sheet, or to add logic to
the queries that are being injected.

34

Attacker succeeds - using a public resource, such as a cheat sheet, or to add logic to
the queries that are being injected.

cP_E

Exploit phase done.

cT_0

Attacker moves to Goals phase.

dP_B

Goals phase occurring.

dF

Attacker fails Goals phase.

dP_F

Attacker failed Goals phase.

35

Attacker attempts - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.

36

Goal flag - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining usernames
and password hashes.
Attack occurring - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.

38

Attacker succeeds - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.
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Table 8.2 continued
Node

Description

39

Defender blocks (passive) - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by
obtaining usernames and password hashes.

40

Defender monitors - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.

41

Attacker fails in - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.

42

Attack failed - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.

43

Defender monitors system due to failed attack - the attacker gaining unauthorized
system access by obtaining usernames and password hashes.

44

Attacker tries again - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.

45

Defender knowledge of attack - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by
obtaining usernames and password hashes.

46

Defender blocks (active) - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by
obtaining usernames and password hashes.

dP_S

Attack successful - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.

dP_D

Attack blocked - the attacker gaining unauthorized system access by obtaining
usernames and password hashes.

8.2.2

Verification of Walkthrough Composition

Cantrell et al. introduced an automated PNPSC Verifier to verify the creation of
auto-generated PNPSC models against the PNPSC formalism [Cantrell, 2019]. The autogenerated models represent a single CAPEC attack pattern description used as input to the
Verifier to check if the auto-generated nets complied with the PNPSC model formalism.
In this composition scenario, fine-grain components were used to assemble a
PNPSC model not documented in the CAPEC database, where a modeler or analyst
documented the execution flow as the attack was taking place. This composition was
completed manually. The Verifier was used with a focus to verify the structure of the

239

composition associated with: (1) initial markings, (2) places, (3) transitions, and (4) arcs.
The Verifier determine that the composite model complied with the formalism of a PNPSC
net (when focusing on the attributes that make up the model structure).
8.2.3

Execution of Walkthrough Composition

After verifying that the composite model complied with the PNPSC formalism, it
was tested by executing it using the PNPSC Simulator. The same process as described in
section 7.3.3 was used.
Once the composite model was input to the PNPSC Simulator, the Simulator
was able to execute it successfully. In 10,000 executions of the model, i.e., 10,000
simulated attacks, the attacker was successful in 341 executions or approximately 3% of
the attacks. Because the individual transitions’ rates stochastically determine which
transitions fire during execution, the attacker success rates are ultimately determined by
the transitions’ rates. The transition rates used in the execution testing were
preliminary estimates, not precise validated value, but even so they produced
attacker success rates reasonably consistent with real-world experiences. Transition
rates set by a subject matter expert would be expected to produce more accurate
success rates.
8.3 Scenario 2: Rebuilding a documented PNPSC model
In the second scenario, fine-grain components were used to re-construct a PNPSC
model that already existed. The intent of this scenario is to show a development process
analogous to a child playing with Legos; the modeler will have all the necessary
components, and the instructions provide him/her with the steps to produce the complete
composite model.
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8.3.1

Rebuilding from pieces

In this scenario, the model that will be re-constructed is CAPEC-6, Argument
Injection. Figure 8.8 shows the auto-generated PNPSC model.

Figure 8.8 Auto-generated PNPSC model for CAPEC-6
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The CAPEC-6 PNPSC model has all four phases. The Explore phase consists of two
techniques:
1. Manually cover the application and record the possible places where arguments
could be passed into external systems
2. Use a spider for web applications to create a list of URLs and associated inputs.
The Experiment phase also consists of two techniques:
1. Use a very large list of probe strings to detect if there is a positive result and what
type of system has been targeted (if obscure).
2. Use a proxy tool to record results, error messages, and/or log if accessible.
The Exploit phase has one technique: manually inject a specific payload into the
targeted argument(s). The Goals phase consists of three different goals that the attacker
may attempt. The first is to gain privileges, the second is to modify data, and the third is to
read data. While not a phase within the PNPSC model, the attacker must have knowledge
(pre-requisites) of two areas. First that the target software fails to strip all user-supplied
input of any content that could cause the shell to perform unexpected actions, and second
that the software allows for invalidated or unfiltered input to execute on the operating
system shell, and, optionally, the system configuration allows for the client to receive
output back. These pre-requisites are documented in the CAPEC attack pattern description
and shown in Figure 8.8 and 8.9 as the places qP0 and qP1.
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Figure 8.9 Pre-requisite and transition representation

To begin the re-construction of the CAPEC-6 PNPSC model using fine-grain
components, the number of techniques used for each phase is considered. For the Explore
and Experiment phases, there will be two fine-grain components for each, the Exploit phase
will have one fine-grain component, and the Goals phase will have three. The prerequisites are one part of the PNPSC model that does not have a fine-grain component
associated with it. Therefore, before starting the re-construction of the model, two places
must be added into the model to represent the required pre-requisites. A transition follows
the pre-requisites that take the models’ flow into the initial place of the Explore phase finegrain component. Figure 8.9 shows the two pre-requisite places and the transition that will
flow into the Explore phase.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 8.10 (a) Manually cover application and record (b) use a spider technique

Figure 8.10 displays the two Explore phase techniques found in the CAPEC-6
attack pattern description. Those techniques are (1) Manually cover the application and
record the possible places where arguments could pass into external systems, and (2) Use
a spider, for web applications, to create a list of URLs and associate inputs. The beginning
place for the Explore phase, aP0_n, is shown in the individual fine-grain component for
each technique. When the composition of these two components is complete, the beginning
places and the end places become one. The end place is aP5_p which has an arc to the
transition that leads to the Experiment phase of the model.
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Figure 8.11 Explore phase fine-grain components composed together

Figure 8.11 displays the two fine-grain components composed to make the Explore
phase of the CAPEC-6 PNPSC model, along with the pre-requisite requirements that
precede the Explore phase. The transition aT5 leads into the Experiment phase, which
begins at place bP0_p. There are two techniques that the attacker may attempt, and those
are to use a proxy tool or to use a large list of probe strings. These two techniques are
displayed individually in Figure 8.12a and Figure 8.12b.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 8.12 (a) Proxy tool technique (b) large list of probe strings technique
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Figure 8.13 Composition of pre-requisite(s), Explore phase, and Experiment phase.
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Figure 8.13 displays the two fine-grain components composed to make the
Experiment phase of the CAPEC-6 PNPSC model, along with the previously composed
pre-requisite requirements and the Explore phase. A transition (bT9) and fail place
(bP10_p) are included in the composition because the attacker can fail during this phase.
The transition bT4 leads to the Exploit phase, which begins at place cP0_p. There is only
one technique for this phase which is to manually inject payload into arguments.

Figure 8.14 Manually inject payload into argument technique in Exploit phase.
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Figure 8.15 Composition through Exploit phase
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. Figure 8.14 displays this technique, and Figure 8.15 displays the model after the
composition with the previous phases. Like the Experiment phase, the attacker may fail
the Exploit phase, and therefore a transition to a fail place has also been added. The
transition cT4 leads to the Goals phase, which begins at place dP0_p. There are three goals
that the attacker may attempt, and those are (1) gain privileges, (2) modify data, or (3) read
data. Figure 8.16 displays the three individual goals. Figure 8.17 shows the full PNPSC
model composition based on reproducing an already existing PNPSC model, CAPEC-6.
Figure 8.17 also shows similarities to the Experiment and Exploit phases, because the
attacker may fail at all three goal attempts, a transition to a fail place has been added.

Figure 8.16 Gain privilege, modify data, and read data goals components
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Figure 8.17 CAPEC-6 Argument injections full PNPSC model
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8.3.2

Verification of Rebuilt Composition

In this composition scenario, fine-grain components were composed to build the
CAPEC-6 PNPSC model. Comparing the models in Figure 8.8 and Figure 8.17 reveals that
the two models are identical, even though one was manually composed from fine-grain
components and the other auto-generated from the CAPEC-6 database entry. The rebuilt
fine-grain composed model was input to the PNPSC Verifier, created by Cantrell et al., to
determine whether the model complied with the PNPSC model formalism [Cantrell, 2019].
The Verifier was used to check the structure of the composition associated with:
(1) initial markings, (2) places, (3) transitions, and (4) arcs. For the rebuilt PNPSC model,
the Verifier determined that the composition complies with the formalism of a PNPSC net
(when focusing on the attributes that make up the model structure), as was the original
auto-generated model.
8.4 Scenario 3: Bottom-up Composition approach
In this scenario, the idea is that a modeler or analyst is working to build a model of
a new attack pattern through a bottom-up approach. Developing a model through this
approach requires that the modeler or analyst have expert knowledge of which individual
techniques would be used to perform an attack of the type or pattern to be modeled. A
bottom-up approach to building an attack pattern would allow a modeler or analyst to use
the repository to find the techniques that can be used by having a goal in mind. Once the
goal is determined and the type of system that the attacker is trying to compromise or the
defender trying to secure is identified, one can work backward by seeking which techniques
from the already documented Exploit phases would lead to that specific goal for that
specific system. Once the modeler or analyst has identified techniques to use in the Exploit
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phase, he/she would need to find techniques used in the Experiment phase leading to those
Exploit phase techniques, and the process continues by finding techniques used in the
Explore phase that will lead to the Experiment phase. Lastly, he/she would find the prerequisite knowledge required to begin the Explore phase techniques.

Figure 8.18 Attack builder landing page

Figure 8.19 Weakness categories to choose from
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Using the repository described in Chapter 6, this can be done through the simple
usage of the provided graphical user interface. The repository has an option for “Attack
Builder” to begin the process. The first thing that the modeler or analyst does is select a
weakness. Figure 8.18 shows the landing screen for the Attack Builder, while Figure 8.19
shows the options that the user has to select from for the weaknesses. The weaknesses that
make up the selection options are based on the Common Weakness Enumerations (CWE)
from the OWASP Top 10 where the CWE’s match the CWE’s found in the CAPEC attack
pattern descriptions [OWASP, 2017] [MITRE, 2017].
For this particular scenario, because Injection is a type of weakness that many
people in the technology industry are familiar with, it is the selected basis for the attack.
The user starts by selecting a weakness, and the page will then adapt to allow the user to
select techniques associated with the different phases of a PNPSC model that have been
documented in the CAPEC database as possible techniques for that specific phase with that
specific weakness, as shown in Figure 8.20.

Figure 8.20 Data selection for each phase of PNPSC model
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This process allows the modeler or analyst to examine and select the different
techniques that he/she could use to model the attack that he/she is attempting to build. This
process could essentially end up in two different situations. One situation is that the
modeler or analyst may put a PNPSC model that has not been documented in the CAPEC
database. The second possible situation is that the modeler or analyst selects the techniques
that he/she is most familiar with and develops a narrowly focused attack pattern that does
not contain techniques from the different options documented in the CAPEC database.
Going through the process, the following is an example of selections made:
Weakness: Injection
Goal: Read Data
Exploit: Store sensitive information for later
Experiment: Network packet injection tool
Explore: Induce errors

Figure 8.21 Execution flow for CAPEC-88 – command injection
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Based on the previously mentioned selections, a direct SQL query executed on the
backend database showed that these selections correspond to CAPEC-88 Command
Injection. The CAPEC attack pattern description for CAPEC-88 states that one of the goals
for this attack is to Read Data, which corresponds to the goal selected. Figure 8.21 shows
the techniques associated with the different phases of the attack. As can be seen, while the
wording is not exact, each phase selected by the attacker through the repository is shown
as part of the execution flow.
A second example of the selections that can be made are:
Goals: Execute Unauthorized Commands
Exploit: Store sensitive info for later
Experiment: Command delimiters – web test framework
Explore: Induce Error
After conducting a direct query against the database, the goal stated matches the
following CAPEC attack pattern descriptions: 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24,
30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, and 46. For the Exploit phase, the CAPEC attack
pattern description returned is 88. For the Experiment phase, the CAPEC attack pattern
descriptions that match the given technique are 15 and 88. Lastly, the matching techniques
for the Explore phase are found in CAPEC attack pattern descriptions 15, 76, and 88.
CAPEC-15 matches the Goals, Experiment, and Explore phases but not the Exploit phase.
The other attack pattern to consider is CAPEC-88, which matches the Exploit, Experiment,
and Explore phases but does not match the Goals phase.

Therefore, through this

comparison of the attack patterns that match the given techniques, no single CAPEC attack
pattern corresponds to the selected techniques of the example. This demonstrates a
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combination of fine-grain components that can be composed into a model that is not
documented in the CAPEC database.
Once the techniques are selected, the same process described in Scenario 2 to build
the PNPSC model would also allow for the model to be composed in this scenario.
8.5 Summary
This chapter has provided three scenarios of fine-grain composition. The first
scenario used fine-grain components to compose a model according to a documented
cyberattack walkthrough. The second scenario described a build process to duplicate a
documented PNPSC model. The third scenario used a bottom-up approach to build a
model, where the model was built based on the goal to be achieved by the attacker.
In all three scenarios, the composite model was verified for compliance with the
PNPSC formalism. Furthermore, the first scenario’s composite model was executed to
simulate an attack 10,000 times using the PNPSC Simulator. In the test executions of the
composite model, the attacker’s success rate was small. A small rate was expected and is
consistent with real-world outcomes. If attacks of the types modeled had high success rates,
then there would be many more successful real-world attacks taking place than there
actually are.
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter briefly summarizes the preceding chapters and gives answers to the
research question stated in Chapter 1, and documents some possible future work. The
chapter concludes with some final thoughts regarding the work’s research contributions.
9.1 Summary of Chapters
Chapter 1 gives the motivations for the research, states the research questions, and
explains the structure of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 provides background information on Petri nets, the CAPEC database,
and related topics.
Chapter 3 explains how the standard Petri net formalism was extended to define
Petri Nets with Players, Strategies, and Costs (PNPSC), the cyberattack modeling
formalism used in this research program.
Chapter 4 reports the various validation activities used to assess and confirm the
validity of PNPSC models.
Chapter 5 introduces the basic concepts of using component models as building
blocks for PNPSC models and describes how those components can be composed into
larger composite models.
Chapter 6 describes a Repository tool, which provides a graphical user interface to
select component models for composition based on model metadata stored in a back-end
database.
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Chapter 7 presents a case study that explains and documents the composition
process with coarse-grain components for two different example scenarios.
Chapter 8 presents a case study that explains and documents the composition
process with fine-grain components for three different example scenarios.
9.2 Answers to the Research Questions
Four specific research questions were defined and approved to guide the direction
and ensure the novelty of this research.
Research question 1 asks, “What are the formal properties of a PNPSC net, and
how do they relate to composing PNPSC component models?”
The formal specification of the PNPSC modeling formalism was defined in Chapter
3. The elements of the formalism, and thus the formal properties that most directly affect
model composition, are the set of places P, the set of transitions T, and the set of arcs W
that connect the places and the transitions. A composite PNPSC model must comply with
the formal connection structure defined for those elements. As reported in Chapter 7 for
coarse-grain components (in two scenarios) and in Chapter 8 for fine-grain components (in
three scenarios), in all cases the composition methods developed in this work produced
composite models that were confirmed by the PNPSC Verifier to comply with the PNPSCP
formal specification.
Research question 2 asks, “Can the NP-complete component selection problem be
solved in an acceptable time when selecting PNPSC component models for composition?”
with sub-questions “What metadata should be associated with the component models to
facilitate composition? What heuristics that use the component metadata will efficiently
select components in most instances?”
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Page proved for a special case [Page, 1999] and Petty proved for the general case
[Petty, 2003b; Petty, 2006] that the component selection problem is NP-complete, and this
result certainly applies to the problem of selecting PNPSC component models from a
repository. However, in practical applications component selection may be possible in
acceptable time through the development and use of appropriate metadata and heuristic
selection processes [Taylor, 2005]. That has been done in this work.
The heuristic method implemented in this work and described in Chapter 6 can
access and search the component repository in O(n) time, where n is the number of
components stored in the repository. Although the number of possible components, based
on the size of the CAPEC database, is large by human standards, it is not large by the
standards of the modern computer performance. Of course, the user must participate in the
process by selecting components from among those found by the search.
The metadata considered for composition is associated with the description of the
techniques as stated in the CAPEC attack pattern descriptions. Unfortunately, the wording
used in the descriptions is not consistent; a manual review was conducted and a technique
number was assigned to the technique descriptions, the same number was assigned for
techniques that had similar descriptions but possibly not exact. The technique number is a
useful piece of metadata to be able to match attack pattern descriptions that have techniques
in common.

Other metadata considered was the phase that includes the technique

described. For fine-grain composition, another critical piece of metadata was knowing the
other techniques that led to the technique that the user is working with and what techniques
he/she is working with leads to.
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The user will be able to search for and select coarse-grain PNPSC models based on
model’s completeness scores, attributes of the attack patterns the models contain, and the
characteristics of the target computer system the user seeks to model.
Whether the user filters based on the attributes of the attack pattern or the attributes
of the target computer system, in both cases the attack patterns with a completeness score
of 15 or greater are listed separately from scores of 15 or less. This score lets the user know
which patterns are deemed “acceptable” for design and modeling and which are not.
Components may be selected based on the attributes of an attack pattern. Based on
the information found in CAPEC database version 3.1, there are different attributes or
sections of the CAPEC report that the attack patterns can be filtered. A drop-down menu
is available for the user to choose to filter:
•

Methods of Attack

•

Typical Severity

•

Typical Likelihood of Exploit

•

Attack Motivation – Consequences

•

CIA Impact

•

Abstraction

•

Techniques

If the user selects Typical Severity or Typical Likelihood of Exploit, he/she then has the
option to select between the levels of Low, Medium, High, and Very High.
•

If the user selects Methods of Attack, he/she then has the option to select between:

•

Collect and Analyze Information

•

Inject Unexpected Items
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•

Engage in Deceptive Interactions

•

Abuse Existing Functionality

•

Employ Probabilistic Techniques

•

Subvert Access Control

•

Manipulate Data Structures

•

Manipulate System Resources

If the user selects Attack Motivation - Consequences, he/she then has the option to select
between:
•

Alter Execution Logic

•

Bypass Protection Mechanism

•

Execute Unauthorized Commands

•

Gain Privileges

•

Hide Activities

•

Modify Data

•

Other

•

Read Data

•

Resource Consumption

•

Unreliable Execution

If the user selects CIA Impact, he/she then has the option to select between:
•

Access Control

•

Authorization

•

Confidentiality

•

Availability
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•

Integrity

•

Accountability

•

Authentication

•

Non-repudiation

•

Other

If the user selects Abstraction, he/she then has the option to select between:
•

Standard

•

Detailed

•

Meta

If the user selects Techniques, there are 93 options that the user can select.
Components may be selected based on the attributes of the target computer system.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 vulnerabilities make up the
options of the characteristics of the target computer system. If the user selects that he/she
uses a system that works with databases and is on a network, then the results of the patterns
that he/she will obtain are associated with the vulnerabilities specified by the OWASP top
10 results.
Based on the user’s selection, the back-end query will match the Common
Weakness Enumerations (CWE) from the OWASP top 10 with the CWEs that appear in
the CAPEC attack pattern to return the appropriate patterns. The user has the following
statements that he/she can select that will correspond to a CWE.
The user will first select that he/she wants to search the patterns by vulnerabilities.
This selection will return the appropriate attack patterns based on the set of questions that
the user has identified in association with their system. The questions asked are:
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•

Does your system run any databases?

•

Does your system require user credentials and/or session ID?

•

Does your system contain/store data of a sensitive nature?

•

Does your system accept information inserted into a webpage?

•

Does your system use applications that accept user input?

•

Does your system generate log and monitoring files?

•

Does your system run applications that parse XML input? Does your system
provide access control?

•

Does your system support web applications?
Research question 3 asks, “What is the appropriate level of granularity for defining

reusable and composable PNPSC component models?” with sub-questions “What are the
differences between the levels of granularity, and how do they impact the overall design of
a PNPSC cyberattack model? Would more than one level of granularity be applicable?”
This project identified two levels of component granularity, coarse-grain and finegrain. PNPSC models of attack pattern are coarse grain components. Multiple coarse-grain
components can be composed to produce complete models of the different possible attack
patterns for target computer systems. PNPSC models of the individual specific techniques
used in the different phases of the attack patterns are fine-grain components. Models of
attack patterns that have not been documented in the CAPEC database can be produced by
inserting fine-grain components into a generic skeleton model. Fine-grain components can
also be used to modify or extend existing coarse-grain models by adding techniques to, or
replacing techniques within, those models.
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The case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 showed that those two levels of model
granularity are both semantically suitable for reuse, because they correspond to
conceptually distinct portions of the attack patterns, and are syntactically effective for
composition, because composite models using them were verified as compliant with the
PNPSC formalism by the PNPSC Verifier and executable by the PNPSC Simulator.
Research question 4 asks, “How can PNPSC component models be composed into
complete PNPSC models of cyberattacks?” with sub-questions “What other places and
transitions must be added as external “interfaces” to enable PNPSC component models to
be composed beyond those in the individual components? Must the internal design of the
component model be modified to enable them to be used as components?”
Chapter 5 defined four operations of composition. These operations are (1)
sequential operation, (2) parallel operation, (3) a combination of sequential and parallel
operations, and (4) a bottom-up approach, otherwise known as a generalization operation.
With the first three operations, some additional transitions and arcs are placed in the design
of a PNPSC model. When a composition occurs sequentially, arcs from the end of the first
attack must lead to a transition that will have an arc to the beginning of the next attack.
This addition allows the PNPSC net to represent the state of an attack as it progresses from
one technique, phase, or attack pattern to the next. With the parallel operation, additional
arcs to create “loopbacks” are required. In this project, the places only contain up to one
token, so if a place leads to two different attacks and the token is consumed by a transition
of one attack and not the other, the attacker could still attempt the second parallel attack.
Therefore, the “loopback” is required to give the attacker that opportunity. If there
might have been multiple tokens found in a place, this may not be the case. However, for
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this project, it is required. Of course, with the combination of sequential and parallel
operations, the arcs and transitions are needed. With the bottom-up process, there are no
other places, transitions, and arcs needed. However, additional arcs and transitions are
required if a sequential or parallel composition occurs, even with a bottom-up process.
9.3 Future Work
While performing this research, several opportunities for future work were
identified.
•

Create a database catalog that will allow individual techniques within a phase of
the PNPSC model to be identified by a unique ID.

•

Revise the metadata in the component repository to provide greater consistency to
the information stored in the database for comparative metadata purposes.

•

Explore additional parts of a PNPSC model that can be identified as a component.
o Explore the results of applying the composition operations and approaches
to new components.

•

Explore the results of applying the composition operations and approaches from
different player views.

•

Explore additional composition operations.
o Define composition operation for iteration.

•

Experiment with the composition methods to determine how to use them to model
newly discovered vulnerabilities.

•

Survey subject matter experts to determine additional selection features to
incorporate into the Repository.

•

Develop metrics for composition quality.
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o Determine if coupling, cohesion, or information hiding metrics can be used.
•

Expand the Repository features to:
o Automate the collection from Dr. Whitaker’s PNPSC model generator and
import models into the Repository.
o Automate the composition process of models once selected and store data
into the database.
o Create an automatic workflow through composition to the validation of the
composition.
o Implement a feature to automatically generate the input files for the
composed models to run on the simulator.
▪

Automatically translating between the different PNPSC model file
formats (GraphViz, PIPE, CSV).

o Allow the user to run the machine learning algorithm on the composed
models to find optimized strategies for each player.
9.4 Research Contributions and Impact
This research has demonstrated how PNPSC models break down into components
and how those components can be selected and composed to model a cyberattack on a
target computer system. Creating the initial PNPSC models manually was time-consuming
and error-prone. Each PNPSC net developed manually took on average 6+ months with
multiple iterations required.

While constructing the models manually was time-

consuming, the effort identified a repeatable process to automate the construction of
PNPSC nets. In this project, once the PNPSC nets were auto-generated for the individual
CAPEC attack pattern descriptions, a database with a GUI was developed and referred to
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as the Repository to store the PNPSC nets. The Repository stores the CAPEC attack
pattern description and information on the PNPSC models to be stored and searched for
selection through a specified set of heuristics.

Through this process, analysis and

cybersecurity specialists to simulate attacks and use the simulation results to develop and
test better ways to either conduct or defend against both present and future types of
cyberattacks. By following the theories provided on composition, those models can then
be combined to allow for analysis and cybersecurity specialists to simulate and focus their
attention on figuring out the best way to secure their systems against a full range of possible
cyberattacks.
This project is a foundation to be built on, and even though this project is a
foundation, the CAPEC attack pattern descriptions are a foundation for it. For a more
systematic implementation of the projects within this research program, the CAPEC attack
pattern descriptions would need to be modified to include additional information that
would allow for this type of project to become a systematic process for researchers.
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APPENDIX A: VALIDATION EFFORT SUBJECT MATTER RESPONSE

Table A.1 Subject matter expert education level

What is your maximum education level?

Count of Response

High School

0

Some College

0

Associate’s Degree

0

Bachelor’s Degree

7

Beyond Bachelor’s Degree

7

Table A.2 Subject matter expert CAPEC familiarity

Are you familiar with the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classification (CAPEC)database?
Not at all familiar

Count of Response
4

Not so familiar

0

Somewhat familiar

6

Very familiar

4

Extremely familiar

0

Table A.3 Subject Matter Expert Petri Net Familiarity

Are you familiar with Petri Nets and their use?

Count of Response

Not at all familiar

4

Not so familiar

4

Somewhat familiar

5

Very familiar

1

Extremely familiar

0
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Table A.4 Subject Matter Expert Cybersecurity Involvement

Are you familiar with Petri Nets and their use?

Count of Response

Not at all

0

Not professional, part time hobby

1

Not professional, full time hobby

0

Professional, part time

0

Professional, full time

13

Table A.5 Subject Matter Expert Cybersecurity Activity Level

How often do you engage in cybersecurity activities?

Count of Response

Less than once a month

1

Once a month

0

A few times a month

0

About once a week

0

A few times a week

4

Every day

9
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Table A.6 CAPEC-63 Validation Results

Validation Instrument Statement?
You are familiar with CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
attack pattern.
The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of
view.
The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that
an attacker can perform.
The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions
that a defender can perform.
The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and
actions that can be performed.
Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an
attacker can do.
Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a
defender can do.
The Petri Net as a whole accurately represent things that occur
during the given cybersecurity attack.
The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified
cyberattack.
The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.
The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.
The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the
attacker/defender.
The costs described in the briefing accurately reflects the costs
for this net.
The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct
enough way to be useful for research.
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Result

P-Value

Reject H0

0.0005

Reject H0

0.0005

Reject H0

0.0005

Reject H0

0.0033

Reject H0

0.0033

Reject H0

0.0005

Reject H0

0.0033

Reject H0

0.0174

Reject H0

0.0033

Reject H0

0.0174

Reject H0

0.0033

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

Fail to reject H0

0.1829

Reject H0

0.0033

Table A.7 CAPEC-66 Validation Results

Validation Instrument Statement?
You are familiar with CAPEC 66 – SQL Injection attack
pattern.
The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of
view.
The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that
an attacker can perform.
The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions
that a defender can perform.
The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and
actions that can be performed.
Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an
attacker can do.
Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a
defender can do.
The Petri Net as a whole accurately represent things that occur
during the given cybersecurity attack.
The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified
cyberattack.
The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.
The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.
The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the
attacker/defender.
The costs described in the briefing accurately reflects the costs
for this net.
The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct
enough way to be useful for research.
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Result

P-Value

Reject H0

0.0003

Reject H0

0.0003

Reject H0

0.0003

Reject H0

0.0003

Reject H0

0.0019

Reject H0

0.0019

Reject H0

0.0019

Reject H0

0.0105

Reject H0

0.0105

Reject H0

0.0019

Reject H0

0.0416

Fail to reject H0

0.2819

Fail to reject H0

0.8759

Reject H0

0.0105

Table A.8 CAPEC-163 Validation results

Validation Instrument Statement?
You are familiar with CAPEC-163 Spear Phishing attack
pattern.
The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of
view.
The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that
an attacker can perform.
The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions
that a defender can perform.
The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and
actions that can be performed.
Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an
attacker can do.
Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a
defender can do.
The Petri Net as a whole accurately represent things that occur
during the given cybersecurity attack.
The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified
cyberattack.
The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.
The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.
The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the
attacker/defender.
The costs described in the briefing accurately reflects the costs
for this net.
The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct
enough way to be useful for research.
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Result

P-Value

Reject H0

0.0002

Reject H0

0.0002

Reject H0

0.0063

Reject H0

0.0011

Reject H0

0.0011

Reject H0

0.0261

Reject H0

0.0011

Reject H0

0.0261

Fail to reject H0

0.0828

Reject H0

0.0011

Reject H0

0.0261

Fail to reject H0

0.6092

Fail to reject H0

0.6092

Reject H0

0.0063

Table A.9 CAPEC-169 Validation results

Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC-169 Footprinting attack pattern.

Reject H0

0.0005

Reject H0

0.0174

Reject H0

0.0033

Reject H0

0.0005

Reject H0

0.0033

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

Fail to reject H0

0.1829

Fail to reject H0

0.3815

Reject H0

0.0174

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of
view.
The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that
an attacker can perform.
The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions
that a defender can perform.
The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and
actions that can be performed.
Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an
attacker can do.
Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a
defender can do.
The Petri Net as a whole accurately represent things that occur
during the given cybersecurity attack.
The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified
cyberattack.
The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.
The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.
The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the
attacker/defender.
The costs described in the briefing accurately reflects the costs
for this net.
The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct
enough way to be useful for research.

Table A.10 IRR analysis
CAPEC Entry

Mean

Median

Range

Mode

Standard
Error

Sample
Variance

Standard
Deviation

CAPEC-63 CrossSite Scripting

0.56

0.71

1.43

0.71

0.06

0.17

0.42

CAPEC-66 SQL
Injection

0.46

0.71

1.29

0.86

0.05

0.20

0.44

CAPEC-163 Spear
Phishing

0.47

0.71

1.29

0.86

0.05

0.19

0.43

CAPEC-169
Footprinting

0.29

0.29

1.57

0.14

0.04

0.13

0.36
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